The effect of cognitive load on the processing of hierarchical visual information by Hoar, Sarah
1 
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
 
The effect of cognitive load on the 
processing of hierarchical visual 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah Hoar 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
PhD in Psychology 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Certificate of Originality 
 
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, it contains no material that has been previously published or 
written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted 
for the award of any other degree or diploma at the university or any other institute of 
higher learning, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text. 
 
Date: 
 
Name: 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The visual world is organised hierarchically from global structure to local detail or from 
the ‘forest’ to the ‘trees’ (Navon, 1977; Palmer, 1975). The present thesis explores the 
effect of cognitive load on the processing of hierarchical visual information; specifically, 
we distinguish between the effects of cognitive load on i) whether observers are biased 
toward prioritising global structure or local detail; ii) the ability to select local and global 
information, as relevant to tasks or behavioural goals.   
 
The main contributions of this thesis are to show that cognitive load i) affects perceptual 
bias by making observers less global and more local or, in other words, less likely to see 
the ‘forest’ for the ‘trees’, and ii) makes it more difficult to selectively attend to the least 
salient level of hierarchical information. These effects of cognitive load are likely 
exerted through separate mechanisms. With respect to perceptual bias, we suggest that 
cognitive load alters relative hemispheric activation and with it the relative priority 
afforded to global structure and local detail. With respect to selection, we suggest that 
cognitive load impairs cognitive control and makes it harder to prevent the processing of 
irrelevant-yet-salient hierarchical information. 
 
Taken together, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that cognitive load exerts 
significant effects on hierarchical processing, whether through effects on global-local 
perceptual bias or attentional selection of hierarchical information. As the visual world is 
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structured hierarchically, whether it be the global scene as a whole or individual 
hierarchical structures such as words or faces, cognitive load – which can vary from 
person-to-person and within an individual circumstantially – could fundamentally affect 
how observers ‘see’ the visual world. 
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CHAPTER ONE – GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Perception results from a continuous interaction between top-down and bottom-up 
factors, so that our experience of the world can be affected by the behavioural relevance 
of visual stimuli as well as physical properties of the environment (e.g., Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Egeth & Yantis, 1997). The visual world is structured hierarchically, 
from the local details up to the global scene as a whole (Palmer, 1975) – or from the 
‘trees’ to the ‘forest’ – and ordinarily we can choose to focus on either the local detail or 
global structure, depending on task demands (Navon, 1977, 1981; Treisman, 2006). 
Cognitive resources must be available for this kind of goal-directed behaviour, so that 
task-relevant information can be held, prioritised and manipulated in working memory. 
However, our cognitive resources are often engaged in other tasks – resulting in 
cognitive load – and in these situations behavioural priorities become harder to maintain 
and vulnerability to distraction is increased (e.g. Baddeley, 1986; Caparos & Linnell, 
2010; de Fockert, Rees, Frith & Lavie, 2001; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert & Viding, 2004). 
Although the processing of hierarchical information is of fundamental importance to 
how we understand the world, little evidence exists to suggest what effect cognitive load 
might have on understanding of hierarchical visual information. This thesis seeks to 
provide a better understanding of this issue. Specifically, we distinguish between i) 
whether cognitive load affects the extent to which people are biased toward prioritising 
either global structure or local detail, and  ii) whether cognitive load affects the ability to 
select local and global information if the task demands it. As top-down and bottom-up 
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mechanisms interact, we also explore how the effects of cognitive load are modulated by 
the salience of local and global information.   
 
Hierarchical information is potentially ambiguous, as it can be understood in terms of 
either its local detail or its overall global structure. In general, some people prioritise 
global structure while others prioritise local detail; in other words, some people are more 
likely to see the forest while others are more likely to perceive the trees. We refer to this 
as perceptual bias. This describes how individuals weight local detail and global 
structure, and suggests the existence of a ‘default setting’ with which observers approach 
visual information (Dale & Arnell, 2013). However, expressing a bias towards one 
hierarchical level of representation over the other does not necessarily mean that the 
other is more difficult to process (Caparos, Linnell, Bremner, de Fockert & Davidoff, 
2013); as observers, we can choose to selectively attend to a single tree while ignoring 
the forest, or appreciate the forest as a whole while ignoring individual trees (Treisman, 
2006). We refer to this as selection. In this thesis we explore the effect of cognitive load 
on both perceptual bias and on selection and consider the ways in which the effects may 
be related. When we refer to processing of hierarchical information without 
distinguishing between bias and selection we use the term hierarchical processing.   
 
People in the Western world have been shown to prioritise global structure over local 
detail (e.g., Davidoff, Fonteneau & Fagot, 2008). They have also been shown to be 
better at selecting global structure than they are at selecting local detail (e.g., Navon, 
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1977; see Kimchi, 1992, for a review). Thus, all else being equal (Kimchi, 1992), 
Westerners are disposed to ‘see’ the forest over the trees. However, whether global 
structure or local detail is ultimately most “salient in the final percept” (p. 26; Kimchi, 
1992) is determined by an interaction between person-driven factors such as perceptual 
bias on the one hand and stimulus-driven factors such as goodness of form on the other. 
The outcome of this interaction denotes the relative strength of local and global 
information and in the present thesis we refer to this as local-global salience (Figure 1a 
depicts this schematically). For example, individual differences in local-global ‘default 
setting’ (e.g., Dale & Arnell, 2013) affect the extent to which individuals represent 
hierarchical information in terms of global structure and local detail; individuals whose 
setting is positioned towards the global end will be more likely to represent hierarchical 
information in terms of its global structure than individuals whose setting is positioned 
more towards the local end. Nevertheless, global salience will be stronger for stimuli 
with good form than those with bad form, regardless of default setting; if stimuli have 
particularly bad global form, then even individuals with a strong global bias will 
represent global structure as being less salient than local detail and will likely be worse 
at selecting global than local information. In the present thesis we explore the effect that 
cognitive load has on hierarchical processing but also consider the influence that 
stimulus-driven local-global salience has on whether local or global information is 
ultimately more salient.   
 
Recent evidence has shown that cognitive load improves performance in a global-
selection task and impairs performance in a local-selection task (Ahmed & de Fockert, 
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2012). It was concluded that cognitive load prompts a “shift towards global processing” 
(p. 1404); however, we note that this research i) fails to distinguish between perceptual 
bias and attentional selection; and ii) neglects the role that stimulus-driven factors play 
in modulating the effect of cognitive load. In the present thesis we extend the work of 
Ahmed and de Fockert. We first explore how cognitive load affects perceptual bias and 
consider the mechanism that may underlie this effect (Chapter 2). We show that 
cognitive load reduces global salience and enhances local salience. We then consider the 
effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information and explore the extent to 
which this effect is modulated by stimulus-driven factors which affect local-global 
salience. We suggest that cognitive load should make it more difficult to ignore 
irrelevant-yet-salient hierarchical information (Chapters 3-6; see Figure 1b for a 
schematic representation). We show that cognitive load does not always enhance global 
processing – as suggested by Ahmed and de Fockert – but can have the opposite effect 
and impair global selection when local salience is strong.  
 
We suggest that cognitive load will not simply make people more global or more local 
but that its effects will depend on both i) whether the paradigm addresses perceptual bias 
or attentional selection; and ii) stimulus-driven factors that modulate local-global 
salience. In the present chapter we provide a brief overview of research into hierarchical 
processing. We see that – all else being equal –global structure is more salient than the 
local detail out of which it is composed (Kimchi, 1992). We review evidence which 
suggests that global salience depends on both individual differences and physical 
stimulus factors. We then consider the effect that cognitive load might have on both 
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perceptual bias and attentional selection. Finally, we provide an overview of the 
paradigms that we will use to explore our question and briefly preview our key findings.   
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Figure 1a. The interaction between extent of global bias (0 = never prioritise global 
structure over local detail, 1 = always prioritise global structure over local detail) and 
goodness of form (0 = poor global form, 1 = perfect global form) determines the 
salience of global and local information. 1b. Global salience (0 = local most salient, 1 
= global most salient) determines efficiency of selection of both local and global 
information. High global salience will benefit selection of global information whereas 
low global salience (corresponding to high local salience) will benefit selection of local 
information.    
a. 
b. 
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1.1 Hierarchical information  
 
We begin with a brief overview of what is meant by hierarchical information. When we 
view the world we perceive an organised collection of objects arranged as a coherent 
scene. Physiologically, though, what the brain receives is a continuous stream of retinal 
activation which must then be parsed and segregated into discrete perceptual units (e.g., 
see Kimchi, 2009, for a review). How exactly perceptual organisation is achieved has 
been the subject of investigation for over a century, beginning with the Gestalt school of 
psychology. The Gestaltists (e.g., Wertheimer, 1923/1938) proposed a series of 
perceptual ‘laws’, such as the Law of Proximity, the Law of Similarity, The Law of 
Closure and the Law of Continuity (see Wagemans, Elder, Kubovy, Palmer, Peterson, 
Singh & von der Heydt, 2012; Wagemans, Feldman, Gepshtein, Kimchi, Pomerantz & 
van der Helm, 2012, for recent reviews of Gestalt grouping principles), to explain how 
stable percepts could emerge from apparent chaos. Their view was that the “whole is 
other than the sum of its parts” (Koffka, 1935/1955). 
 
This view has been explored extensively in the time since. Introspection provides 
compelling support for the Gestaltists’ argument that global form is qualitatively 
different than a summation of individual parts, as whole scenes are remarkably easy to 
understand despite the amount of information that they contain; for instance, Potter 
(1975, 1976) demonstrated that participants could correctly identify a target scene 
embedded in amongst a rapid-serial-visual-presentation (RSVP) stream of stimuli 80-
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90% of the time when the presentation duration of each stimulus was only 250 ms. The 
instant categorisation of scenes is referred to as scene ‘gist’ (e.g. see Oliva, 2005; Oliva 
& Torralba, 2006, for reviews) and illustrates that global structure – defined by the 
spatial arrangement of its constituent parts – is processed before local detail (e.g., Oliva 
& Schyns, 2000; Schyns & Oliva, 1994). Thus, global scene attributes seem to be 
dominant in early visual processing and seem to be of fundamental importance in how 
we understand the world.  
 
Although scenes are the most naturalistic form of hierarchical display the relationship 
between elements in a scene is difficult to control because individual element identities 
are typically heterogeneous and may indicate the identity of the global whole (Navon, 
2003). For example, an individual tree may prime the global construct of ‘forest’ as we 
know that trees are integral parts of forests. Global-local processing has therefore been 
most frequently investigated with hierarchical patterns (Kinchla, 1974; Navon, 1977; see 
Figure 2), stimuli where many local elements are arranged to form a global structure but 
local detail and global structure can be manipulated independently. For instance, the 
small ‘S’s in Figure 2a are arranged to form a large ‘S’ but in Figure 2b the small ‘S’s 
have been replaced with ‘H’s, while the spatial layout remains the same. Similarly, it 
would be possible to arrange small ‘S’s to form a large ‘H’ or small ‘H’s to form a large 
‘H’. Hierarchical patterns provide simple and easily-to-manipulate stimuli with which to 
investigate global-local processing of visual information.   
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The original, and most widely-cited, study with hierarchical patterns was conducted by 
Navon (1977) using a selective-attention paradigm. Navon’s goal was to test the 
assumption that the global form is rapidly accessible and must be elaborated on in order 
to perceive local details. Navon likened this idea to Aktualgenese – termed microgenesis 
in English texts (Flavell & Draguns, 1957; Werner, 1956) – which suggests that percepts 
progress through qualitatively different stages of development. In the selective-attention 
hierarchical-patterns paradigm, participants have to selectively attend to either the local 
detail or global structure of briefly-presented hierarchical patterns. Navon suggested that 
global information should be available earlier than local information, which should 
mean that i) responses are faster to global targets than to local ones; and ii) irrelevant 
global information interferes with selective attention to local detail, whereas irrelevant 
local information does not affect global-level responses. The latter should be evident in 
slowing on trials in which the local and global levels of a pattern are ‘incompatible’ with 
each other; responses to local detail (e.g., ‘H’) should be slowed if the identity of local 
elements is incompatible with the identity of the global structure (e.g., ‘S’ as opposed to 
‘H’, see Figure 2b) but responses to global structure should not be affected if its identity 
is incompatible with the identity of its local elements (e.g., if the local elements become 
‘S’; see Figure 2a). The data conformed to this pattern and were interpreted as evidence 
that global structure is more salient than local detail in the early stages of visual 
processing.  
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Figure 2. An example of two hierarchical patterns: a. Both the global and local levels 
are compatible with each other (‘S’); b. The global configuration (‘S’) is incompatible 
with the local elements (‘H’; note that the local element ‘H’ in this example is still a 
global configuration of two vertical lines and one horizontal line; however, it is lower in 
the hierarchy than the large ‘S’ which the ‘H’s comprise). 
 
 
In the present thesis we use the term global advantage to refer to circumstances in 
selective-attention hierarchical-patterns tasks where global information is responded to 
faster, and with less interference, than local detail. We align this with Kimchi’s (1992) 
use of the term in her review of the hierarchical-patterns literature. Similarly, when we 
discuss occasions where local detail is selected more efficiently than global structure we 
use the term local advantage. In situations where a global advantage is observed it is 
reasonable to assume that global information is more salient than local information, 
whereas a local advantage would suggest that local detail is more salient than global 
a
. 
b
. 
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structure. It can be suggested that decreased global salience is associated with increased 
local salience and the point at which local detail becomes more salient than global 
structure is determined by both person-driven factors such as perceptual bias and 
stimulus-driven factors such as goodness of form which together determine local-global 
salience. This conceptualisation of local-global salience is compatible with the idea that 
salience lies on a continuum; specifically, salience results from the relative weight given 
to hierarchical information by both person-driven and stimulus-driven factors. Whereas 
salience varies continuously on a single dimension, it is likely determined by 
interactions between several independent local-global processing mechanisms; the local-
global processing mechanisms that determine salience are not therefore situated on a 
single dimension. In other words, whereas salience is on a continuum, the processes 
which interact to determine salience are not. 
 
The majority of research into hierarchical processing has focused on stimulus-driven 
factors that can affect local-global salience. In a review of the hierarchical-patterns 
literature, Kimchi (1992) summarised a host of stimulus factors that could affect global 
salience and, in the time since then, many more have been identified. Global salience (as 
determined by the extent of global advantage) has been found to depend on: whether 
stimuli are presented foveally or peripherally (e.g., Grice, Canham & Boroughs, 1983; 
Kimchi, 1988; Lamb & Robertson, 1988; Pomerantz, 1983); the size of the stimulus (or 
visual angle; e.g., Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979; Lamb & Robertson, 1990; McLean, 
1978/1979; Navon & Norman, 1983); goodness of form (e.g., Hoffman, 1980; Sebrechts 
& Fragala, 1985); element density and number (e.g., Kimchi, 1988; Kimchi & Palmer, 
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1982; Martin, 1979; Navon, 1983); and exposure duration (e.g., Hughes, Layton, Baird 
& Lester, 1984; Kimchi, 1988; Luna, 1993; Miller, 1981; Paquet & Merikle, 1984; 
Paquet & Merikle, 1988; Pomerantz, 1983, Qiu, Fu and Luo, 2009; Wandmacher & 
Arend, 1985), amongst many other factors. Thus, any number of changes in the 
relationship between individual elements, the identity of the elements themselves, the 
position in the visual field or size, or the amount of processing time can impact on the 
salience of local and global information.  
 
In this thesis we consider stimulus-driven determinants of local-global salience when we 
explore the effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing. When considering the 
effect that cognitive load might have on perceptual bias, we acknowledge that – 
although cognitive load may affect the extent to which global structure is prioritised over 
local detail – whether local detail or global structure is ultimately most salient will also 
be influenced by stimulus-driven factors. When considering the effect of cognitive load 
on selection of hierarchical information, stimulus-driven factors which affect local-
global salience will also determine whether local or global information is most difficult 
to ignore. In the present thesis, our investigation specifically focuses on exposure 
duration and density of hierarchical patterns as stimulus-driven factors that can 
determine global salience.  
 
Global salience has been shown to increase as the number and relative density of the 
local elements that constitute global structure increases (e.g., Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; 
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see Figure 3). Kimchi (1998, 2000) has demonstrated that local elements are more likely 
to be perceived as individual entities when there are relatively few of them in a given 
configuration; as local elements within a pattern become more numerous and more 
dense, however, they become less categorisable as individual elements and more akin to 
a texture which defines global structure. Accordingly, this affects the salience of local 
and global information: “When the pattern is composed of a few relatively large 
elements, the elements are salient as figural parts of the overall form. When the number 
of elements increases and they become part of the texture, the global configuration is 
more salient than the individual elements” (p.525; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982). Thus, not 
all hierarchical patterns are equal in terms of global salience; Kimchi (1998, 2000) has 
demonstrated that high-density stimuli initially have strong global salience which decays 
with time whereas low-density stimuli initially have low global salience (and high local 
salience). Thus, not only is global salience determined by density, but density-driven 
global salience is affected by exposure duration. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An illustration of how pattern density can determine local and global salience. 
The pattern on the left is more likely to be represented in terms of its local elements 
while the pattern on the right is more likely to be defined by its global structure (Kimchi 
& Palmer, 1982).  
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Exposure duration is an important stimulus-driven factor to consider as a determinant of 
global salience, as the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977), 
which is often used to index local-global salience, is a speeded-response measure in 
which patterns are usually presented for a limited duration. In general, global salience of 
hierarchical patterns has been shown to be strong initially but weaken over time (e.g. 
Hibi, Takeda & Yagi, 2002; Ninose & Gyoba, 2003; Paquet & Merikle, 1984; Qui et al., 
2009; see). This suggests that strong global salience is a fleeting phenomenon in 
hierarchical patterns and is determined by the abrupt common-onset of the elements 
comprising a hierarchical pattern. This is important as the length of time that patterns are 
presented for varies between studies; some studies present patterns for just a few tens of 
milliseconds whereas others present stimuli until response (which can be in the region of 
600 ms). Thus, global salience may differ between paradigms simply because of 
variations in exposure duration.   
 
The fleeting nature of global salience was demonstrated by Paquet & Merikle (1984) 
when they ran a version of Navon’s (1977) selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task 
but varied the exposure-duration of the stimuli between 10, 40, and 100 ms. It was found 
that unidirectional global-to-local interference was observed when stimuli were 
presented for 10 ms but that at  longer exposure durations (40 and 100 ms) both global-
to-local and local-to-global interference was observed to the same extent. Qiu et al. 
(2009) replicated these findings in a divided-attention task in which participants had to 
indicate whether a target letter appeared at either the local or the global level of a 
hierarchical pattern. According to the logic of the paradigm, quicker responses to targets 
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at the global level indicate that the global level is more salient than the local level, 
whereas quicker responses to local targets suggest that the local level is more salient 
than the global level. Patterns were presented for either 80 ms or for an unlimited 
duration. There was a global advantage in the limited-exposure condition – indicating 
stronger global than local salience – but global- and local-level reaction times were 
identical at unlimited-exposure durations. These data suggest that global-level 
information is more salient than local detail for an initial but limited period of time and 
that at longer exposure durations local and global salience is more equally matched.  
 
The decay of global salience on a selection task has also been shown to have real-world 
consequences. There is a well-known effect amongst Chinese and Japanese readers that 
prolonged viewing of Chinese characters or Japanese kanji results in a loss of perceptual 
coherence and makes it more difficult to tell whether or not the characters are 
orthographically correct. This is referred to as orthographic satiation of Chinese 
characters (Cheng & Wu, 1994) or Gestaltzerfall for Japanese kanji (Ninose & Gyoba, 
1996, 2002, 2003) and describes the fact that characters are initially represented as 
global wholes with strong global salience before an uncertainty gradually emerges about 
orthographic correctness, indicating reduced global salience. These findings have been 
replicated using Navon-type hierarchical patterns (Ninose & Gyoba, 2003); evidently 
then, the decay in global salience over time can cause confusion about real-world 
stimuli.  
  
28 
 
 
 
 
In light of this evidence that exposure duration is important in affecting local-global 
salience, it is perhaps unsurprising that a global advantage was observed in Navon’s 
(1977) original selective-attention hierarchical-patterns study, as he used hierarchical 
patterns which were both high in density and were presented for a limited duration (40 
ms) and would thus be likely to possess strong global salience. In the present thesis we 
use exposure duration, in addition to pattern density, to manipulate global salience in 
hierarchical patterns when we explore the effect of cognitive load on both perceptual 
bias and on attentional selection.   
 
Although the majority of research has focused on stimulus-driven determinants of local-
global salience, recent research has also begun to explore the effect that the disposition 
of the perceiver can have on hierarchical processing. The present thesis adds to this line 
of research by exploring the effect that cognitive load – which occurs when excessive 
demand is placed on cognitive processes and can vary both within and between 
individuals – can have on hierarchical processing; specifically, we distinguish between 
the effect of cognitive load on local-global perceptual bias and its effects on attentional 
selection. However, much of the previous research into how perceiver-driven differences 
may affect hierarchical processing has tended to treat perceptual bias and attentional 
selection as reflecting the same underlying process. We now briefly discuss research on 
individual differences in hierarchical processing and illustrate how perceptual bias and 
selection are often conflated. It is important to state that we do not automatically equate 
differences in hierarchical processing with differences in cognitive load. However, 
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appealing to individual differences in hierarchical processing is a useful illustration of 
the effect that person-driven factors can have on hierarchical processing.  
 
Recently it has been demonstrated that an array of individual differences in many 
different – and varied – groups of people can affect hierarchical processing: people 
living in remote areas are more locally-biased than urban dwellers (Davidoff et al., 
2008); Buddhists show a stronger global advantage than atheists on a selection task 
(Colzato, Hommel, van der Wildenberg & Hsieh, 2010), who are in turn more global 
than Calvinists (Colzato, van den Wildenberg & Hommel, 2008); individuals with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) are more local than controls (Rankins, Bradshaw 
& Georgiou-Karistianis, 2005; Yovel, Revelle & Mineka, 2005); homosexuals are more 
local than heterosexuals (Colzato, Hooidonk, van der Wildenberg, Harinck & Hommel, 
2010); and East Asians show a stronger global advantage than Americans (Kitayama, 
Duffy, Kawamura & Larsen, 2003; McKone, Davies, Fernando, Aalders, Leung, 
Wickramariyaratne & Platow, 2010). Different experimentally-manipulated motivational 
and mood states have also been shown to affect hierarchical processing, such as 
approach motivation (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), happy and sad moods (Gasper & 
Clore, 2002), whether participants have been primed with either a local or global 
processing style (McCrae & Lewis, 2002) and whether they feel as though they have 
power over a situation (Guinote, 2007). Interestingly, whether participants have 
performed a cryptic crossword or Sudoku puzzle just prior to a hierarchical processing 
task has been shown to affect performance (Lewis, 2006). 
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A widespread assumption in the hierarchical-processing literature is that performance on 
local-global processing tasks relates to how individuals approach hierarchical 
information in the real world; it seems plausible that individual differences in local-
global processing exist because a particular hierarchical processing style is more useful 
to the perceiver’s behavioural goals. For instance, to explain why homosexuals have a 
less global processing style than heterosexuals, Colzato et al. (2010) suggest that 
homosexuals have a chronic attentional bias to local detail resulting from the need “to 
detect perceptual cues indicative of homosexual orientation, which … facilitates finding 
like-minded, social peers, and potential friends and sex mates” (p. 4). Similarly, the 
more global processing style of East Asians and more local style of Americans is said to 
reflect the interdependent and individualistic nature of these cultures respectively (e.g., 
Kitayama et al., 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). According to this view, the focus on 
collectivism in East Asian cultures promotes a focus on global context at the expense of 
local detail, whereas the focus on autonomy and independence in American culture leads 
to a more analytic processing style where objects are analysed in isolation from their 
context (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Nisbett, Peng, Choi & Norenzayan, 2001; Uskul, 
Kitayama & Nisbett, 2008).  
 
It seems reasonable to assume that individual differences in perceptual bias and 
attentional selection are the same: a tendency to prioritise global structure over local 
detail when approaching hierarchical information in the absence of task demands should 
also mean that global structure is easier to select than local detail (as long as the same 
stimuli are used in both of these measures, to minimise the influence of stimulus-driven 
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factors in determining local-global salience). We have already seen that this seems to be 
the case for Westerners, who show both a global bias on a measure of perceptual bias 
(Davidoff et al., 2008) and global advantage on a measure of attentional selection (e.g., 
Navon, 1977). However, there is reason to believe that perceptual bias and attentional 
selection may be governed by two separate mechanisms; thus, although perceptual bias 
and attentional selection may usually be aligned, cognitive load could potentially affect 
the operation of these mechanisms in different ways. Evidence that perceptual bias and 
selection are governed by separate mechanisms comes from Caparos et al. (2013) who 
showed that members of the Himba, a remote population in Namibia who show a 
markedly local bias (Caparos, Ahmed, Bremner, de Fockert, Linnell & Davidoff, 2012; 
Davidoff et al., 2008) were better at selecting both local and global hierarchical 
information in comparison to their Western counterparts (students at a London, UK, 
university) who show a global bias. Caparos et al. (2013) proposed that the Himba may 
“have superior attentional control than Westerners” (p. 211) and suggest that perceptual 
bias and attentional selection should be distinguished from each other when exploring 
hierarchical processing.  
 
The evidence discussed here (Caparos et al., 2013) is compatible with the idea that 
cognitive load affects attentional selection by placing demands on the cognitive control 
network and by making it more difficult to ignore salient irrelevant hierarchical 
information. The way in which it may affect perceptual bias, however, is less clear as the 
propensity to prioritise global structure over local detail does not immediately suggest 
the involvement of cognitive control. In the following section we review evidence 
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concerning the effect of cognitive load on visual processing and discuss the ways in 
which it may affect the processing of hierarchical visual information in particular, both 
in terms of bias and in terms of attentional selection. We preview some of the findings 
observed in the present thesis. We also discuss the extent to which perceptual bias may 
feed into selection and discuss the importance of accounting for stimulus-driven factors 
when exploring hierarchical processing.   
 
1.2 Cognitive load 
 
Cognitive control processes are responsible for actively maintaining behavioural goals 
and allocating priority of processing to behaviourally relevant stimuli to ensure that 
behaviour is coherent and efficient (e.g., Baddeley, 1986, 1996; Engle & Kane, 2004; 
Kane & Engle, 2003; Lavie et al., 2004; see Baddeley, 2012, for a recent review). With 
regard to the selection of hierarchical information, therefore, the function of cognitive 
control is to ensure that information from the relevant hierarchical level is processed 
without interference from information at the unattended level. For example, in a task of 
local selection it is important that irrelevant global structure is ignored, whereas local 
detail must be ignored when the task requires that global information is attended. The 
efficiency of selection is dependent on the availability of cognitive resources. When 
cognitive resources are engaged in secondary tasks – resulting in cognitive load – 
cognitive processing is impaired and it becomes more difficult to deploy attention in a 
manner consistent with top-down behavioural goals and to avoid distraction from task-
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irrelevant information. In selection tasks, high cognitive load is therefore associated with 
longer response latencies and lower accuracy in response (e.g., de Fockert et al., 2001; 
Lavie et al., 2004; Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois & Chun, 2004). 
 
The fact that imposing a cognitive load impairs maintenance of task goals and makes it 
more difficult to ignore behaviourally irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004) 
suggests that cognitive control is a limited-capacity system with a finite pool of 
resources. Previous research has suggested that working memory is the cognitive-control 
process responsible for the maintenance of task priorities (e.g., Baddeley, 1986, 1996, 
2012; Engle & Kane, 2004). In the majority of the experiments presented in this thesis 
we manipulate cognitive load by having participants perform a secondary task that loads 
on working memory at the same time as performing a primary hierarchical processing 
task; specifically, participants are required to remember digit strings at the same time as 
performing a task of local-global processing. The digit-rehearsal task is designed to 
engage working memory which would otherwise be engaged in performance of the 
primary task; thus, imposing cognitive load during performance of a local-global 
processing task can indicate how cognitive load could affect hierarchical processing.    
  
The effect that cognitive load may have on processing of hierarchical information is 
important as the modern world is full of cognitive distractions, and while under varying 
amounts of cognitive load individuals are having to navigate through and interact with 
the hierarchically-organised environment which surrounds them. Cognitive load can 
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vary both inter- and intrapersonally; some individuals may generally be under more 
cognitive load than others, but the extent of the cognitive load that any individual is 
under will also vary circumstantially (for examples, mobile phones are ubiquitous in 
modern life but impose a very high cognitive load; e.g., see Nasar & Troyer, 2013). 
Thus, if cognitive load affects how hierarchical information is processed, this could have 
profound implications for how visual information is represented and manipulated.  
 
It has been argued that one function of cognitive control is to vary the focus of the 
attentional window (e.g., Belopolsky, Zwaan, Theeuwes & Kramer, 2007; Theeuwes, 
1994, 2004, 2010; Theeuwes, Kramer & Kingstone, 2004). This is a spatial resource 
which can be either widely distributed or narrowly focused and according to this view 
everything that falls within the window is perceptually processed. A narrow window 
should benefit local selection whereas deploying attention more widely should benefit 
global processing at the expense of processing local detail (Treisman, 2006). Indeed, 
global processing has been linked with a wide attentional window (e.g., Kitayama et al., 
2003; Srivastava, Kumar & Srinivasav, 2010); thus the fact that – all else being equal – 
Westerners express a global perceptual bias (Davidoff et al., 2008) and are better at 
selecting global information than local information (e.g., Navon, 1977), means that it is 
possible that Westerners approach the world with the attentional window in a distributed 
state.  
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Recently it has been shown that cognitive load defocuses the attentional window 
(Caparos & Linnell, 2010; Linnell & Caparos, 2011). If cognitive load always defocuses 
attentional resources, and if a wide attentional window facilitates global processing, then 
global processing may become more efficient under high cognitive load (Ahmed & de 
Fockert, 2012). Caparos and Linnell used a variant of the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Hoffman, 1972, 1973) – a local selection task which measures the ability to select task-
relevant stimuli in the face of distracting information presented in the periphery – to 
demonstrate that high cognitive load spreads the spatial focus of perceptual resources. In 
the flanker task, target stimuli are presented in conjunction with distractor items which 
are to be ignored. These items can be response compatible with the target (e.g., an ‘E’ 
when the target is an ‘E’) or response incompatible (e.g., an ‘E’ when the target is an 
‘F’). The extent to which attention can be constrained to the target without interference 
from the distractor is assessed by subtracting reaction times on trials with compatible 
distractors from reaction times on trials with incompatible distractors. This difference 
quantifies the extent of interference. The more distractors are perceptually processed, the 
more interference increases.  
 
To explicitly measure the distribution of attention, Caparos and Linnell (2010; Linnell & 
Caparos, 2011) used a version of the flanker task in which the spatial separation between 
the target and distractor varied (Müller, Mollenhauer, Rösler & Kleinschmidt, 2005); by 
extracting the amplitude of interference as a function of separation, the focus of attention 
can be derived. Research with this paradigm has demonstrated that the spatial profile of 
attention can be likened to a ‘Mexican hat’, where distractor interference first decreases 
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with separation from the target but then increases again, before finally tapering off 
(Bahcall & Kowler, 1999; Cutzu & Tsotsos, 2003; Hopf, Boehler, Luck, Tsotsos, Heinze 
& Schoenfeld, 2006; Müller et al, 2005; Slotnick, Hopfinger, Klein & Sutter, 2002). The 
point at which distractor interference stops decreasing and starts increasing again (the 
‘turning point’) can be used as an index of the focus of attention. When the turning point 
occurs at a small separation, attention is focused; when it occurs at a large separation, 
attention is defocused.  Caparos & Linnell (2010) had participants perform the task 
under conditions of high (remembering six digits) and low (remembering one digit) 
cognitive load. Their data showed that the turning point of the attentional profile 
occurred at a larger separation in the high cognitive load condition, compatible with 
attentional resources having spread and defocused.  
 
The separation-flanker task is arguably a task of local selection, as a central target is to 
be isolated and identified and competing information in the periphery is to be ignored. 
However, Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) interpreted Caparos and Linnell’s (2010) 
finding to infer that high cognitive load always causes a widening of the attentional 
window, even when the task does not involve local selection. If a wide attentional 
window is associated with global processing, then high cognitive load should always 
result in a processing style which favours the processing of global structure in a 
hierarchical-patterns task. They tested this assumption by having participants perform a 
selective-attention version of the hierarchical patterns task (Navon, 1977) under low or 
high cognitive load. In the local task, participants were required to respond to the 
identity of local elements and to ignore the global structure. In the global task, local 
37 
 
 
 
 
detail was to be ignored whilst global structure was attended. Just as for the flanker task, 
the amount of interference from the irrelevant information was determined by the 
difference in reaction times to compatible trials from those on compatible trials. Ahmed 
and de Fockert demonstrated that high cognitive load increased interference from 
irrelevant global information on a local-selection task but decreased interference from 
irrelevant local information on a global-selection task. They suggested that their data 
confirmed a “shift towards global processing with [high cognitive] load” (p. 1404).   
 
The aim of the present thesis is to more thoroughly explore the effect of high cognitive 
load on hierarchical processing. The focus of our investigation was twofold. Firstly, we 
distinguished between perceptual bias and selection, and explored the effect that 
cognitive load might have on the way in which hierarchical information is prioritised 
when there is no selection task to perform. Thus, our first question is “does cognitive 
load have an impact on perceptual bias?” If a spread in attentional resources equates to a 
shift towards global processing and if cognitive load invariably leads to defocused 
attention then it is possible that people under high cognitive load will show a stronger 
global bias than those under low cognitive load. Secondly, the claim that high cognitive 
load is associated with a “shift towards global processing” (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012) 
suggests that high cognitive load should always favour the global level of selection at 
the expense of the local level. We explore this assumption in more depth and explore the 
extent to which the observation of Ahmed and de Fockert was determined by strong 
global salience in their stimuli. In a series of experiments, the present thesis explores and 
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challenges the assumptions that i) increasing cognitive load leads to a stronger global 
bias, and ii) cognitive load always facilitates global selection and impairs local selection.  
 
We explore the first assumption by investigating the effect of high cognitive load on 
perceptual bias. If high cognitive load causes the attentional window to defocus, then 
this should enhance the representation of global structure and participants should show a 
stronger global bias under high than low cognitive load. However, we will now preview 
our own findings – which we present in Chapter 2 – to suggest that cognitive load may 
in fact reduce the global bias.   
 
In order to explain the mechanistic underpinnings of hierarchical processing, several 
theorists have proposed that local-global processing is underpinned by two separate local 
and global processing mechanisms. For example, Förster and Dannenberg (2010) have 
proposed that when processing information, the most appropriate hierarchical processing 
mechanism is activated to execute the task at hand. Support for separate local-global 
processing mechanisms at a neural level comes from evidence which suggests that 
processing of local and global information in the brain is lateralised, with the left 
hemisphere dominant for processing of local and the right dominant for processing of 
global information (e.g., Fink, Halligan, Marshall, Frith, Frackowiak & Dolan, 1996, 
1997; Martinez, Moses, Frank, Buxton, Wong & Stile, 1997; Van Kleeck, 1989). 
Lateralisation of local and global information is linked to the observation that the left 
and right hemispheres process relatively high and low spatial frequency information 
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respectively (LaGasse, 1993; Shulman, Sullivan, Gish & Sakoda, 1986), and that high 
spatial frequency information defines local detail whereas low spatial frequency 
information denotes global structure. It has been suggested that identification of either 
the local or global level of a hierarchical pattern activates the relevant level-specific 
lateralised mechanism (termed the mechanism activation hypothesis; Lamb, London, 
Pond & Whitt, 1998; Lamb & Yund, 1996). Indeed, Ivry and Robertson (1998) proposed 
that both the left and right hemispheres receive the same spatial frequency information 
and that the left and right hemispheres are responsible for amplifying the high and low 
spatial frequency information respectively.  
 
We suggest that it is plausible that the resting activation of these two lateralised systems 
– and thus the extent to which low and high spatial frequency information is amplified – 
may determine the relative weight given to local and global information and thus may 
determine the perceptual bias. For example, if the resting activation of the right-
lateralised global mechanism is higher than the left-lateralised local mechanism then 
global structure will receive priority of processing over local detail and a global 
perceptual bias will be observed. This could contribute to why, all else being equal, 
global structure is more salient than local detail (e.g., Kimchi, 1992). There is evidence 
to support this assertion. Global-dominant right hemisphere activation is higher than 
(local-dominant) left hemisphere activation when participants are preparing to respond 
to visual information (Duschek & Schandry, 2003; Helton, Hollander, Tripp, Parsons, 
Warm, Matthews & Dember, 2007; Hitchcock, Warm, Matthews, Dember, Shear, Tripp, 
Mayleben & Parasuraman, 2003; Stronbant & Vingerhoets, 2000). Hemispheric 
40 
 
 
 
 
asymmetry for the processing of hierarchical information is most pronounced in divided-
attention tasks, when both levels of representation must be attended to (Yovel, Yovel & 
Levy, 2001) and the relative activation of the left and right hemispheres is thought to 
represent the ‘preferred’ level of hemispheric activation for anticipating hierarchical 
information (Hübner, Volberg & Studer, 2007). Thus, perceptual bias may reflect the 
relative activation of the cerebral hemispheres when prioritising hierarchical 
information; higher right activation than left activation would result in a global bias, 
while higher left activation than right activation would result in a local bias. 
 
In the present work, we explore the idea that cognitive load might change the relative 
activation of the cerebral hemispheres thus affecting the relative weight given to local 
and global information and with it perceptual bias. There is evidence to suggest that 
activation of the right hemisphere is only higher than activation of the left hemisphere 
when the task is easy; when task difficulty increases and imposes a high cognitive load, 
activation of the right hemisphere decreases and hemispheric activation becomes more 
bilateral (Helton, Warm, Tripp, Matthews, Parasuraman & Hancock, 2010). Thus, under 
low cognitive load global-dominant right hemisphere activation is higher than local-
dominant left hemisphere activation and a global perceptual bias is observed. Under high 
cognitive load, however, both hemispheres may be activated to the same extent with the 
result that processing of global information is no longer prioritised over the processing 
of local information and the global bias is reduced.  
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We investigated the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias in Chapter 2 by using a 
similarity-matching version of the hierarchical patterns task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; 
see Figure 4). In our version of the task, participants are presented with three 
hierarchical patterns simultaneously. One of these is a target pattern and the other two 
are comparison patterns, one of which matches the target at the local level while the 
other matches it at the global level. The participant must indicate which comparison 
pattern they perceive as most resembling the target pattern. The proportion of global 
matches indicates the strength of global salience; as global salience increases, so will the 
proportion of global matches. By comparing the proportion of global matches when the 
task is performed under low and high cognitive load (remembering one and six digits 
respectively) we can explore whether high cognitive load strengthens or weakens global 
salience.  
 
To preview our findings, we found that participants under high cognitive load made 
significantly fewer global matches than participants under low cognitive load. This 
suggests that high cognitive load weakens the global bias and decreases the salience of 
global structure (and enhanced the salience of local detail). This effect was found only 
when stimuli were presented for an unlimited duration. When exposure durations were 
limited there was no effect of cognitive load; we suggest that the sudden onset of 
hierarchical patterns meant that global salience was strong at limited exposure durations 
(see earlier in this chapter) and thus compensated for the effect of cognitive load on 
perceptual bias. Exposure duration was not the only stimulus-driven factor to affect 
global salience. We also show that pattern density affects the likelihood that patterns 
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will be matched according to global structure, with high-density patterns being more 
likely to be matched at the global level than low-density patterns (Kimchi & Palmer, 
1982). Therefore, although high cognitive load reduces global salience, the likelihood of 
a global match is still dependent on stimulus-driven factors that determine global 
salience.  
 
Figure 4. An example of a similarity-matching version of the hierarchical patterns task. 
Participants are asked whether the pattern at the top ‘looks most like’ the pattern on the 
bottom left or bottom right. In the example above, a ‘left’ response would indicate a 
match at the global level whereas a ‘right’ response would indicate a local match. 
 
From Chapter 3 onwards we explore the effect of cognitive load on task-driven selection 
of hierarchical information. Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) showed that high cognitive 
load impaired local selection and improved global selection. However, we suggest that 
these findings were driven by the strong global salience of their stimuli, evidenced by 
the fact that participants were faster to respond to the global level than the local level of 
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their patterns. It has been suggested that “the more obvious the form, the more it resists 
alteration by an observer” (p. 45; Katz, 1951) and in Ahmed and de Fockert’s study it is 
likely that cognitive load made it more difficult to ignore high-salient global information 
when performing a local-selection task. We suggest that the opposite effect should be 
observed when local salience is strong. In this instance, high cognitive load should make 
it more difficult to ignore high-salient local information and performance on a task of 
global selection should be impaired.  
 
In the present thesis, with respect to the effect of cognitive load on selection of 
hierarchical information, we aimed to extend the work of Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) 
and show that high cognitive load does not always favour the selection of global-level 
information, but can benefit local processing when local salience is strong. The vast 
majority of studies into local-global processing use some variant of the selective-
attention hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) to explore selection of hierarchical 
information as it allows investigation into how easily either local or global information 
can be selected in the face of incompatible and distracting information at the other level. 
Selective-attention tasks are typically limited-exposure paradigms. We have already 
discussed evidence which suggests that global salience is strongest at limited exposures 
and our experiments in Chapter 2 showed that high cognitive load does not influence 
global salience at limited exposures while it did reduce global salience at unlimited 
exposures. In Experiments 4 and 5 (presented in Chapter 3) we ran a selective-attention 
version of the hierarchical-patterns task under low (remember one digit) and high 
(remember six digits) cognitive load. Using exposure duration as a manipulation of 
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global salience, we predicted that the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias at 
unlimited exposures would feed into the effect of cognitive load on selection when 
exposures were unlimited. By using stimuli in which local salience becomes stronger 
than global salience under high cognitive load, we predicted that it should become more 
difficult to ignore local information on a global-selection task when under high cognitive 
load. Thus we predicted that high cognitive load should impair global selection at 
unlimited exposures, when local salience is strong. This effect should however be absent 
for limited exposures. 
 
We saw a trend in this direction but it was not significant. We reasoned that extending 
exposure duration was not an appropriate manipulation of global salience in the 
selective-attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task given that the latter is 
designed as a speeded-response task aimed at addressing the initial stages of visual 
processing. In Chapter 4 we present two experiments in which we enhanced local 
salience by manipulating the density of hierarchical patterns. Global salience in 
hierarchical patterns has been shown to increase as the number and relative density of 
the local elements increases (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982). Thus in Experiments 6 and 7 we 
ran a standard limited-exposure version of the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns 
task but compared the effect of high cognitive load on selection of low-density (high 
local salience) and medium-density (equal global and local salience) patterns. We 
manipulated cognitive load by having participants perform a task switching version of 
the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task. In this version of the task, participants 
are told at the beginning of each trial whether they are to perform the local- or global-
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selection task. If the task to-be-performed is the same as the task on the previous trial 
this is a ‘no-switch’ trial, whereas if the task to-be-performed is different to the task on 
the previous trial this is a ‘switch’ trial. Task switching is cognitively demanding (e.g., 
Yeung & Monsell, 2003) and allows us to explore the difference between selection 
under high cognitive load (switch trials) and low cognitive load (no-switch trials) in the 
same block of trials. We demonstrated that high cognitive load increased interference 
from irrelevant local detail on a global-selection task but only with low-density patterns 
where local salience was strong.  
 
1.3 Beyond hierarchical patterns 
 
In the experiments presented in Chapters 5 and 6 we moved our investigation beyond 
hierarchical patterns. The overwhelming majority of research on global-local processing 
has been conducted with hierarchical patterns, and indeed the discussion of hierarchical 
information so far has centred on these stimuli. However, hierarchical patterns lack 
certain grouping properties – such as closure and connectedness – that are present in 
real-world objects. Arguably, it is erroneous to class them as objects and they can more 
reasonably be thought of as object clusters (Navon, 2003). Indeed, Navon has argued 
that hierarchical patterns are object formations, and that local elements are not features 
of the object but are individual discrete objects; the spatial positioning of these 
individual objects in relation to each other determines the overall global form. By 
focusing only on hierarchical patterns, and ignoring stimuli in which elements are 
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connected to form an integral whole, we may fail to observe effects of cognitive load on 
hierarchical processing that may not necessarily be apparent with hierarchical patterns. 
Furthermore, closed and connected objects present us with another grouping principle to 
manipulate in order to vary global salience.   
 
For this reason, in the experiments presented in Chapter 5 we focused our investigation 
on the Framed Line Test (Kitayama et al., 2003), a task with closed and connected 
figures in which local detail forms an integral part of the global whole. The FLT is a task 
designed to address the extent to which local detail can be isolated from or integrated 
into its surrounding context. We used it here to investigate how cognitive load might 
affect selection of hierarchical information. In this task, participants are shown a square 
frame with a line descending from the top and are required to redraw the line, from 
memory, in a differently-sized empty test frame (see Figure 5 for a schematic 
representation of the task). There are two different tasks to perform: the absolute task 
and the relative task. In the absolute task, participants are required to redraw the line the 
same absolute length as it was in the original frame, regardless of the size of the test 
frame. Even if the test frame is bigger or smaller than the first the line must be drawn the 
same absolute size as it was when it was originally presented. This assesses the ability to 
isolate the local line from its global context, and is in essence a local selection task. We 
align the absolute task with the local-selection hierarchical-patterns task. In the relative 
task, participants are required to redraw the line in proportion to the frame; that is, if the 
test frame is bigger than the first then the line should be drawn proportionally longer. 
This is in essence a task of global selection as successful performance depends on the 
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ability to integrate the line element into its global context. We align the relative task 
with the global-selection hierarchical-patterns task. 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic illustration of the Framed Line Test (FLT; Kitayama et al., 2003).  
Frame dimensions are for illustrative purposes only. In the absolute task (top right), the 
new line has been redrawn in the frame exactly the same length as the first line was in 
the first frame (original stimulus on left), which in this instance measures 30 mm. In the 
relative task (bottom right), the new line has been redrawn in the same proportion to the 
new frame as the first line was to the first frame, namely as one third of the height of the 
frame in this instance.  
 
Global salience in the FLT is strong (Zhou, Gotch, Zhou & Liu, 2008; although see 
Kitayama et al., 2003). This is likely to be because the local line element is physically 
connected to the frame and thus the local detail and global context form a single entry-
level perceptual unit (Palmer & Rock, 1994). We reasoned that we could reduce global 
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salience and enhance local salience by disconnecting the local line element from the 
frame. Thus, we had two versions of the FLT: one connected version with strong global 
salience and the other disconnected version with strong local salience. In Chapter 5, we 
report a series of experiments in which we ran both versions of the FLT under low and 
high cognitive load. In the original version of the FLT – where the line is connected to 
the frame and global salience is strong – we showed that high cognitive load made it 
more difficult to ignore irrelevant global information and impaired performance on the 
absolute task. We aligned this with the results from Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) 
study with global-salient hierarchical patterns. In the version of the FLT where the line 
is disconnected from the frame – and local salience is strong – high cognitive load 
however impaired performance on the relative task. These studies provide further 
evidence to suggest that the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical 
information depends on stimulus-driven factors which determine local-global salience 
and does not always cause a “shift towards global processing” (Ahmed & de Fockert, 
2012).  
 
We concluded our investigation with a single experiment in Chapter 6 in which we 
explored how cognitive load might affect performance on a drawing task. While 
participants were under high or low cognitive load we compared performance on a task 
copying ‘impossible’ figures, where attending to global structure would be detrimental 
to performance, compared with performance on a task copying ‘possible’ figures. 
Participants copied pictures of both ‘possible’ objects – 2-dimensional drawings of 3-
dimensional objects that can exist in 3D space – and ‘impossible’ objects – 2D drawings 
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of 3D objects that cannot exist in 3D space – under both low and high cognitive load. 
We demonstrated that high cognitive load makes it more difficult to ignore a strong yet 
confusing global context and slows performance when copying confusing impossible 
objects. We suggest that cognitive load could potentially make the world more 
confusing, if irrelevant hierarchical information interferes with selection of relevant 
information. 
 
1.4 Outline summary of thesis 
 
In the present thesis, we investigate the effect of cognitive load on the processing of 
hierarchical information. Across a series of experiments (see Table 1 for an overview of 
experiments), we show that cognitive load affects both perceptual bias and attentional 
selection and that its effects are modulated by stimulus-driven factors that determine 
local-global salience. In Chapter 2, we explore the effect of cognitive load on perceptual 
bias and present evidence to suggest that cognitive load reduces the global bias and the 
salience of global information. In Chapters 3-6, we explore the effect of cognitive load 
on selection of hierarchical information and show that cognitive load can increase 
interference from local detail on a global-selection task when local salience is strong as 
well as increase interference from irrelevant global structure when global salience is 
strong. Thus, the present thesis suggests that cognitive load may not simply make people 
‘more global’ or ‘more local’; rather, the effect of cognitive load depends on an 
interaction between the bias and goals of the perceiver with the physical properties of 
the environment. 
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CHAPTER TWO – COGNITIVE LOAD AND PERCEPTUAL BIAS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the General Introduction we distinguished between the possible effects that cognitive 
load could have on perceptual bias and on selection of hierarchical information. Whereas 
selection describes the ability to select hierarchical information that is most relevant to 
task demands, perceptual bias is analogous to a default setting with which observers 
approach hierarchical visual information. For example, people in London, UK are more 
likely than members of the Himba, a remote culture in Namibia, Africa, to interpret 
visual information in terms of its global structure rather than local detail (Davidoff et al., 
2008). In the present chapter we explore the effect of cognitive load on this perceptual 
bias and the extent to which it affects the salience of local and global information. 
Recent evidence has shown that high cognitive load causes a “shift towards global 
processing” (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012); if cognitive load always shifts processing 
towards the global level then we should see global salience increase under high 
cognitive load. However, in the present chapter we discuss evidence to suggest that 
cognitive load may in fact reduce global salience. We present a series of experiments 
which explore whether cognitive load makes it more or less likely that global-level 
information will be prioritised over local detail. We use a paradigm which measures 
hierarchical perceptual bias to explore whether cognitive load increases or decreases the 
salience of local and global information. 
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Hierarchical perceptual bias denotes the relative processing priority given to global 
structure or local detail. All else being equal, in the urbanised world there is a global 
bias so that global structure is more salient than local detail (e.g., Davidoff et al., 2008); 
that is, if local elements and global structure are equally recognisable, the global form is 
the preferred level of representation (Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 2003). Navon (2003) has 
suggested that this makes adaptive sense, saying that “an old-time hominid would be 
liable to pay dearly, had s/he failed to recognise a pair of glowing dots in the bush at 
dark as the eyes of a predator, mistaking it for two fireflies” (p. 281; see Wagemans et 
al., 2012a, 2012b, for recent reviews of Gestalt grouping principles). When we explore 
the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias we are effectively exploring whether it 
impacts on the likelihood that a pair of glowing dots will be classed as ‘eyes’ or ‘two 
fireflies’, or that we will see the ‘forest’ or the ‘trees’.   
 
There is little extant evidence to suggest how cognitive load might affect hierarchical 
processing and furthermore the evidence that does exist concerns attentional selection 
rather than perceptual bias. As has been previously discussed, Ahmed and de Fockert 
(2012) have suggested that high cognitive load shifts processing towards the global 
level. To briefly recapitulate, participants performed a selective-attention hierarchical-
patterns task and had to respond to either the local or global level of briefly presented 
hierarchical patterns, under low or high cognitive load. They showed that high cognitive 
load impaired local selection (by making it more difficult to ignore global information 
on a local-selection task) and improved global selection (by making it easier to ignore 
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local detail on a global-selection task) and concluded that high cognitive load should 
always facilitate global processing. 
 
To explain their data, Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) invoked evidence to suggest that the 
window of attention defocuses under high cognitive load (Caparos & Linnell, 2010) and 
thereby increases the salience of global information. If cognitive load does always 
defocus the window of attention then it should also enhance global salience, making it 
more likely that hierarchical information will be interpreted according to its global 
structure than local detail. However, in the General Introduction we suggested that 
Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) saw a “shift towards global processing” because they used 
hierarchical patterns with strong stimulus-driven global salience; cognitive load then 
made it more difficult to ignore global structure on a local-selection task and easier to 
ignore local detail on a global-selection task. We suggested that a ‘shift towards local 
processing’ would be observed if local salience was strong. If cognitive load does not 
always cause a shift in the global direction then cognitive load may not always enhance 
global salience.   
 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that cognitive load may in fact reduce the perceptual 
bias towards global structure, reducing the weight assigned to global structure over local 
detail and thus enhancing the salience of local over global information. In other words, 
rather than increasing the global bias, cognitive load may decrease it and make people 
less likely to see a set of eyes instead of two fireflies, or the wood for the trees.   
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We invoke a hemispheric activation account to support this possibility. As was outlined 
in the General Introduction, several researchers have proposed the existence of separate 
mechanisms for processing the different levels of hierarchical information, with local 
and global processing being lateralised to the left and right cerebral hemispheres 
respectively (Ivry & Robertson, 1998; Lamb, London, Pond & Whitt, 1998; Lamb & 
Yund, 1996). This is said to be due to how the brain processes spatial frequency 
information; generally speaking, the left hemisphere is dominant for processing of the 
high spatial frequencies that underpin local detail whereas the right hemisphere 
processes the low spatial frequency information that defines global structure (e.g., 
LaGasse, 1993; Shulman, Sullivan, Gish & Sakoda, 1986). Ivry and Robertson’s (1998) 
Double Filtering by Frequency theory suggests that both hemispheres receive the same 
spatial frequency information, but that the left and right hemispheres amplify high and 
low spatial frequency information (which denote local detail and global structure) 
respectively. It is possible that perceptual bias could be determined by the resting 
activation of the lateralised hierarchical processing mechanisms. If the relative activation 
of the cerebral hemispheres determines the extent to which high and low spatial 
frequency information (and consequently local and global information) is prioritised 
then relative hemispheric activation could plausibly determine the relative weight that 
local detail and global structure receive in hierarchical processing.  
 
There is evidence to support this assertion. Yovel et al. (2001) have suggested that each 
hemisphere prepares to respond to its preferred level of representation in anticipation of 
the onset of hierarchical information, and that the relative extent of this preparation 
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determines the extent to which local or global information is prioritised. In a divided-
attention hierarchical patterns task – arguably a measure of perceptual bias (Roalf, 
Lowery & Turetsky, 2006) in which participants have to indicate whether a target is 
present or absent in a hierarchical pattern regardless of whether or not it appears at the 
local or global level – Yovel et al. demonstrated that participants responded to local 
targets more quickly if patterns were presented to the left hemisphere but responded to 
global targets more quickly if patterns were presented to the right hemisphere. This 
suggests that each hemisphere prioritises information at its preferred level of 
representation (i.e., the left prepares to respond to local information while the right 
prepares to respond to global information). Relative hemispheric activation, therefore, 
will determine the extent to which local or global information is prioritised. 
 
The suggestion that relative hemispheric activation determines the extent to which local 
and global information is prioritised also suggests that that relative hemispheric 
activation could determine perceptual bias. Evidence has suggested that the right 
hemisphere is relatively more activated than the left when the brain is preparing to 
respond to upcoming visual information (Duschek & Schandry, 2003; Helton et al., 
2007; Hitchcock et al., 2003; Stronbant & Vingerhoets, 2000). This asymmetric 
hemispheric activation could explain why, all else being equal, global structure receives 
priority of processing over local detail (Kimchi, 1992) and thus makes people more 
likely to see the wood for the trees. This also suggests that anything that alters 
hemispheric activation could also have an effect on perceptual bias.  
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Recent evidence has suggested that elevated right hemisphere activation when preparing 
to respond to visual stimuli is only apparent when the task is easy (Helton et al., 2010). 
When the task is difficult – and comes with a higher cognitive load – right hemisphere 
activation drops and hemispheric activation becomes bilateral. Thus, this suggests that a 
right hemispheric (global) advantage may only be apparent when in the absence of 
cognitive load. Helton et al. ran a detection task where participants had to respond to a 
target that appeared at irregular intervals in a stream of centrally-presented letter stimuli. 
In the easy condition, the contrast between stimuli and the background was high and 
targets were easy to detect. In the difficult task, the contrast between the background and 
the experimental stimuli was low and it was much more difficult to detect the target. 
While participants were performing the detection task, functional near infrared 
spectroscopy (fNIRS) was used to measure cerebral tissue oxygen saturation, a measure 
of brain activation. It was found that right hemisphere activation was only higher than 
left hemisphere activation when the task was easy; when the task was difficult, and 
participants were under a higher cognitive load, cerebral activation was bilateral and 
there was no longer a right hemisphere advantage. Thus, when the task is easy (in the 
absence of cognitive load) activation of the right hemisphere is higher than the left, but 
when the task is difficult (and imposes a high cognitive load), hemispheric activation 
becomes bilateral. In terms of perceptual bias, this suggests that a global bias should be 
observed under low cognitive load because activation of the global-dominant right 
hemisphere is higher than the local-dominant left. Under high cognitive load, however, 
global structure should no longer receive priority over local detail and global salience 
should be reduced (and local salience increased).   
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There is further evidence to suggest that the change in hemispheric activation by Helton 
et al. (2010) is due to an imposition of cognitive load. Research has suggested that the 
act of monitoring the environment for an extended period of time, as was required in the 
target detection task employed by Helton et al., is cognitively demanding in itself. This 
is known as vigilance, and has been shown to incur a high cognitive load (Helton & 
Russell, 2011) and to increase stress and mental fatigue (Warm & Parasuraman, 2008). 
Interestingly, Helton, Hayrynen and Schaeffer (2009) demonstrated that remaining 
vigilant when performing a global speeded-response hierarchical patterns task both 
impaired responses to the global level of hierarchical-patterns and resulted in elevated 
right tympanic membrane temperature (TMT), a physiological marker which increases 
as cortical activation decreases and is indicative of cognitive fatigue. Sustained attention 
to the local level during a local speeded-response task, however, had neither a 
behavioural nor physiological effect. This provides direct evidence to suggest that the 
cognitive load incurred through vigilant behaviour specifically affects processing of 
global information, and it is possible that this is because the right-hemispheric fatigue 
caused by cognitively-demanding vigilant behaviour reduces global salience.   
 
Taken together, the work of Helton and colleagues (Helton et al., 2010; Helton & 
Russell, 2011) suggests that high cognitive load is associated with reduced right 
hemisphere activation. Extrapolating from this, it is possible that high cognitive load 
will alter relative hemispheric activation and thus affect the extent to which global 
structure is prioritised over local detail. Under low cognitive load, activation of the right 
hemisphere should be higher than the left so that global structure is prioritised over local 
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detail. Under high cognitive load, however, hemispheric activation should become 
bilateral and the right-lateralised global and left-lateralised local mechanisms equally 
activated; as a result, the global bias should be reduced and global salience relatively 
weakened under high than low cognitive load.  
 
In this chapter, we present three experiments to investigate the effect of cognitive load 
on hierarchical perceptual bias and local-global salience. Although local-global 
processing is most commonly addressed with selective-attention paradigms (e.g., Navon, 
1977), Navon (2003) has suggested that similarity-matching paradigms (e.g., Kimchi & 
Palmer, 1982; see Figure 6) – where participants instead choose to match hierarchical-
patterns according to perceived similarity at either the local or global level – are better 
suited to addressing which level of a hierarchical-pattern is “given more weight in high-
order processes” (p. 275) and allow insight into whether local elements or global 
structure is most salient. In this task, participants are presented with a test pattern, which 
they must match to one of two comparison patterns on the basis of which two look most 
similar. Importantly, the test pattern matches one of the comparison patterns at the local 
level while the other matches it at the global level. The proportion of occasions on which 
patterns are matched according to the global or local level of representation can be taken 
as an indication of the salience of global information.   
 
We explored how cognitive load might affect perceptual bias by observing how 
performing a secondary task designed to engage cognitive resources – an 
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operationalisation of cognitive load – affected global salience in a similarity-matching 
version of the hierarchical patterns task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982). There were two 
contrasting possibilities. If high cognitive load always causes the attentional window to 
defocus (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012), then we might expect to see a higher proportion 
of global matches under high than under low cognitive load. However, if high cognitive 
load reduces global salience by affecting relative hemispheric activation and reducing 
the global perceptual bias then we would expect fewer global matches under high than 
low cognitive load.  
 
In the present chapter we broaden Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) conclusions regarding 
the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information and explore how 
cognitive load affects the likelihood that global structure is prioritised over local detail. 
However, whether global information is ultimately most “salient in the final percept” (p 
26; Kimchi, 1992) will also depend on stimulus-driven factors which affect global 
salience. In their similarity-matching hierarchical-patterns task, Kimchi and Palmer 
(1982) used four different pattern densities to demonstrate that the likelihood that 
patterns would be matched at the global level increased with pattern density; whereas 
low-density stimuli were most likely to be matched at the local level, high-density 
stimuli were most likely to be matched at the global level. We used a manipulation of 
pattern density in the present experiments as we wanted to demonstrate that the effect of 
cognitive load was independent of pattern density.  
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Figure 6. An example of a single trial in the similarity-matching version of the 
hierarchical patterns task. Matching the pattern at the top with the pattern on the bottom 
left is a global match, whereas a match with the pattern on the bottom right is a local 
match. 
 
 
In the General Introduction we discussed the extent to which global salience was 
affected by the exposure duration of hierarchical-patterns. Global information is most 
salient when hierarchical patterns are presented very briefly (e.g. Paquet & Merikle, 
1984; Sripati & Olson, 2009). Even if cognitive load does affect relative hemispheric 
activation and increases the salience of local information, the sudden onset of 
hierarchical patterns at short exposures could mean that global coherence is increased so 
that global structure is still more salient than local detail. However, at longer exposures 
– when the effects of common onset have worn off – the effect of cognitive load on 
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perceptual bias may become apparent. Therefore, we ran two versions of the task: one 
where exposure durations were limited (Experiment 1) and another where exposure 
durations were unlimited (Experiments 2 and 3). We argue that unlimited exposure 
durations – which allow observers to look at stimuli for as long as they like – are more 
suitable for investigating the effect of cognitive load on the representation of 
hierarchical information in real-world scenarios as real-world vision is not driven by a 
series of brief exposures. 
 
2.2 Experiment 1 
 
In this first experiment we investigated the effect of cognitive load on local-global 
salience when exposure durations were limited. To test this, we added a cognitive load 
manipulation to Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) similarity-matching task and limited the 
exposure duration of the patterns to either 30 ms or 150 ms. We have suggested that 
cognitive load may either enhance or reduce global salience; we propose that evidence 
favouring the latter possibility is more convincing than that supporting the former. 
Nevertheless, even if cognitive load reduces global salience (and enhance local 
salience), global structure is usually dominant in the early stages of processing (e.g., 
Shulman et al., 1986; Sripati & Olson, 2009) and we predict that the sudden onset of 
hierarchical patterns should mask any effect of cognitive load to reduce global salience. 
Thus, we did not predict that cognitive load would have any effect on local-global 
salience when exposure durations were limited. 
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The proportion of global matches was taken to reflect the salience of local and global 
information; more than 50% global matches indicates that global structure is more 
salient than local detail whereas fewer than 50% global matches indicates that local 
detail is more salient than global structure. Kimchi and Palmer (1982) demonstrated that 
the proportion of global matches increases as the relative density of the individual 
elements increases; by including a pattern-density manipulation in the present study, we 
could observe whether cognitive load affected all densities equally. 
 
2.2.1 Method 
 
2.2.1.1 Design 
A mixed design was used, with pattern density (low, medium and high) and display time 
(30 ms and 150 ms) as the within-subjects variables and cognitive load (low or high) as 
the between-subjects variable. Proportion of global matches was the dependent variable. 
 
2.2.1.2 Participants 
Forty individuals (mean age 24.98 years; 28 females, 12 males) participated in the study 
and were reimbursed £5 for their time. All participants reported to have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. All participants were first year undergraduate students at 
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Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. The study received ethical approval from the 
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.    
 
2.2.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
The experimental stimuli were presented on a Sony Trinitron CRT (F520) monitor using 
E-Prime version 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, PA). Patterns were 
presented on a white background and were small black triangles or squares configured to 
form large triangles or squares; the large shape could be either compatible (e.g., a large 
square formed of small squares) or incompatible (e.g., a large square formed of small 
triangles; see Figure 7) with the small shapes. Each pattern subtended approximately 
2.4° of visual angle. The small squares subtended 1.2°, 0.8°, and 0.6°, and the small 
triangles 1.0°, 0.7°, and 0.5° for the low, medium, and high densities, respectively. Each 
pattern was presented once at the top of a stimulus triad (see Figure 7), with two 
comparison patterns below it, one of which it matched at the local level only, and the 
other of which it matched at the global level only. Previous work with similarity-
matching tasks in our laboratory has shown that performance does not change with 
multiple presentations of matching stimuli. Kimchi and Palmer (1982) used only one 
version of each stimulus triad; however, to avoid the possibility that matching was based 
on the positioning of the comparison patterns rather than local-global salience, each triad 
existed in two forms with the locations of the comparison patterns switched. A total of 
24 unique stimulus triads were used. Each stimulus triad was presented once for 30 ms 
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and once for 150 ms; the whole experiment consisted of 48 trials presented in a 
randomized order.  
 
For the between-subjects cognitive-load manipulation, either one digit (low cognitive 
load) or six digits (high cognitive load) between ‘1’ and ‘9’ were pseudorandomly 
selected; for the high-cognitive-load condition, the digits were drawn without 
replacement. 
 
2.2.1.4 Procedure 
 Participants were seated 60 cm from a computer screen (maintained using a chinrest) 
and were informed that the task was to indicate, with a keypress, whether the pattern on 
the bottom left or right of the triad ‘looked most like’ the pattern at the top, whilst 
remembering either one (low cognitive load) or six (high cognitive load) digits. The 
digit(s) were presented (simultaneously) for 3,000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 
1,000 ms, at the beginning of blocks of 24 trials; each trial began with a 1,000-ms 
fixation cross before the stimulus triad was presented, centred on fixation, for either 30 
or 150 ms. After each block of 24 trials, participants were asked to type in the digit(s) 
that they had been remembering; for the high-cognitive-load manipulation, the digits 
were to be recalled in serial order, and participants were considered to have adequately 
recalled the digit string if at least five digits were recalled in the correct order. The 
procedure was then repeated for the remaining 24 trials. 
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Figure 7. An illustration of the stimulus triads used. The top row depicts the low-density 
patterns, the middle row the medium-density patterns and the bottom row the high-
density patterns. For the purpose of brevity we omitted Kimchi & Palmer’s (1982) 
highest-density patterns from our stimulus set.   
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2.2.2 Results 
 
The cognitive-load task was performed adequately by all participants. A preliminary 
analysis of the matching data indicated that display time (30 vs. 150ms) had no effect on 
the responses [p > .1]; hence, this variable was excluded from further analysis. The 
proportion of global matches on the matching task were analysed in a two-way mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with pattern density and cognitive load as the 
independent variables. A Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons was applied to 
all post-hoc tests. We found no main effect of high (M= .64, SE = .05) versus low (M= 
.63, SE= .05) cognitive load on the proportions of global matches [p > .1].  
 
A significant main effect of pattern density [F(2, 76) = 4.11, p < .01, η2 = .7] 
demonstrated that more global matches were made to high-density (M = .76, SE = .04) 
than to medium-density (M = .69, SE = .04) patterns [t(39) = –3.46, p < .01] and that 
medium-density patterns in turn were matched more often on the global level than were 
low-density patterns (M = .45, SE = .04) [t(39) = –9.20, p < .01]. This replicates the 
pattern observed by Kimchi and Palmer (1982) in their original task. Pattern density did 
not interact with cognitive load [p > .1; see Figure 8]; importantly, this illustrates that 
cognitive load did not affect the relationship between the density of the local elements 
and the likelihood that they would be matched according to their global structure. 
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Figure 8. Limited exposure-duration (Experiment 1). The proportion-of-global-matches 
made to hierarchical-patterns as a function of pattern-density under both low- and high-
cognitive-load. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.  
 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
 
Our data show that, when exposure durations were limited, local-global salience was the 
same for participants under low and high cognitive load. We concluded that cognitive 
load does not affect the initial representation of global structure. In Experiment 2, we 
investigated the effect that high cognitive load may have on local-global salience once 
the initial global salience has decayed.   
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2.3 Experiment 2 
 
In this experiment, we investigated the effect of cognitive load on local-global salience 
when exposure durations are unlimited. We allowed participants to view stimuli for as 
long as they liked, by using unlimited exposure durations. If cognitive load always 
makes processing more global (Ahmed and de Fockert, 2012) then the global bias 
should increase and participants under high cognitive load should be more likely to 
match patterns according to their global structure than those under low cognitive load. 
However, if cognitive load affects relative hemispheric activation and weakens global 
salience (and enhances local salience), then we expect participants under high cognitive 
load to make fewer global matches than those under high cognitive load.  
 
2.3.1 Method 
 
2.3.1.1 Design  
All variables remained the same as in Experiment 1 with the exception of display time 
which was removed as exposure durations were now unlimited. Additionally, we 
recorded reaction times (RTs) to address whether any observed effects were due to the 
length of the viewing time. 
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2.3.1.2 Participants  
A group of 40 new individuals (mean age 25.05 years; 31 female, 9 male) participated in 
the experiment and were reimbursed with £5. All of the participants reported having 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants were first year undergraduate 
students at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. The study received ethical approval 
from the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of 
London, UK. 
 
2.3.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli  
The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those in Experiment 1.  
 
2.3.1.4 Procedure  
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception that each 
stimulus triad was presented only once for an unlimited duration and only one block of 
24 trials was presented. As with Experiment 1, participants in the high-cognitive-load 
condition were considered to have adequately recalled a digit string if at least five of the 
digits were recalled in the correct order. 
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2.3.2 Results 
 
The cognitive-load task was adequately performed by all participants. The proportion of 
global matches on the matching task were analysed with a two-way mixed ANOVA 
with pattern density and cognitive load as the independent variables. A Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons was applied to all post-hoc tests. A main effect of 
cognitive load [F(1, 38) = 5.49, p < .05, η2 = .13] indicated that participants under high 
cognitive load made significantly fewer global matches (M = .41, SE = .07) than did 
those under low cognitive load (M = .62, SE = .06). Cognitive load did not interact with 
pattern density (see Figure 9).  
 
A significant main effect of pattern density [F(2, 76) = 8.85, p < .01, η2 = .19] 
demonstrated that significantly more global matches were made to the high (M = .58, SE 
= .05) [t(39) = –3.46, p < .05] and medium (M = .55, SE = .05) [t(39) = –3.49, p < .05] 
densities than to the low (M = .46, SE = .04) density. As with Experiment 1, the absence 
of an interaction between pattern density and cognitive load suggests that cognitive load 
did not affect the relationship between the density of a pattern and the likelihood that it 
would be represented according to its global structure. 
 
It was important to establish that the effect of load on matching was not driven by 
differences in inspection times. We repeated the two-way mixed ANOVA using RTs as 
71 
 
 
 
 
the dependent variable and found that RTs under low cognitive load (M = 1,352 ms, 
SE= 158.6) were statistically identical to those under high cognitive load (M = 1,366 ms, 
SE = 192.14); additionally, RTs did not interact with pattern density [p > .1]. 
 
 
Figure 9. Unlimited exposure-duration (Experiment 2). The proportion-of-global-
matches made to hierarchical-patterns as a function of pattern-density under both low 
and high cognitive load. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.   
 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 illustrated that the extent of global salience demonstrated in Experiment 1 
remained for participants under low cognitive load when exposure duration was 
unlimited. However, global salience was reduced, and local salience enhanced, when the 
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task was performed under high cognitive load and exposures were unlimited. This does 
not support Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) assumption that cognitive load should 
always make processing more global. Rather, it supports an account which suggests that 
cognitive load reduces global salience. We suggest that this could be due to an effect of 
cognitive load on relative hemispheric activation and the likelihood that information will 
be represented in terms of its global structure rather than local detail. In Experiment 3 
we try to replicate this finding using a slightly different version of the hierarchical-
patterns similarity-matching task.  
 
2.4 Experiment 3 
 
We wanted to replicate the observed effect of cognitive load in Experiment 2. 
Furthermore, the measure used in Experiment 2 required that participants compared a 
test pattern to two comparison patterns and it is possible that this was cognitively 
demanding and could have induced a cognitive load in itself. In Experiment 2 we 
showed that cognitive load enhances local salience and it is possible that the higher 
cognitive load of the task may have meant that patterns were matched at the global level 
less often than would be expected if the measure were less demanding. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3 we simplified the measure of hierarchical perceptual bias. We expected 
cognitive load to reduce global salience (and enhance local salience) but predicted that a 
higher proportion of global matches would be made overall in comparison to 
Experiment 3.  
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2.4.1 Method 
 
2.4.1.1 Participants 
36 participants (mean age 24.9 years; 27 females, 9 males) took part in the study. They 
were first-year undergraduate psychology students at Goldsmiths, University of London, 
UK, and participated in exchange for course credit. All of the participants reported 
having normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study received ethical approval from 
the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, 
UK.  
 
2.4.1.2 Design 
The design was identical to that in Experiment 2.  
 
2.4.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as those used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
However, stimuli were now presented on their own instead of as part of a stimulus triad. 
Furthermore, we presented only incompatible stimuli (see Figure 10).  
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2.4.1.4 Procedure  
The procedure was similar to that in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants were seated 60 
cm from a computer screen (maintained using a chinrest) and had to indicate their 
response with a key-press. However, this time the task was to indicate whether ‘square’ 
or ‘triangle’ best described their first impression of the pattern. As the local and global 
level of the patterns was always incompatible, responses were taken as an indication of 
which level was most salient. As with Experiments 1 and 2, participants performed the 
task whilst remembering either one (low cognitive load) or six (high cognitive load) 
digits. The digit(s) were presented (simultaneously) for 3,000 ms, followed by a blank 
screen for 1,000 ms, at the beginning of the block; each trial began with a 1,000-ms 
fixation cross before the stimulus was presented, centred on fixation, for an unlimited 
duration. The stimulus disappeared from the screen when the participant made their 
response and was replaced with a fixation cross beginning the next trial. At the end of 
the block, participants were asked to type in the digit(s) that they had been remembering; 
for the high-cognitive-load manipulation, the digits were to be recalled in serial order, 
and participants were considered to have adequately recalled the digit string if at least 
five digits were recalled in the correct order. As participants were to judge either 
‘square’ or ‘triangle’, only incompatible patterns (where it was possible for this choice 
to be made) were included in the task, meaning that the procedure contained only 6 
unique trials. These were presented twice, totalling 12 trials.  
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Figure 10. An illustration of the hierarchical patterns used in Experiment 3 (replicated 
from Kimchi and Palmer, 1982).   
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2.4.2 Results 
 
All participants adequately performed the cognitive load task, and so data from all 
participants were entered into the analysis. Data were analysed with a mixed ANOVA, 
with pattern density (low, medium and high) as the within-subjects variable and 
cognitive load (low vs. high) as the between subjects variable. The dependent variable 
was proportion of global matches, and reflected the proportion of times that participants 
responded to the patterns in accordance with its global structure. As in Experiments 1 
and 2, there was a main effect of pattern density [F(2, 68) = 7.28, p < .01, η2 = .18]. 
Medium-density patterns (M = .74, SE = .07) were matched significantly more globally 
than low-density patterns (M = .59, SE = .07) [t(35)= -3.22, p < .05]; however the global 
matches made to high-density patterns (M = .77, SE = .06) were not significantly greater 
than those made to medium-density patterns [p > .1]. Again, pattern density did not 
interact with cognitive load [p > .1; see Figure 11].  
 
There was a main effect of cognitive load [F(1, 34) = 4.69, p  < .05, η2 = .12], indicating 
that significantly fewer global matches were made under high cognitive load than under 
low cognitive load (see Figure 12).   
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Figure 11. Unlimited exposure-duration with single patterns (Experiment 3). The 
proportion of global matches made to hierarchical-patterns as a function of pattern-
density under both low and high cognitive load. Error bars represent one standard error 
of the mean.   
 
 
 
Figure 12. Unlimited exposure-duration with single patterns (Experiment 3). The 
proportion of global matches made to hierarchical-patterns under both low and high 
cognitive load. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.   
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2.4.3 Discussion 
 
In the present experiment, we again demonstrated that cognitive load enhances the 
salience of local elements and decreases the salience of global structure, meaning that 
the proportion of global matches decreases under high cognitive load. Interestingly, 
overall global matches are higher than those in Experiments 1 and 2 for both low and 
high cognitive load. This could be because the demands associated with this measure 
were less than those associated with the standard similarity-matching measure utilised in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Interestingly, the drop in the proportion of global matches under 
high compared to low cognitive load in the present experiment was roughly the same as 
in Experiments 1 and 2 (about 20 percentage points). We suggest that high cognitive 
load weakens global salience (at unlimited exposure durations) but that global salience 
may ultimately be stronger than local salience if global salience is very strong to begin 
with. 
 
2.5 Discussion of Chapter 2 
 
The present chapter explored the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias and 
considered the mechanisms that could underlie its effects. We used a matching task that 
directly probed whether observers were more likely to represent hierarchical patterns in 
terms of their local elements or global structure. We report that global salience was 
equally strong for participants under both low and high cognitive load at limited 
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exposure durations (Experiment 1). When exposure durations were unlimited, however, 
high cognitive load reduced the global bias and was associated with a decrease in global 
salience and an increase in local salience (Experiments 2 and 3). Our data do not support 
the idea that cognitive load causes a “shift towards global processing” (Ahmed & de 
Fockert, 2012) that is associated with enhanced global salience. Instead, our findings 
suggest that cognitive load reduces the likelihood that hierarchical information will be 
interpreted in terms of its global structure over its local detail. As real-world perception 
does not result from a series of limited exposure durations, we argue that our findings 
from Experiments 2 and 3 could be more representative of how cognitive load affects 
local-global salience in real-world vision; we suggest that high cognitive load could 
fundamentally affect how hierarchical information is prioritised by making it more likely 
that we will see ‘eyes’ instead of a ‘two fireflies’ or the ‘trees’ instead of the ‘forest’.  
 
We have outlined two possible effects that cognitive load might exert on local-global 
salience via effects on perceptual bias. Firstly, Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) 
conclusion that high cognitive load causes the attentional window to defocus might 
suggest that high cognitive load should increase the weight given to global structure over 
local detail; this would enhance global salience and significantly increase the proportion 
of global matches made in the similarity-matching paradigm. We did not find any 
evidence in favour of this account and therefore cannot support the assertion that high 
cognitive load always enhances processing of global information. The second possibility 
follows on from the work of Helton et al. (2010). Cognitive load (as a task-difficulty 
effect) could affect relative hemispheric activation and thus affect the relative priority 
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given to local and global information. Importantly, according to this account cognitive 
load should reduce the perceptual bias towards global structure and enhance local 
salience. This is indeed what we found in Experiments 2 and 3, where significantly 
fewer global matches were made under high cognitive load than low cognitive load.  
 
A schematic representation of our hemispheric-activation account can be seen in Figure 
13. When the task is easy – such as under low cognitive load – the global-dominant right 
hemisphere should be relatively more active than the local-dominant left and thus a 
perceptual bias towards global structure should be observed. Under high cognitive load, 
however, activation should become bilateral as a result of performing a secondary 
(cognitive-load) task (Helton et al., 2010). Thus, under high cognitive load, both 
hemispheres should be equally active and local detail should be more salient than under 
low cognitive load.  
 
Increasing local salience with cognitive load was exactly what we found when we 
presented hierarchical patterns for an unlimited duration; however, we did not see any 
effect of cognitive load when we presented patterns for a limited duration. Global 
salience is strongest when patterns are presented very briefly (e.g., Paquet & Merikle, 
1984). We suggest that the sudden onset of a hierarchical pattern meant that global 
salience was strong enough to compensate for the effect of cognitive load on relative 
hemispheric activation. Thus, the effect of cognitive load on relative hemispheric 
activation was not observable at limited exposure durations. Once however the initial 
81 
 
 
 
 
global salience due to common onset had decayed, the effect of cognitive load on 
perceptual bias became apparent. Because real-world vision does not usually result from 
a series of briefly-presented stimuli, we suggest that unlimited-exposure measures are 
better than limited-exposure ones for addressing the extent of perceptual bias. From this 
point on, our discussion focuses on our data from Experiments 2 and 3 with unlimited 
exposure durations.   
 
Figure 13. Schematic representation of hemispheric activation under low and high 
cognitive load. Right hemispheric activation is higher than left hemispheric activation 
under low cognitive load but under high cognitive load right hemispheric activation is 
reduced and left-right cerebral activation is equal. When exposure durations are 
unlimited, under low cognitive load we should see a global bias, whereas under high 
cognitive load we should see a reduction in global bias.  
 
Our explanation of the data suggests that cognitive load should always enhance the 
salience of local information. However, whether global structure or local detail is 
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ultimately most salient is still dependent on stimulus-driven factors such as goodness of 
form; a particularly good Gestalt will have stronger global salience than a grouping with 
a bad Gestalt, regardless of perceptual bias (that is, the tendency to prioritise global 
structure over local detail; Figure 14 depicts this schematically with respect to our 
unlimited-exposure data from Experiment 2). This has important implications for the use 
of the phrase ‘perceptual bias’ when describing the extent to which global structure is 
prioritised over local detail. Findings from similarity-matching paradigms are often 
interpreted as reflecting absolute perceptual bias: over 50% global matches are often 
assumed to reflect a global bias whereas fewer than 50% global matches are said to 
reflect a local bias. However, matching patterns with poor global form less than 50% of 
the time at the global level does not necessarily indicate an absolute local bias; rather, it 
may simply reflect the fact that stimuli with poor form have weak global salience. We 
move on now to illustrate this issue with respect to our findings from Experiments 2 and 
3.  
 
In Experiment 2, when our data were collapsed across pattern density, global salience 
was stronger than local salience under low cognitive load (~60% global matches) but 
local salience was stronger than global salience under high cognitive load (~40%). If we 
had (misguidedly) assumed that absolute perceptual bias is reflected in fewer or greater 
than 50% global matches then we might have concluded that participants showed a 
global bias under low cognitive load but a local bias under high cognitive load. In 
Experiment 3, however, patterns were matched at the global level approximately 80% of 
the time under low cognitive load and approximately 60% of the time under high 
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cognitive load. Now, if we (misguidedly) assumed that perceptual bias is reflected in 
fewer or greater than 50% global matches, we might have concluded that participants 
showed a global bias under both low and high cognitive load.  
 
Figure 14.  An illustration of how local-global salience is influenced by both person-
driven perceptual bias and stimulus-driven determinants of local-global salience. Here, 
high cognitive load reduces global salience, but local-global salience is still influenced 
by pattern-density. 
 
Therefore, it is important to avoid the temptation of referring to ‘local bias’ or ‘global 
bias’ in absolute terms. Rather, it is necessary to speak in relative terms; for example, 
when describing the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias we could say that 
cognitive load reduces the number of global matches, and by implication the extent to 
which global structure is prioritised over local detail. Alternatively it is possible to speak 
in terms of local-global salience. For example, for both Experiments 2 and 3 we can say 
that cognitive load reduced global salience and enhanced local salience. The emphasis 
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on salience also allows us to make cross-experimental comparisons when using the same 
stimuli. For example, we can say that cognitive load reduced global salience and 
enhanced local salience in both Experiments 2 and 3 but that global salience was 
stronger overall in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 2. 
 
The difference in local-global salience seen between Experiments 2 and 3 shows that 
even slight variations in measures of hierarchical processing can affect local-global 
salience. There are several reasons why this could have been the case. It is possible that 
participants in Experiment 3 were simply more likely to represent patterns in terms of 
their global structure than local detail than participants in Experiment 2. Indeed, 
participants in Experiment 2 were first year undergraduate students from a mixture of 
study programmes at an arts university, whereas participants in Experiment 3 were first-
year psychology undergraduates. It is possible that the different content of these study 
courses could encourage different processing styles (or, conversely, could attract 
individuals with different processing styles). Research has suggested that artists process 
visual information more holistically than scientists (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010) 
and thus we might expect students of psychology, which has a large scientific 
component, to match patterns at the global level less than students from arts 
programmes; however, we demonstrated that our psychology undergraduate participants 
in Experiment 3 matched patterns at the global level more than the mixed-programme 
participants in Experiment 2. This suggests that differences in matching between 
participants in Experiments 2 and 3 were unlikely to be due to differences in 
scientific/artistic processing style. However, it is possible that the two groups of 
85 
 
 
 
 
participants could have by chance differed on traits known to influence local-global 
matching, such as culture (Davidoff et al., 2008). 
 
There could also have been paradigmatic reasons for their differences in matching 
behaviour. For example, matching a test stimulus with one of two comparison stimuli in 
Experiment 2 may have been more cognitively demanding than responding to a single 
pattern presented in isolation in Experiment 3.  Thus, asymmetric hemispheric activation 
in Experiment 2 may not have been as pronounced under low cognitive load as it was in 
Experiment 3 with the result that local salience was stronger in the former experiment 
than it was in the latter. Encouragingly, regardless of the salience of local-global 
information in Experiments 2 and 3, cognitive load caused the likelihood that patterns 
would be matched at the global level to reduce by the same magnitude of twenty 
percentage points. Thus, although it is possible that individual differences could affect 
baseline local-global salience, the effect of cognitive load on local-global salience is 
constant. 
 
The present discussion has highlighted the problems with using the term ‘perceptual 
bias’ when trying to describe an absolute tendency for individuals to prioritise global 
structure or local detail. It is intuitive by appealing to suggest that a default state exists 
that dictates whether individuals prioritise local or global information. However, local-
global salience is dependent on stimulus-driven and paradigm-driven factors as well as 
person-driven ones. Thus, in this thesis we use the term perceptual bias only in relative 
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terms (for instance, increasing cognitive load reduces the likelihood that hierarchical 
information will be interpreted in terms of its global structure) and refer to local-global 
salience when speaking in absolute terms.  
 
In the General Introduction, we suggested that local-global salience should also 
determine how well local and global level information can be selected in a selective-
attention task. This is an intuitively appealing suggestion as stronger global than local 
salience, for example, should make the global structure more accessible than the local 
detail. Conversely, stronger local than global salience should make local detail more 
accessible than global structure. We have suggested that cognitive load should make it 
more difficult to ignore irrelevant yet salient hierarchical information. Crucially, we 
suggest that the effect of high cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information 
should depend on whether local detail or global structure is most salient: high cognitive 
load will make it difficult to ignore global information if global salience is strong and 
difficult to ignore local detail if local salience is strong. In the following chapters we 
address the issue of selection, and explore the extent to which cognitive load affects the 
ability to select behaviourally-relevant hierarchical information. 
 
The experiments presented in this chapter have shown that high cognitive load can 
enhance local salience (and reduce global salience) when exposure durations are 
unlimited. Thus in Experiments 4 and 5 (presented in Chapter 3) we run a selective-
attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) to test this assumption 
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and use exposure-duration as a manipulation of local-global salience. In Experiment 1, 
we showed that global salience was stronger than local salience under both low and high 
cognitive load when exposure durations were limited. However, in Experiments 2 and 3, 
we showed that cognitive load reduced global salience and enhanced local salience when 
exposures were unlimited. We would then expect cognitive load to make it more 
difficult to ignore salient global information at limited exposure durations but harder to 
ignore salient local information at unlimited exposure durations. 
 
In conclusion, the experiments reported in the present chapter have shown that high 
cognitive load can enhance the salience of local detail. We appeal to a hemispheric-
activation account and suggest that hemispheric activation is asymmetric under low 
cognitive load – and favours global structure – but is bilateral under high cognitive load. 
This means that local detail is more salient under high than low cognitive load. We saw 
this effect only when exposure durations were unlimited; when exposure durations were 
limited, cognitive load had no effect on global salience. This illustrates the importance 
of accounting for exposure duration when drawing conclusions about the effect of 
cognitive load on perceptual bias. In the following chapters, we investigate the extent to 
which cognitive load affects attentional selection. We also explore the extent to which 
the effect of cognitive load on selection is influenced by stimulus-driven salience, and 
discuss whether the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias can influence attentional 
selection.  
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CHAPTER 3 - SELECTIVE ATTENTION TO HIERARCHICAL PATTERNS 
  
3.1 Introduction 
   
It has been suggested that cognitive load will always benefit global processing (Ahmed 
& de Fockert, 2012). The present thesis explores this assertion in more depth and 
distinguishes between the effect that cognitive load has on perceptual bias and its effect 
on attentional selection. We explored the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias in a 
series of experiments reported in Chapter 2 and showed that participants under high 
cognitive load were less likely to match patterns according to global structure than were 
participants under low cognitive load (but only when exposure durations were 
unlimited). This suggests that cognitive load enhances local salience (and reduces global 
salience) and does not support the assumption that cognitive load should always enhance 
global processing. In the present chapter we explore the effect of cognitive load on 
selection. Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) showed that cognitive load increased 
interference from global structure on a local-selection task and reduced interference 
from local detail on a global-selection task. They took this to mean that cognitive load 
enhanced global processing. However, we suggest that this effect was due to the strong 
global salience of their experimental stimuli. This being the case, when local salience is 
strong, high cognitive load should impair global selection; indeed, in line with our 
findings presented in Chapter 2, cognitive load may even increase local salience and 
make it more difficult to ignore salient local detail in a global-selection task. In the 
present chapter, we explore the effect that cognitive load might have on the selection of 
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hierarchical information and set out to demonstrate that high cognitive load can increase 
interference from local information when local salience is strong.   
 
To explore the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information we used 
the original – and probably most widely used – measurement of the ability to select 
hierarchical information, the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 
1977). Attention can be flexibly deployed to local detail or global structure depending 
on task demands (Treisman, 2006); sometimes it may be important to process the scene 
as a whole while at other times analysis of local detail may be more appropriate. The 
selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task provides an indication of how well local 
and global information can be selected in the face of competing hierarchical information.  
 
Navon (1977) was interested in whether, despite a preference for global form, 
participants would be able to voluntarily direct their attention toward either the local or 
global level of a hierarchical pattern and ignore competing information from the 
unattended level. To test this, he developed the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns 
task which measures responses to either the local or global level of hierarchical patterns 
(Experiment 3 in Navon, 1977, is the best example of the sort of task that is popular 
now). As previously described in the General Introduction, the logic of the selective-
attention hierarchical-patterns task was that if participants are distracted by information 
at the unattended level, then responses to the target level will be interfered with. 
Specifically, responses will be slower when information at the unattended level is 
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response-incompatible compared to response-compatible. Two key findings emerged 
from Navon’s study. Firstly, overall latencies to global targets were faster than to local 
targets. Secondly, responses to local elements were significantly slowed when 
incompatible information was present at the global level, while responses to global 
targets were unaffected by the identity of local elements. These two findings were taken 
to support the idea that global-level information has a processing advantage over local 
detail. These observations have been referred to collectively as a ‘global advantage’ 
(Kimchi, 1992).  
 
The selective-attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task was recently used to 
show that high cognitive load increases interference from irrelevant global information 
and decreases interference from irrelevant local information (Ahmed & de Fockert, 
2012); this was interpreted as cognitive load always enhancing the global advantage in a 
hierarchical-patterns task. We have discussed this finding in the General Introduction 
but will briefly review Ahmed and de Fockert’s task here. Participants performed a 
selective-attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) and, in 
separate blocks, had to indicate the identity of the local elements in the local task or the 
global structure in the global task. The task was performed under either low cognitive 
load (remember one digit while performing the selection task) or high cognitive load 
(remember six digits) and stimuli were presented for a limited duration (250 ms). 
Ahmed and de Fockert found that, under high cognitive load, participants experienced 
increased interference from global information on a local-selection task and decreased 
interference from local information on a global-selection task. Ahmed and de Fockert 
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invoked the finding that cognitive load causes the perceptual resources involved in 
spatial attention to spread or defocus (Caparos & Linnell, 2010; Linnell & Caparos, 
2011) and concluded that cognitive load invariably spreads attention and thus makes 
people more global. 
 
However, it is unsurprising that Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) observed a “shift towards 
global processing under [high cognitive] load” as they used stimuli in which global 
salience was stronger than local salience, evidenced by the fact that participants 
responded to global structure more quickly than they responded to local detail. In 
general, high cognitive load makes it more difficult to maintain behavioural goals and 
increases the processing of irrelevant information (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004) and thus it is 
likely that cognitive load made it more difficult to ignore the salient global level of 
representation in Ahmed and de Fockert’s study. However, if stimuli have strong local 
salience, we predict that the opposite pattern of performance should be observed and 
cognitive load should make it more difficult to ignore salient local information when 
performing a global-selection task.  
 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that it may be cognitively demanding to attend to the 
global level of a hierarchical pattern when global salience is weaker than local salience. 
Helton, Hayryen and Schaeffer (2009) ran a divided-attention hierarchical-patterns task 
(Navon, 1977) in which participants had to monitor a stream of briefly presented 
hierarchical patterns and indicate, with a button press, when a target appeared at either 
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the global level or the local level. They also recorded tympanic membrane temperature 
(TMT), a physiological measure of cognitive fatigue which increases as cortical 
activation decreases. In the behavioural task, participants were faster to respond to local 
than global targets, which suggests that local detail was more salient than global 
structure. The physiological measure also showed elevated right hemisphere TMT, 
indicative of cognitive fatigue, but only when responding to global-level information. 
Responding to a local-level target, however, had no physiological effect. This was taken 
to reflect an increase in cognitive fatigue as a result of sustained attention only to the 
global level. We suggest that right hemisphere cognitive fatigue may be the result of 
attending to the less salient global structure whilst ignoring the more salient local detail. 
If this is the case, then this evidence suggests that it may be cognitively-demanding to 
ignore local detail when it is more salient than global structure. 
 
In the General Introduction, we discussed a host of stimulus-driven factors that have 
been shown to affect global salience (as summarised by Kimchi, 1992) and in Chapter 2 
we presented a series of experiments to demonstrate the extent to which one of these 
factors – exposure duration – could influence the effect that cognitive load has on the 
salience of local and global information. In the present chapter, we present two 
experiments in which we explore whether the effect of cognitive load on local-global 
salience will ‘feed into’ the effect of cognitive load on attentional selection with the aim 
of demonstrating that cognitive load can cause a shift towards local processing when 
local salience is strong. In Experiments 1-3 (presented in Chapter 2) we provided 
evidence to suggest that exposure duration impacts the effect of cognitive load on local-
93 
 
 
 
 
global salience and we considered the possibility that we could use exposure duration 
and cognitive load to manipulate local-global salience on a selective-attention 
hierarchical-patterns task
1
.  
 
In Experiment 1 – the limited-exposure hierarchical patterns task – it was shown that 
global information was more salient than local information in medium-density patterns 
(~60% global matches overall) when stimuli were presented for a limited duration, under 
both high and low cognitive load. In Experiment 2 we then demonstrated that high 
cognitive load reduced global salience (and increased local salience) when stimuli were 
presented for an unlimited duration; now, local detail was more salient than global 
structure under high cognitive load (~40% global matches) whereas global information 
remained more salient than local information under low cognitive load (~60% global 
matches).Thus, our data from Experiments 1 and 2 (described in Chapter 2) suggest that 
global salience is strong under both low and high cognitive load at limited exposure 
durations but that local salience is strong under high cognitive load at unlimited 
exposure durations (while global information remains salient under low cognitive load; 
                                                          
 
 
 
1
 The reader is reminded that we ran an unlimited-exposure similarity-matching paradigm in both 
Experiments 2 and 3 and found that global salience was weaker overall in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 3. In the discussion to Chapter 2 we suggested that this was because task demands were higher 
in Experiment 2 than Experiment 3 and thus local salience was stronger in the former than in the latter. 
Task demands in a selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task should be higher than in Experiment 3 and 
therefore we predict that local-global salience in a selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task will be 
more comparable to local-global salience in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 3. Thus, from here on we 
discuss local-global salience of hierarchical patterns with respect to the findings from Experiment 2.  
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Figure 15 illustrates the hypothesised global salience under low and high cognitive load 
at limited and unlimited exposure durations). Thus, we reasoned that we could use 
exposure duration to manipulate global salience in medium-density patterns under high 
cognitive load in a selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task; at limited exposures we 
should see a global advantage under high cognitive load but at unlimited exposures we 
should see a local advantage under high cognitive load. High cognitive load should then 
make it more difficult to ignore global information on a local-selection task at limited 
exposure durations but more difficult to ignore local information on a global-selection 
task at unlimited exposure durations. This would demonstrate that the effect of cognitive 
load on local-global salience (reported in the experiments presented in Chapter 2) would 
then influence the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information.  
 
We ran a selective-attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) with 
an added cognitive load manipulation and presented stimuli for either a limited 
(Experiment 4) or unlimited (Experiment 5) duration. We chose to use the medium-
density patterns from Chapter 2 as our experimental stimuli, for the reasons just 
discussed. We also chose this density of pattern so that we could make cross-
experimental comparisons between the experiments detailed in Chapter 2 (Experiments 
1 and 2) and the experiments detailed in the present chapter.   
 
95 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Schematic representation of global and local salience under low and high 
cognitive load at limited and unlimited exposure durations for medium-density patterns 
reported in Experiments 1 and 2. The dotted line marks the point at which local and 
global information is equally salient. 
 
 
In the present experiments, we aim to show that high cognitive load does not always 
make processing more global but can in fact impair global selection if local detail is 
sufficiently salient. We predicted that a slight global advantage should be observed 
under low and high cognitive load at limited exposure durations as global information 
should be more salient than local information (Experiment 4). Given a global advantage, 
high cognitive load should make global information more difficult to ignore and 
interference from irrelevant global structure on a local-selection task should increase (as 
was observed by Ahmed and de Fockert, 2012, when using stimuli with strong global 
salience). At unlimited exposures, however, a local advantage should be seen under high 
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cognitive load (Experiment 5). Under these circumstances, high cognitive load should 
make it more difficult to ignore the salient local detail and interference from local 
information on a global-selection task should increase.  
 
3.2 Experiment 4 
 
In the present experiment we used a variant of the original – and most widely-used – 
version of the hierarchical patterns task (Navon, 1977). This task was designed to 
measure the ability to selectively attend to either local elements or global structure. We 
presented the patterns for a limited exposure duration with a cognitive load 
manipulation.  
 
3.2.1 Method 
 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
66 participants (mean age 19 years; 50 females, 16 males) were all first-year-
undergraduate psychology students and participated in exchange for course credit. 
Testing took place in a series of undergraduate lab classes and thus participant numbers 
were dictated by class attendance. The study received ethical approval from the 
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.    
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3.2.1.2 Design 
The within-subjects variables were task (local vs. global selection) and compatibility 
(compatible vs. incompatible). The between-subjects variable was cognitive load (low 
vs. high; remember one digit vs. six digits). The order in which the tasks were performed 
was counterbalanced across participants; half performed the local selection task before 
the global task and the other half performed the global selection task before the local 
task. Participants had to response as quickly but as accurately as possible to a series of 
hirarchical patterns: the dependent variables were reaction time (RT) and accuracy.  
 
3.2.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was developed using E Prime version 1.2 and was presented on a Sharp 
LL-172A-B LCD monitor in a dimly-lit room. Stimuli were identical to the medium-
density patterns that we used in Experiments 1-3 (see Figure 16). We replicated the 
hierarchical patterns developed by Kimchi and Palmer (1982) using Adobe Photoshop 
CS2. Patterns were small black triangles or squares configured to form large triangles or 
squares; the large shape could be either compatible (e.g., a large square formed of small 
squares) or incompatible (e.g., a large square formed of small triangles) with the small 
shapes (see Figure 16). There were 4 unique hierarchical patterns and each subtended 
approximately 2.4° of visual angle. Small squares subtended 0.8° and small triangles 
0.7°. Stimuli were presented on a white background and were viewed from a distance of 
60 cm. 
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Figure 16. An illustration of the medium-density hierarchical patterns used in the 
present experiment (recreated from Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).   
 
 
3.2.1.4 Procedure 
Participants were seated so that their eyes were 60 cm from the screen and they placed 
the index finger of each hand on the ‘c’ and ‘m’ keys of a QWERTY keyboard. They 
were then presented with on-screen instructions about the task that they were about to 
perform. For the local task, they were informed that they were to indicate whether the 
small shapes were squares or triangles, whereas, for the global task, they were to 
indicate whether the large shape was a square or a triangle. Participants were asked to 
respond quickly but to keep their responses as accurate as possible. They were then 
presented with 8 practice trials in which each of the four hierarchical patterns was 
presented three times. Stimuli were presented in a random order. After the practice block 
had finished participants were given the opportunity to tell the experimenter if anything 
was unclear.  
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This experiment required the task to be performed whilst remembering either one (low 
cognitive load) or six (high cognitive load) digits. On completion of the practice trials, 
participants were informed that they would be shown either one (for those in the low 
cognitive load condition) or six (high cognitive load condition) digits at the beginning of 
the main task. They were told that they would have to remember this/these whilst 
performing the trials, before typing them in when prompted to do so. The order in which 
the local and global tasks were performed was counterbalanced, so that half of the 
participants performed the local task first and the other half performed the global task 
first.   
 
The structure of the limited-exposure task can be seen in Figure 17. Each block of trials 
began with the presentation of either one digit (low cognitive load task) or six digits 
(high cognitive load task) for 2500 ms. A block of trials then began. Each trial ran as 
follows. A fixation cross was presented for 1000 ms before presentation of a hierarchical 
pattern for 250 ms. This was then replaced with a blank screen which remained until 
participants made their response. The fixation cross appeared once again and the trial 
procedure was repeated. To increase location uncertainty, each of the 4 unique patterns 
were presented in three different locations: once in the centre of the screen, once 1.7° 
above centre along the vertical midline and once 1.7° below centre along the vertical 
midline. Each of the four unique patterns in each of the three locations was presented 
three times per block. Four blocks of trials were presented per task, meaning that each of 
the four unique patterns in each of the three locations was presented twelve times per 
task. This is comparable with trial numbers in other speeded-response experiments in 
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our laboratory, to allow for cross-experimental and cross-paradigmatic comparisons. 
After all 36 trials in the block had been completed participants were asked to type in the 
digit(s) that they had been rehearsing since the beginning of the block. After four blocks 
had been completed, participants were then presented with instructions for the second 
task (global if the first task was local, or local if the first task was global) and given an 
opportunity to practice before the experimental trials proper were presented. Participants 
then completed four blocks of the second task.  
 
 
Figure 17. Schematic representation of a single block of trials in the limited-exposure 
hierarchical-patterns task (Experiment 4). There were four blocks of 36 trials for the 
local task and four for the global task, making eight blocks in total.  
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3.2.2 Results 
 
Participants were included in the analysis if they accurately recalled the single digit in 
the low cognitive load condition or five out of six digits, in the correct order, in the high 
cognitive load condition. Blocks of trials were excluded from the final analysis if the 
participant failed to adequately recall the cognitive load associated with that block. If 
participants correctly recalled digits in less than 50% of the blocks, their data were 
excluded from the final analysis. Data were also excluded from the analysis if 
participants achieved below 75% accuracy on either the local or the global task overall. 
In total, the data from nine participants were excluded in accordance with these criteria: 
four from the low cognitive load condition and five from the high cognitive load 
condition. In total the data of 57 participants were entered into the final analysis. 
 
We excluded the first trial for each participant from the final analysis as we have 
previously seen that participants are much slower to respond to this trial than the 
following trials. Furthermore, instead of using raw RT or accuracy as dependent 
variables we used inverse efficiency as our dependent variable. Inverse efficiency scores 
are calculated by dividing mean reaction time by the mean accuracy for that condition 
(Townsend & Ashby, 1983; mean RTs and accuracy can still be seen in Table 2) and are 
a way of combining RT and accuracy into a single DV. This can help control for the 
possibility of a speed-accuracy trade off. This is especially important when considering 
the effect of cognitive load on performance of a task, as cognitive load has been shown 
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to both increase RTs and reduce accuracy in response (ref) and inverse efficiency allows 
us to account for both of these possible effects in a single DV. We calculated efficiency 
scores for each level of factor that was entered into the analysis.   
 
Table 2. Mean reaction times and accuracy for responses in Experiment 4.  
 
 
 
Data were entered into a three-way mixed-subjects ANOVA with task (local vs. global) 
and compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) as the within-subjects factors and 
   Local task Global task 
 Reaction time  Comp Inc Comp Inc 
L
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Low cognitive load 
M 485.64 514.83 500.02 551.25 
SE 17.07 18.72 16.94 17.53 
High cognitive load 
M 485.93 513.2 477.76 522.7 
SE 13.09 14.97 11.95 12.17 
 Accuracy 
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Low cognitive load 
M .96 .93 .97 .91 
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
High cognitive load 
M .97 .93 .97 .91 
SE 0.0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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cognitive load (low vs. high) as the between-subjects factor. Inverse efficiency was the 
dependent variable. Descriptive statistics can be seen in Figure 18a.  
 
There was a significant main effect of task [F(1, 55) = 8.08, p < .01, η2 = .04], 
surprisingly in the direction that participants were significantly quicker to respond to the 
local elements [M = 528.4 ms, SE = 10.81] than global structure [M = 548.4 ms, SE = 
10.48] of the hierarchical patterns used in this task. The main effect of compatibility 
[F(1, 55) = 178.26, p < .001, η2 = .76] replicates the standard finding that responses to 
incompatible stimuli [M = 572.63 ms, SE = 10.81] are slower than those to compatible 
stimuli [M = 504.18 ms, SE = 10.48]. Furthermore, the interaction between task and 
compatibility was highly significant [F(1, 55) = 22.11, p < .001, η2 = .29]. Follow-up t-
tests revealed that inverse efficiency scores to compatible patterns were statistically 
identical [p > .1] in the local [M = 502.64 ms, SE = 10.85] and global tasks [M = 504.27 
ms, SE = 10.9] but inverse efficiency scores to incompatible patterns were significantly 
larger [t(56) = 3.86, p < .01] in the global task [M = 589.94 ms, SE = 10.66] than in the 
local task [M = 553.58 ms, SE = 12.72]. This is compatible with the suggestion that, 
regardless of cognitive load, interference from local detail on the global-selection task is 
greater than interference from global structure on the local-selection task. 
 
The interaction of interest was between task, compatibility and cognitive load which 
would have allowed us to suggest that interference on the local- and global-selection 
tasks was different under low and high cognitive load (see Figure 18b for interference, 
104 
 
 
 
 
calculated by subtracting inverse efficiency scores to compatible trials from inverse 
efficiency scores to incompatible trials, as a function of task and cognitive load). 
However, this was non-significant [p > .1]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. a. Inverse efficiency scores for participants under high and low cognitive 
load in the local and global limited-exposure selection tasks for both compatible and 
incompatible trials. b. Interference scores (incompatible inverse efficiency minus 
compatible inverse efficiency scores) for responses in the local and global tasks under 
low and high cognitive load. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
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3.2.3 Discussion 
 
We had predicted that we would see a global advantage for our medium-density patterns 
in the present experiment, as they were matched more frequently at the global level than 
at the local level at limited exposure durations in Experiment 2.  We then predicted that 
cognitive load would increase interference from salient global information on a local-
selection task (as was observed by Ahmed and de Fockert, 2012, when using stimuli 
with strong global salience). However, participants responded to our medium-density 
patterns with a local advantage and we did not observe a significant asymmetric effect 
of cognitive load on interference in the local and global selection tasks (although there 
was a very slight trend in the direction compatible with Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012, see 
Figure 18b). As participants responded to our medium-density stimuli with a global bias 
but a local advantage it is possible that neither local nor global information was 
sufficiently salient to provoke an asymmetric effect of cognitive load. In Experiment 5, 
we aim to show that cognitive load can further enhance local salience and increase 
interference from local information on a global selection task.  
 
3.3 Experiment 5 
 
In Experiment 4 we ran a limited-exposure version of the selective-attention 
hierarchical-patterns task. Experiment 2 (presented in Chapter 2) illustrated that 
cognitive load enhances local salience of hierarchical patterns presented for an unlimited 
duration. Thus, in the present experiment we repeated the task in Experiment 4 but 
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presented patterns for an unlimited duration in order to enhance local salience. We 
predicted that local salience would be stronger than global salience under high cognitive 
load and expected cognitive load to increase interference from local detail on a global 
selection task.  
 
3.3.1 Method 
 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
79 participants (mean age 19.04 years; 58 females, 21 males) were all first-year-
undergraduate psychology students at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK and 
participated in exchange for course credit. Testing took place in a series of 
undergraduate lab classes and thus participant numbers were dictated by class 
attendance. The study received ethical approval from the Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.    
 
3.2.1.2 Design 
The design was identical to that in Experiment 4.  
 
3.3.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 4.  
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3.3.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure for the unlimited exposure-duration task can be seen in Figure 19. The 
procedure was identical to that used in the limited-exposure-duration task in Experiment 
4 with the exception of exposure duration and response: patterns were now presented for 
an unlimited duration and only disappeared when the participant made their response. 
Thus, participants had the opportunity to view the patterns until they had decided on, 
and started to execute, their response.  
 
Figure 19. Schematic representation of a single block of the unlimited-exposure version 
of the hierarchical patterns task (Experiment 5). As in the limited-exposure condition 
(Experiment 4), there were four blocks of 36 trials for the local task and four for the 
global task, making eight blocks in total. 
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3.3.2 Results 
 
Participants were included in the analysis if they accurately recalled the single digit in 
the low cognitive load condition or five out of six digits, in the correct order, in the high 
cognitive load condition. Blocks of trials were excluded from the final analysis if the 
participant failed to adequately recall the cognitive load associated with that block. If 
participants correctly recalled digits in less than 50% of the blocks, their data were 
excluded from the final analysis. Data were also excluded from the analysis if 
participants achieved below 75% accuracy on either the local or the global task overall. 
In total, the data from five participants were excluded in accordance with these criteria; 
one from the low cognitive load condition and four from the high cognitive load 
condition. As in Experiment 4 we calculated inverse efficiency scores for each variable 
(mean RTs and accuracy can still be seen in Table 3). 
 
As in Experiment 4, data were entered into a three-way mixed-subjects ANOVA with 
task (local vs. global) and compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) as the within- 
subjects factors and cognitive load (low vs. high) as the between-subjects factor. Inverse 
efficiency was the dependent variable (descriptives can be seen in Figure 20a).  
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Table 3. Mean reaction times and accuracy for responses in Experiment 5.  
 
 
 
The main effect of task was non-significant [p > .1]; unlike Experiment 4, participants 
were not significantly quicker to respond to local detail than global structure (although 
there was a trend in this direction). There was a main effect of compatibility [F(1, 72) = 
2.42, p < .01, η2 = .59] which again replicates the often-observed finding that 
incompatible stimuli (M = 655.76, SE = 21.5) are responded to slower than compatible 
stimuli (M = 591.37, SE = 21.01). As in Experiment 4, the interaction between task and 
   Local task Global task 
 Reaction time  Comp Inc Comp Inc 
U
n
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Low cognitive load 
M 538.93 569.86 546.88 592.36 
SE 20.84 21.2 26.52 25.7 
High cognitive load 
M 623.23 662.3 609.32 675.11 
SE 35.1 38.41 32.73 32.95 
 Accuracy 
      
U
n
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e
d
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x
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o
s
u
re
        
Low cognitive load 
M .99 .97 .99 .96 
SE .0 .01 .0 .01 
High cognitive load 
M .98 .96 .97 .94 
SE .0 .01 .01 .01 
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compatibility was significant [F(1, 72) = 4.63, p < .01, η2 = .06]. Incompatible patterns 
in the global task were responded to slower than incompatible patterns in the local task; 
however, the Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-test failed to reach significance [p > .05]. 
The main effect of cognitive load was significant [F(1, 72) = 4.95, p < .05, η2 = .06] 
which illustrates that participants under high cognitive load (M = 670.33, SE = 29.72) 
were slower to respond than participants under low cognitive load (M = 576.8, SE = 
29.7).  
 
As in Experiment 4, the interaction of interest was between task, compatibility and 
cognitive load. A significant interaction would allow us to suggest that cognitive load 
had an asymmetric effect on interference in the local- and global-selection tasks. The 
descriptive statistics presented in Figure 20b show that there was a trend in the expected 
direction; however, this was not significant [p > .1].  
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Figure 20. a. Inverse efficiency scores for participants under high and low cognitive 
load in the local and global selection tasks for both compatible and incompatible trials. 
b. Interference scores (incompatible inverse efficiency minus compatible inverse 
efficiency scores) for responses in the local and global tasks under low and high 
cognitive load. Both figures are for Experiment 5. Error bars represent one standard 
error of the mean. 
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3.3.3 Discussion 
 
We had predicted that cognitive load would enhance the salience of local detail at 
unlimited exposure durations and would make it more difficult to ignore local 
information in a global-selection task. This would provide evidence to suggest that the 
effect of cognitive load on local-global salience (discussed in Chapter 2) would feed into 
the effect of cognitive load on attentional selection. We saw a trend in the expected 
direction, where interference from local elements on a global-selection task was greater 
under high than low cognitive load, but this was not significant. 
 
3.4 Discussion of Chapter 3 
 
The present experiment explored the effect of cognitive load on the selection of 
hierarchical information. Previous research using hierarchical patterns with strong global 
salience has shown that cognitive load enhances processing of irrelevant global 
information, described as a “shift towards global processing” (Ahmed & de Fockert, 
2012). However, we suggested that this effect was driven by the strong global salience 
of the stimuli and that high cognitive load should make it more difficult to ignore the 
most salient level of representation, irrespective of whether this is global structure or 
local detail. We thus aimed to show that cognitive load would cause a ‘shift towards 
local processing’ when local salience was strong.   
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In Experiments 1-3, we demonstrated that high cognitive load enhanced the salience of 
local elements when exposure durations were unlimited; at limited exposure durations, 
however, global structure was most salient under both low and high cognitive load. In 
the experiments reported in the present chapter we predicted that cognitive load would 
affect local-global salience in a selective-attention hierarchical patterns task. We used 
exposure duration and cognitive load as a manipulation of global salience and predicted 
that global salience would be stronger than local salience under both low and high 
cognitive load at limited exposure durations. However, at unlimited exposures cognitive 
load would make local detail more salient than global structure and thus high cognitive 
load would increase interference from irrelevant but salient local information on a 
global-selection task. We observed a slight trend in the predicted direction, but this was 
not statistically significant.  
 
The present thesis argues that the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical 
information will depend on the relative salience of the attended and unattended levels of 
the hierarchical stimulus. We argue that Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) saw increased 
global interference under high cognitive load because they used hierarchical patterns 
with strong global salience, which was likely determined by the high density and limited 
exposure of the patterns. Had they used stimuli with strong local salience, then we 
predicted that they would have seen the opposite effect: cognitive load would have 
increased interference from irrelevant local detail. In the present chapter we attempted to 
manipulate local-global salience by using identical stimuli to that used in our previous 
experiments (Experiments 1-3, presented in Chapter 2) and varying their exposure 
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duration. We predicted that local or global salience – as indexed by matching 
performance in Experiments 1 and 2 – would translate into a local or global advantage 
respectively on a selection task.  
 
Interestingly, we saw a local advantage for participants under both low and high 
cognitive load for stimuli presented at unlimited and as well as limited exposure 
durations. Thus, global salience as indexed in a matching task does not necessarily 
translate into global salience in a selection task. Failure to show a global advantage at 
limited exposure-durations is not necessarily surprising in itself, as global advantage 
depends on a number of stimulus-driven factors (see Kimchi, 1992 for a review). 
However, what is more surprising is that we saw a local advantage on a selection task in 
the present experiments for the same hierarchical patterns where global matches were 
preferred on a matching task (in Experiments 1 and 2), which illustrates that local-global 
salience on a matching paradigm does not necessarily indicate local-global salience (as 
indexed by local or global advantage) on a selective-attention task even when using 
identical hierarchical patterns. The fact that we did not see a global advantage at limited 
exposure durations may also be why we did not replicate Ahmed and de Fockert’s 
(2012) finding that cognitive load enhances global processing at limited exposure 
durations, as global salience was weaker than local salience. It is important to 
acknowledge that the argument presented in this thesis would suggest that we should 
have seen a ‘shift towards local processing’ at limited exposures in Experiment 4 
because we (unexpectedly) observed a local advantage at limited durations. However, 
the fact that the global level of our medium-density patterns was more salient than local 
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detail in a limited-exposure matching task (Experiment 1) but less salient than local 
detail in a limited-exposure selection task suggests that local salience at limited exposure 
durations may not have been strong enough to observe a ‘shift towards local processing’ 
under high cognitive load.  
 
There are several reasons that may explain why local-global salience on our measures of 
perceptual bias and attention selection did not converge. Firstly, it is possible that the 
selective-attention task used in the present experiment was more cognitively-demanding 
than the similarity-matching paradigm used in Chapter 2; this could have imposed an 
extra cognitive load which in turn could have enhanced the relative salience of local 
information over global structure. Secondly, it is possible that a preference to weight 
global information more highly than local detail does not necessarily mean that the 
global level is easier to select. While perceptual bias could be determined by person-
driven factors such as hemispheric activation it could also be driven by higher cognitive 
decision-making processes; indeed, Navon (2003) has suggested that similarity-
matching paradigms could be “suspected…of being too-much influenced by post-
perceptual biases” (p. 278). Thus, a preference to favour global over local information 
could be influenced to an extent by post-perceptual biases which may not determine 
efficiency of selection. Hence, global salience was stronger than local salience in a 
measure of perceptual bias but a local advantage was observed in a task of attentional-
selection. It is also important to acknowledge that we presented the medium-density 
hierarchical patterns in isolation in the present experiment, whereas the medium-density 
patterns were presented intermixed with low- and high-density patterns in Experiments 
117 
 
 
 
 
1-3. It is entirely possible that global salience is dependent on whether pattern-density is 
blocked or intermixed; against this, however, we have run single-pattern-density 
similarity-matching experiments as part of other studies and found that global salience 
of medium-density stimuli is comparable when they are presented alone and when they 
are presented intermixed with other densities (~60% global matches).  
 
It may also be the case that differences in local-global salience induced by cognitive 
load were insufficiently strong to influence the selection of global and local information. 
Indeed, in our unlimited-exposure version of the task in Experiment 5, exposure 
durations were participant-determined and it was likely that durations were too brief to 
see an enhancement of local salience to the extent that it was observed in Experiment 2. 
For example, in Experiment 2 the average response latency when exposures were 
unlimited was approximately 1,350 ms, almost twice as long as the approximately 650 
ms reported in Experiment 4. Thus, failure to show that cognitive load can increase 
interference from local detail on a global-selection task may be due to the use of 
exposure duration as a means of increasing local salience, rather than the absence of an 
effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information. Indeed, the issue of 
using variable exposure durations is a problem in itself, beyond the issue just 
highlighted. The selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) was 
developed to test an assumption about the initial dominance of global-level information 
and was not designed to explore the development of the percept. Arguably, there can 
never be any true unlimited-exposure version of the selective-attention hierarchical-
patterns task, as by its very nature the task depends on quick responses.  
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Although we did not see an effect of cognitive load on local-global salience expressed in 
an effect of cognitive load on attentional selection, our data more generally show the 
importance of controlling for exposure duration when using the hierarchical-patterns 
task to make inferences about local and global processing, especially when person-
driven influences on selection are the subject of investigation. We did see that, for both 
the local and global tasks, responses were significantly slower when stimuli were 
presented for an unlimited, as opposed to a limited, duration. This in itself is to be 
expected as participants would have felt under less time pressure. However, responses 
under high cognitive load were significantly slower than those under low cognitive load 
(for both the local and global tasks) when exposures were unlimited but not when 
exposures were limited. If we had run only a limited-exposure version of the task, we 
would have concluded that cognitive load had no effect on responses. If we had looked 
solely at data from an unlimited-exposure version of the task, however, we would have 
concluded that cognitive load did exert an effect. This observation is important as 
exposure duration is not a variable that is rigorously controlled when using selective-
attention hierarchical-patterns tasks. Studies present stimuli for varying durations, and 
this is not taken into account in cross-experiment, or cross-paradigm, comparisons. Our 
data suggest that top-down differences in control may exert their effects when stimulus 
presentation is unlimited in a different way to when it is limited. 
 
In conclusion, the experiment presented in this chapter attempted to address the extent to 
which the effect of cognitive load on selection is modulated by local-global salience. To 
manipulate global salience we varied exposure duration, predicting that global salience 
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would be strongest at limited exposures and that local salience would be strongest at 
unlimited exposure durations under high cognitive load. However, we found that local 
salience was stronger than global salience at both limited and unlimited exposure 
durations, and did not see high cognitive load increase interference from irrelevant local 
information on a global selection task. We reasoned that exposure duration was an 
inappropriate manipulation of local-global salience with medium-density hierarchical 
patterns.   
 
We suggest that there are more appropriate ways of increasing local salience. Indeed, in 
Chapter 2 we used hierarchical patterns in which the number of elements and their 
density varied; higher-density patterns were more likely to be represented in terms of 
their global structure than lower density patterns (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982). 
Furthermore, Kimchi (1998, 2000) has suggested that high-density stimuli are initially 
represented in terms of their global structure but that low-density stimuli are initially 
represented in terms of their local elements.  It is likely that a density manipulation is a 
more appropriate manipulation of local-global salience. Specifically, by using 
hierarchical patterns that are very low in density we may see strong local salience even 
at limited exposure durations. In Chapter 4, we present two experiments (Experiments 6 
and 7) in which we continue our investigation with hierarchical patterns but manipulate 
local-global salience by varying pattern density. By using low-density stimuli we set out 
to demonstrate that cognitive load can increase interference from local information when 
local salience is strong in a limited-exposure paradigm. In Experiments 6 and 7 we also 
utilise a different cognitive load manipulation to that used in the experiments presented 
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thus far; whereas in Experiments 1-5 participants had to perform a secondary cognitive 
load task while performing the attentional-selection task, in Experiments 6 and 7 
participants had to perform a task-switching task. The ability to switch between tasks 
efficiently is essential for controlled cognitive functioning in everyday life. However, it 
is cognitively demanding and arguably provides a more ‘real-world’ manipulation of 
cognitive load.  
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CHAPTER 4 - TASK SWITCHING 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the experiments reported in Chapter 3, we explored how cognitive load affects the 
selection of hierarchical information. It has been argued that cognitive load always 
benefits global selection while impairing local selection (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012). 
However, we suggest that the effect of cognitive load on local and global selection is 
influenced by stimulus-driven factors which affect local-global salience. When global 
salience is strong – as it was in Ahmed and de Fockert’s study – high cognitive load 
makes it more difficult to ignore salient global information when performing a local-
selection task. When local salience is strong, however, high cognitive load should make 
it harder to ignore irrelevant local information when performing a global-selection task. 
In two experiments in Chapter 3, we used a selective-attention version of the 
hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) to explore whether high cognitive load can 
improve local selection when local salience is strong. We did not find convincing 
evidence to suggest that high cognitive load can make processing more local. We 
suggest that our manipulation of stimulus-driven salience – involving varying the 
exposure duration of the stimulus – did not enhance local salience to a sufficiently great 
extent. In the present chapter, we continue our investigation with hierarchical patterns 
and present two experiments in which we vary stimulus density in order to manipulate 
local and global salience. We demonstrate that high cognitive load can impair global 
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selection when patterns have strong local salience and conclude that high cognitive load 
does not always cause a “shift towards global processing” (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012). 
 
In addition to changing our manipulation of global salience from exposure-duration to 
pattern-density, in the experiments reported in this chapter we also changed the way in 
which we manipulated cognitive load. Instead of having participants rehearse digit 
strings whilst performing the selection task, we introduced a task-switching variable. 
Task switching involves managing the balance between competing goals – the hallmark 
of efficient goal-directed behaviour (Monsell, 2003) – and is in itself cognitively 
demanding and imposes a cognitive load (Yeung & Monsell, 2003). Indeed, it comes 
with a behavioural cost and is associated with increased response latencies and higher 
error rates (e.g., Allport, Styles & Shulan, 1994; Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) 
which are both markers of cognitive load (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Lavie et al., 2004). The 
ability to efficiently switch between different tasks is crucial for efficient cognitive 
functioning in everyday life. Task-switching may be necessary for complex operations, 
such as driving a vehicle, but can also occur as a result of entertaining repeated 
distractions such as text messages, telephone calls or e-mails. Thus, task-switching may 
not only be an effective manipulation of cognitive load but also allows us to consider 
how task-switching – an ubiquitous everyday task – could affect hierarchical processing. 
 
Each time a task is changed or distraction is indulged, the brain must reconfigure the 
cognitive task set essential for performance of a particular task (Allport et al., 1994; 
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Rogers and Monsell, 1996). In terms of the selection of hierarchical information, the 
task set specifies which level of the hierarchy is to be responded to, that is, whether 
participants are preparing to select either local or global information. In experimental 
scenarios, task-switching is explored by measuring performance on consecutive trials in 
which the task to-be-performed is the same, in comparison to trials on which the task-to-
be-performed changes. For example, switching from performing a local task on one trial 
to performing a global task on the next constitutes a task-switch; performing a local task 
on two consecutive trials, however, does not. If task set can be perfectly reconfigured 
then task-switching should not affect how efficiently local and global information is 
selected. However, the high cognitive load associated with task switching should 
increase interference from irrelevant-yet-salient hierarchical information on switch trials.   
 
In Chapter 3, we considered the possibility that the salience of the to-be-selected 
hierarchical information in a selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task would be 
influenced by the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias. To briefly review our 
previous findings, in Chapter 2 we presented a series of experiments which 
demonstrated that high cognitive load reduced the salience of global structure and 
enhanced the salience of local elements but only when stimuli were presented for 
unlimited exposure-durations. The experiments reported in Chapter 3, however, showed 
us that exposure duration was an inappropriate manipulation of global salience in a 
selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task. We suggest this is because selective-
attention paradigms are not capable of delivering sufficiently long exposure-durations. 
Therefore, in the present study we chose stimuli for which local salience was likely to be 
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stronger than global salience even at limited exposure durations. In other words, we used 
a limited-exposure paradigm but manipulated global salience through pattern-density. 
Global salience is dependent on the number and relative density of local elements in a 
hierarchical pattern (Kimchi, 1998, 2000; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; our data from 
Experiment 1-3 also replicate this) and very-low-density patterns should have strong 
local salience even at limited exposure-durations.  
 
Kimchi (1998, 2000) used a primed-matching paradigm to study the microgenesis of 
global and local salience in hierarchical patterns and demonstrated that the temporal 
trajectory of local and global salience varied with the number and relative size of the 
elements comprising the global whole. She presented participants with a hierarchical 
pattern as a prime for a duration varying between 40 ms and 690 ms (Kimchi, 1998) or 
390 ms (Kimchi, 2000). The prime then disappeared and was replaced by a pair of 
hierarchical patterns which could be the same or different; the task was to indicate 
whether the two patterns were the same or different. In such primed-matching tasks, 
‘same’ responses are faster if the test patterns are similar to the prime than if they are 
different from it; the logic of the hierarchical-patterns version of this paradigm is that 
‘same’ responses will be faster if the target patterns are matched at a hierarchical level 
which matches the participant’s internal representation of the prime. For example, if 
participants are biased towards representing the prime at the local level, then responses 
should be faster to test patterns which are matched at the local than at the global level. 
Conversely, positive responses to target similarity should be faster to stimulus pairs 
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matched on global structure if the prime is represented in terms of its global structure 
more than its local detail.  
 
By presenting primes for differing exposure-durations, Kimchi (1998, 2000) was able to 
demonstrate how the relative salience of local and global information changes with time 
and showed that the temporal trajectory of local and global salience varies with the 
density of hierarchical patterns. She suggested that the local elements of low-density 
patterns form the entry-level perceptual units of these patterns, and that time and 
attentional resources are necessary to consolidate these elements into a global whole. For 
high-density patterns, however, she suggested that global structure is the entry-level unit 
and that attentional resources were necessary to dis-embed local elements from their 
strong global context. This being the case, very-low-density hierarchical patterns should 
have strong local salience, especially at limited exposure durations, whereas high-
density patterns should have strong global salience at limited exposures. In the present 
experiments we predicted that high cognitive load – induced by task-switching – should 
make it more difficult to ignore salient local information when selecting the global level 
of low-density hierarchical patterns.  
 
In sum, we endeavoured to show that high cognitive load (induced by task-switching) 
does not always benefit global processing but that it can make processing more local 
when stimuli have strong local salience. We continued our investigation with the 
selective-attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) – used in 
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Experiments 4 and 5 (presented in Chapter 3) – but manipulated global salience by 
changing pattern density and made exposure duration always limited. In Experiment 4, 
we saw that our medium-density patterns (Kimchi & Palmers, 1982) were responded to 
with a local advantage (namely that local detail was responded to more quickly than 
global structure) whereas in Experiments 1-3 (presented in Chapter 2) we saw that these 
same stimuli were matched more at the global level, suggesting that global salience was 
stronger than local salience. We suggested that participants may have preferred to 
represent these stimuli in terms of their global structure even though their local detail 
was easier to select. In other words, a change of paradigm was sufficient to induce a 
switch in the level of hierarchical information that was most salient. We conclude that 
medium-density patterns possessed neither strong local salience nor strong global 
salience. Thus, in the experiments reported in the present chapter we used our lowest-
density stimuli from Experiments 1-3 (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) in order to ensure that 
stimuli had strong local salience. These patterns were a similar density to Kimchi’s 
(1998) few-element patterns which the evidence suggests are represented initially in 
terms of their local elements. We reasoned that increasing cognitive load should make it 
more difficult to select the global structure of these low-density patterns and that an 
increase in interference from salient-but-irrelevant local detail should be observed. We 
also ran our task-switching experiment with the medium-density patterns used in 
Experiments 4 and 5; this time, we predicted that cognitive load would have no effect on 
selection as we had observed no effect of cognitive load on selection of these patterns in 
Experiments 4 and 5.  
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The task-switching version of the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task, which 
we use in the present experiments, differs from the usual version of the selective-
attention hierarchical-patterns task in the way that the local- and global-selection tasks 
are blocked. In the selective-attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task (as used in 
Experiments 4 and 5, Chapter 3), the local- and global-selection tasks are completed in 
separate blocks. In the switching version of the task presented here, however, 
participants are only informed of the task they are to perform at the start of each trial, 
and thus have to quickly reconfigure their task set to either ‘go local’ or ‘go global’ on 
each trial. This should reduce the influence of block-wise strategic effects and allows for 
the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information to be explored 
within-participants in the same block of trials. It should also make it harder to ignore 
salient information given that it is relevant on half of all trials.  
 
Research has shown a robust ‘switch cost’ for switch trials in comparison to no-switch 
trials (e.g., Allport et al., 1994), with reaction times and error rates being greater in the 
former than in the latter. We equate ‘switch’ trials with high cognitive load and ‘no-
switch’ trials with low cognitive load. If cognitive load makes it more difficult to ignore 
salient (yet irrelevant) information then we would expect switch costs to depend on both 
the task to be performed (local or global) and on pattern density. When using low-
density patterns with strong local salience, we would expect to see worse performance 
on a global-selection trial which immediately follows a local-selection trial, as the task 
switch should incur a high cognitive load and make it more difficult to ignore salient 
irrelevant local detail. When switching from a global to a local task using the same low-
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density stimuli, however, we would not expect high cognitive load to increase 
interference from irrelevant global structure given its low salience. When using medium-
density patterns we would not expect to see asymmetric effects of cognitive load on 
local and global selection given that local and global salience are reasonably equated. 
 
We ran two experiments, one with medium-density patterns (Experiment 6), and the 
other with low-density patterns (Experiment 7), with the patterns corresponding to the 
‘medium-’ and ‘low-density’ patterns used in Experiments 1-3. In Experiment 6 we did 
not expect to see any effect of cognitive load on local and global selection as we had 
seen no effect of cognitive load on selection of these patterns at limited exposure-
durations in Experiment 4. In Experiment 7, however, we predicted that we would see an 
asymmetric effect of cognitive load on local and global selection; cognitive load, as 
induced by switching, should increase interference from salient local information on a 
global-selection task but should not increase interference from global information on a 
local-selection task. 
 
 
4.2 Experiment 6 
 
Task switching is known to be cognitively demanding (Yeung & Monsell, 2003) and in 
the present experiment we used a task-switching paradigm as a manipulation of 
cognitive load, equating no-switch trials with low cognitive load and switch trials with 
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high cognitive load. In the present experiment, we altered the selective-attention version 
of the hierarchical-patterns task used in Chapter 3 so that the local and global tasks were 
no longer performed in separate blocks; now, participants were told at the beginning of 
each trial which task they were to perform. In the present experiment, we used medium-
denisty patterns so that the task was identical to the task in Experiment 4 except for the 
manner in which the trials are performed (blocked in Experiment 4 vs. switching in 
Experiment 6). As we saw no effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical 
information in Experiment 4, we did not expect to see an effect of task switching in the 
present experiment.  
 
4.2.1 Method 
 
4.2.1.1 Participants  
Forty-three undergraduate students (mean age 21.2 years; 38 females, 5 males) at 
Goldsmiths, University of London, participated in the present experiment. Participation 
was in exchange for course credit. Testing took place in a series of undergraduate lab 
classes and thus participant numbers were dictated by class attendance. The study 
received ethical approval from the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at 
Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.    
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4.2.1.2 Design  
We used a 2x2x2 within-participants design. The independent variables were switch 
(switch trials vs. no-switch trials), task (local vs. global) and compatibility (compatible 
vs. incompatible). The dependent variable was inverse efficiency, which we computed 
from dividing reaction time (ms) by accuracy for each factor. (We also used an inverse 
efficiency measure of performance in Chapter 3; more detail on this calculation is 
provided in the results section.)  
 
4.2.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli. 
The task was developed and executed with E-Prime version 1.2 (Psychology Software 
Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, PA). Stimuli were presented on a Sony Trinitron GDM-F520 
CRT monitor with a 21-in flat screen. Stimuli were identical to the medium-density 
hierarchical patterns used in Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (originally developed by 
Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) and were created using Adobe Photoshop CS2. Patterns were 
small black triangles or squares configured to form large triangles or squares. The local 
and global levels of hierarchical patterns could be either compatible (e.g., small squares 
arranged to form a large square) or incompatible (e.g., small squares arranged to form a 
large triangle). Figure 21 depicts our stimulus set. There were four unique hierarchical 
patterns and each subtended approximately 2.4° of visual angle. Small squares 
subtended 0.8° and small triangles 0.7°.  Whether participants were to perform the 
global or local task was indicated with a vocal instruction, which was ‘big’ for the global 
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task or ‘small’ for the local task. The voice was female and was recorded and edited 
using GoldWave® software.  
 
Figure 21. The complete stimulus set used in the present experiment (replicated from 
Kimchi & Palmer, 1982, and identical to our medium-density patterns used in 
Experiments 1-5).  
 
 
There were 96 trials in total. Each of the four original hierarchical patterns was 
presented once in the global task and once in the local task. Each of these eight possible 
trials was presented once in the centre of the screen, once 1.7° above centre along the 
vertical midline, and once 1.7° below centre along the vertical midline. The resulting 24 
possible trials were presented four times, totalling 96 trials, with each stimulus in each 
location being presented 12 times per task.  
 
4.2.1.4 Procedure. 
Figure 22 illustrates the procedure for Experiment 6. Participants were seated 60 cm 
from the screen and were asked to place the index finger of each hand on the ‘c’ and ‘m’ 
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keys of a QWERTY keyboard. They were then asked to read through a series of on-
screen instructions describing the task that they were about to perform. Participants were 
informed that they would hear a voice at the start of each trial, which would say either 
‘big’ or ‘small’. If the voice said ‘big’ then participants were to indicate whether the 
large shape was a square or a triangle. If the voice said ‘small’ then they were to say 
whether the small shapes were squares or triangles. Each trial ran as follows: a fixation 
cross was presented in the centre of a white screen for 1,000 ms. As soon as this 
disappeared, it was replaced with a blank screen for 1,500 ms and participants 
immediately heard either ‘big’ or ‘small’. The blank screen was then replaced with a 
hierarchical pattern which was presented for 250 ms. The pattern then disappeared and 
was replaced with a blank screen; participants had 3,000 ms to make their response. The 
response screen timed-out after 3,000 ms. If a response was made within this time, the 
blank screen remained for a further 1,000 ms following the response before the next trial 
began. Participants were asked to respond as quickly but as accurately as possible. They 
then performed a practice block that consisted of sixteen trials; each of the four unique 
stimuli were presented twice in the local task and twice in the global task. After the 
practice block, participants were told that the main task was to begin and performed 96 
experimental trials.  
 
‘Switch’ and ‘no-switch’ trials were computed after the data had been collected. A trial 
was designated a switch trial if the task to be performed was different to the one in the 
trial that preceded it (e.g., if the global task was to be performed on a trial following a 
trial where the local task was performed). A trial was a no-switch trial if the task was the 
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same as on the previous trial (e.g., if a global-task-trial followed another global-task-
trial). ‘Switch’/’no-switch’ was treated as an additional independent variable. Whether 
the local or global task was to be performed on each trial was determined at random. 
Thus, whether a trial was designated ‘switch’ or ‘no-switch’ depended on the random 
order in which the local or global task was selected and therefore there were potentially 
slightly uneven numbers of switch and no-switch trials in each dataset. 
 
 
Figure 22. A schematic representation of a single trial of the task-switching 
hierarchical-patterns task used in Experiment 6 (medium-density patterns). 
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4.2.2 Results 
 
We excluded the first trial for each participant from the final analysis. We then 
calculated inverse efficiency scores, by dividing reaction times for each condition by the 
accuracy for that condition. This was to limit the influence of potential speed-accuracy 
trade-offs. The mean RTs and errors before calculation of inverse efficiency can be seen 
in Table 4. We then calculated interference scores by subtracting inverse efficiency 
scores on compatible trials from those on incompatible trials.  
 
Table 4. Mean reaction times and accuracy for Experiment 6. 
 
   Local task Global task 
   Comp Inc Comp Inc 
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 
       
No-switch 
M 720.99 797.94 706.56 825.52 
SE 25.96 30.88 23.36 30.49 
Switch 
M 846.06 913.86 832.68 932.69 
SE 28.02 32.19 31.09 32.23 
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 No-switch 
M .99 .96 .99 .96 
SE .01 .01 .0 .02 
Switch 
M .96 .94 .97 .91 
SE .01 .01 .0 .02 
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Participants were excluded from the final analysis if they achieved below 75% accuracy 
on either the local or global task in switch or no-switch trials. Accuracy was high overall 
(see Table 4), and no participants fell below our exclusion threshold. The data from all 
participants were entered into a 2x2x2 within-subjects ANOVA, with switch (switch vs. 
no-switch), task (local vs. global) and compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) as the 
factors. The dependent variable was the inverse efficiency score (see Figure 23).  
 
There were main effects of switch [F(1, 42) = 73.9, p < .001, η2 = 64] and compatibility 
[F(1, 42) = 6.12, p < .05, η2 = 13]. Responses were more efficient on no-switch trials [M 
= 811.19, SE = 53.48] in comparison to switch trials [M = 986.18, SE = 74.63] and more 
efficient on compatible trials [M = 796.92, SE = 28.94] as opposed to incompatible trials 
[M = 1,000.45, SE = 99.16]. The main effect of task was non-significant [p > .1] 
indicating that, overall, participants were equally efficient at responding to local 
elements and global structure. 
 
There were no significant interactions [p > .1]. The interaction between switch, task and 
compatibility would have shown that switching affects interference on the local and 
global tasks differently; however, this interaction was non-significant [p = .2] (see 
Figure 24).  
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Figure 23. Inverse efficiency scores for compatible and incompatible patterns in the 
local and global tasks, for both no-switch and switch trials (Experiment 6). Error bars 
show one standard error of the mean.  
 
 
Figure 24. Interference in no-switch and switch trials for both the local and global 
tasks. We calculated interference by subtracting inverse efficiency scores for compatible 
stimuli from those for incompatible stimuli (Experiment 6). Error bars show one 
standard error of the mean.  
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4.2.3 Discussion 
 
The present experiment has demonstrated that a switch cost is apparent on a task-
switching version of the hierarchical-patterns task – evidenced by less efficient 
responses and more interference in switch trials compared to no-switch trials – but this 
pattern was present in the local task and the global task to the same extent. This is not 
surprising as we had shown no task-specific effect of cognitive load in a selective-
attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task in Experiment 4 using these same 
stimuli.  In Experiment 7 we aimed to show that switch costs for local and global tasks 
are asymmetric when local salience is strong. 
 
 
4.3 Experiment 7 
 
 
In the previous experiment, we demonstrated that switch-costs on a task-switching 
selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task were comparable to the effects of high 
cognitive load on selection; efficiency in responses was impaired and more interference 
was experienced from irrelevant information. However, interference was symmetrical 
across the local and global tasks. We now repeat the experiment using low-density 
hierarchical patterns which should have strong local salience. We suggest that switching 
will now be associated with increased interference from irrelevant – and salient – local 
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information on a global-selection task, but that switching should have no effect on 
interference from irrelevant global information on a local-selection task.  
 
4.3.1 Method 
 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
38 participants (mean age 23.6 years; 32 females, 6 males) were recruited from 
Goldsmiths, University of London. Participants were all undergraduate students and 
participation was reimbursed with course credit. The study received ethical approval 
from the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of 
London, UK.    
 
4.3.1.2 Design 
The design was identical to that in Experiment 6.  
 
4.3.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli. 
The apparatus was identical to that used in Experiment 6. However, in the present 
experiment we used low-density stimuli (equivalent to our lowest-density stimuli used in 
Chapter 2, replicated from Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; see Figure 25). Each pattern 
subtended approximately 2.4° of visual angle. The small squares subtended 1.2° and the 
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small triangles 1.0° of visual angle. There were 96 trials in total. Each of the four 
original hierarchical patterns was presented once in the global task and once in the local 
task. Each of these eight possible trials was presented once in the centre of the screen, 
once 1.7° above centre along the vertical midline, and once 1.7° below centre along the 
vertical midline. These resulting 24 possible trials were presented four times, totalling 
96 trials.  
 
 
Figure 25. The complete stimulus set used in the present experiment (replicated from 
Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).  
 
 
4.3.1.4 Procedure. 
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 6. 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
As in Experiment 6, we excluded the first trial for each participant from the final 
analysis. We again calculated inverse efficiency scores, by dividing reaction times for 
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each condition by the accuracy for that condition. Mean RTs and errors before inverse 
efficiency calculations can be found in Table 5. 
 
Data were entered into a 2x2x2 within-subjects ANOVA, with switch (switch vs. no-
switch), task (local vs. global) and compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) as the 
factors. The dependent variable was inverse efficiency. Participants were excluded from 
the final analysis if they achieved less that 75% accuracy in either the global or local 
task for either switch or no-switch trials. All participants met this threshold, so the data 
from all participants were entered into the analysis. See Figure 26 for inverse efficiency 
scores.   
 
There were significant main effects of switch [F(1, 36) = 112.46, p < .001, η2 = .76], 
compatibility [F(1, 36) = 98.23, p < .001, η2 = .73] and task [F(1, 36) = 4.86, p < .05, η2 
= .12]: responses on switch trials [M = 942.88, SE = 40.45] were less efficient than those 
on no-switch trials [M = 760.94, SE = 30.23]; responses to incompatible patterns [M = 
925.99, SE = 38.55] were less efficient than to compatible patterns [M = 777.83, SE = 
32.13]; participants were more efficient in responding to the identity of local elements 
[M = 831.46, SE = 35.68] than global structure [M = 872.35, SE = 34.99]. The fact that 
responses to local patterns were more efficient than to global patterns is consistent with 
a local advantage.   
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Table 5. Mean reaction times and accuracy for Experiment 7. 
 
 
There was also a significant interaction between task and compatibility [F(1, 36) = 
10.12, p < .01, η2 = .22]. To explore this interaction, we subtracted inverse efficiency 
scores for compatible patterns from inverse efficiency scores for incompatible patterns, 
for both the local and global tasks, to obtain a measure of interference. Overall, 
interference was greater in the global task [M = 200.52, SE = 23.57] than in the local 
task [M = 95.8, SE = 20.82], indicating that participants found it more difficult to ignore 
irrelevant local information than irrelevant global information. This again suggests that 
local salience was strong in this task. Compatibility also interacted significantly with 
switch [F(1, 36) = 5.98, p < .05, η2 = .14]. We calculated interference scores for both 
   Local task Global task 
   Comp Inc Comp Inc 
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 
       
No-switch 
M 692.91 753.21 685.29 797.62 
SE 26.19 32.42 26.46 28.6 
Switch 
M 826.18 863.44 791.38 934.83 
SE 33.9 34.82 29.75 31.23 
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 No-switch 
M .99 .97 .98 .94 
SE .01 .01 .01 .02 
Switch 
M .97 .90 .96 .86 
SE .01 .02 .01 .02 
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switch and no-switch trials and found that, overall, there was more interference from 
incompatible information in switch trials [M = 185.34, SE = 25.24] than in no-switch 
trials [M = 110.98, SE = 16.5]. The interaction between switch and task was non-
significant [p > .1].  
 
 
Figure 26. Inverse efficiency scores for compatible and incompatible patterns in the 
local and global tasks, for both no-switch and switch trials (Experiment 7). Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean.  
 
 
The main interaction of interest was between switch, task, and compatibility. This was 
also significant [F(1, 36) = 4.28, p < .05, η2 = .11]. We again calculated an interference 
measure by subtracting compatible inverse efficiency scores from incompatible inverse 
efficiency scores. We did this for the local and global task, for both no-switch and 
switch conditions, giving us four interference scores in total (see Figure 27). Bonferroni-
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corrected post-hoc t-tests revealed that there was significantly more interference in the 
global task for switch trials in comparison to no-switch trials [t(36) = -3.35, p < .01]. 
Switching, however, had no significant effect on interference in the local task [p > .1]. 
This suggests that switching makes it harder to ignore irrelevant-but-salient local 
information, but has no effect on the suppression of irrelevant low-salient global 
information.     
 
 
Figure 27. Interference derived from inverse efficiency scores in no-switch and switch 
trials for both the local and global tasks (Experiment 7). Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean.  
 
  
4.3.3 Discussion 
 
The results indicate that cognitive load (induced by task-switching) can impair global 
selection when local salience is strong. This does not support the assertion that cognitive 
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load always facilitates global processing (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012); rather, it supports 
the idea that the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information depends 
on the relative salience of the different levels of hierarchical information.   
 
4.4 Discussion of Chapter 4 
 
Cognitive load has been shown to enhance selection of global information (Ahmed & de 
Fockert, 2012) and this finding has been interpreted as cognitive load inducing a “shift 
towards global processing”. However, we have suggested that the effect of cognitive 
load should depend on the salience of the stimulus, such that cognitive load should make 
the most salient level of a hierarchical stimulus more difficult to ignore. Whereas 
increased interference from global information has been found in a local-selection task 
performed on hierarchical patterns with strong global salience (Ahmed & de Fockert, 
2012), in the present study we showed that cognitive load increases interference from 
local information in a global-selection task performed on hierarchical patterns with 
strong local salience (Experiment 7). When, however, we used stimuli in which local 
and global salience were reasonably well matched, task switching increased local and 
global interference to the same extent (Experiment 6). This suggests that cognitive load 
does not always facilitate selection of global information. Rather, the effect of cognitive 
load on selection of hierarchical information depends on stimulus salience: cognitive 
load impairs local selection when global salience is strong but impairs global selection 
when local salience is strong. In the present experiments we also confirmed that task-
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switching is an effective manipulation of cognitive load in a hierarchical-patterns task 
and our results suggest that task-switching, common in everyday life, affects how well 
we can selectively process hierarchical information.  
 
In Experiments 4 and 5 (reported in Chapter 3), we attempted to manipulate local-global 
salience by varying the exposure-duration of the experimental stimuli. However, we 
found that participants in the unlimited-exposure condition were still quite quick to 
respond to patterns and we questioned the efficacy of manipulating local-global salience 
through exposure duration in a speeded-response paradigm. Thus, in the present 
experiments we manipulated local-global salience using pattern density. Our data from 
the present experiments suggest that our manipulation of pattern density did indeed 
affect local-global salience. In Experiment 6, where we used medium-density stimuli, 
local and global responses were equally fast; with the low-density patterns used in 
Experiment 7, however, we observed a local advantage. These data suggest that local 
salience was strong for low-density patterns, but that global and local salience was 
reasonably matched for medium-density patterns.   
 
We have shown that high cognitive load can increase interference from irrelevant local 
information when local salience is strong. It is perhaps unsurprising that this pattern of 
data has not been reported before – and that Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) concluded 
that high cognitive load always facilitates global processing – as research with 
hierarchical patterns tends to use very dense stimuli. Navon’s (1977) original stimuli 
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were very dense, with 19 or 22 local elements comprising each global structure. This is 
in stark contrast to Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) low-density stimuli used in Experiment 
7, which have only three or four individual elements in each pattern. By only using 
hierarchical patterns with strong global salience to make conclusions about hierarchical 
processing in real-world vision, we are missing an important interaction between local-
global salience and top-down effects on hierarchical processing. This is especially 
important when investigating individual differences in hierarchical processing; where 
individual differences are associated with top-down differences in cognitive control, 
using only hierarchical patterns with strong global salience will only tell us half the 
story.  
 
Comparing performance on a selection task with both low- and high-density patterns 
allows us to distinguish between different accounts of the underlying mechanisms 
responsible for individual differences in performance. If individual differences are due 
to differences in cognitive control, then interference from irrelevant local information 
should increase for stimuli with strong local salience (Experiment 7) while interference 
from irrelevant global information should increase for stimuli with strong global salience 
(as in the findings of Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012). However, if individual differences in 
local-global selection always result in impaired local selection or always result in 
impaired global selection, regardless of local-global salience, then we could conclude 
that the underlying mechanism is unlikely to be associated with cognitive control. 
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In addition to the effect that cognitive load has on cognitive control (induced by task-
switching), it is worth considering the possibility that task-switching might also affect 
the relative activation of the global-dominant right- and local-dominant left-hemisphere 
mechanisms and with it the salience of global and local information. Increasing task 
difficulty has been shown to reduce right hemisphere activation so that brain activation 
becomes bilateral (Helton et al., 2010) and we have previously show that cognitive load 
reduces the salience of global information and enhances the salience of local information 
(Experiments 2 and 3). It is possible that task-switching might make it more difficult to 
activate the right-lateralised global-level mechanism which means that global salience 
should be reduced and interference from irrelevant local information should be increased 
(on a global-selection task). The effect of this would be apparent on trials where a global 
trial follows a local trial, as the global-level mechanism may not be fully activated and 
interference from local-level information should be increased. On trials where a local 
trial follows a global trial, however, responses should not be affected by irrelevant 
global structure. 
 
Our findings followed this pattern, but only when we used low-density hierarchical 
patterns (Experiment 7); when we used medium-density patterns, we did not see an 
asymmetric effect of task-switching on performance of the local- and global-selection 
tasks (Experiment 6). This is comparable to our findings reported in Experiment 4 
(presented in Chapter 3) where we argued that local salience in our medium-density 
patterns was not strong enough for an effect of cognitive load on selection to be 
apparent. This suggests that, although task-switching may be affecting the activation of 
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the global-level mechanisms, it may only be possible to observe the effect of cognitive 
load on perceptual bias feed into a selection task when local information is sufficiently 
salient.  
 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that high cognitive load does not always promote a 
“shift towards global processing”. Rather, we have shown that high cognitive load (as 
induced by task-switching in Experiments 6 and 7) can make irrelevant local detail more 
difficult to ignore, but only when it is salient. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, 
it shows that cognitive load does not necessarily make people more global but can make 
processing more local when local salience is strong. Secondly, our data suggest that 
task-switching in the real-world may affect the selective processing of hierarchical 
information. The modern world is full of distractions that compete for our attention and 
indulging each e-mail, text message and phone call may have an impact on how we 
process the visual world. The effect that it will have on our ability to select information, 
however, will depend on the salience of information in the environment.  
 
We now move our investigation beyond hierarchical patterns. Although research into 
local-global processing is most frequently conducted with hierarchical patterns, these 
patterns have received criticism for lacking certain grouping principles – such as closure 
and connectedness – which define global structure in real-world objects (Navon, 2003). 
This may mean that the global salience of ‘real-world’ objects in which local detail is 
connected to global structure may not decay with time. As real-world vision does not 
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consist of a series of limited-exposure presentations, the selective-attention version of 
the hierarchical-patterns task may not indicate the efficiency of selection in real-world 
scenarios, in which stimuli can often be inspected for longer periods of time. Thus, in 
Chapter 5 we continue our investigation of hierarchical processing by using the Framed 
Line Test (Kitayama et al., 2003), an unlimited-exposure paradigm designed to address 
selection of local and global hierarchical information.   
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CHAPTER 5 - THE FRAMED LINE TEST 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
Over the last three chapters, we have explored the effect exerted by cognitive load on 
perceptual bias and attentional selection. It has been suggested that high cognitive load 
always causes the attentional window to spread and will thus always benefit global 
processing (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012). However, we have found that cognitive load 
can increase interference from irrelevant local detail when local salience is strong 
(Experiment 7, presented in Chapter 4). This suggests that the effect of cognitive load on 
the selection of hierarchical information is influenced by stimulus-driven factors which 
determine local-global salience. The present chapter continues this line of investigation 
but moves away from hierarchical patterns as a means of investigating hierarchical 
processing. Although hierarchical patterns provide a compelling index of local-global 
processing, it has been noted that they lack certain grouping properties, such as closure 
and connectedness, that are present in real-world objects (Navon, 2003). In this chapter, 
we investigate the effect of cognitive load on performance of the Framed Line Test 
(Kitayama et al., 2003), a task which measures local and global selection using a 
stimulus where the local element is usually physically connected to the global structure. 
We show that simply disconnecting the local line from its global context alters the 
relative salience of local and global information and can dramatically alter the effect of 
cognitive load on selective attention to hierarchical information.  
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To reiterate, the experiments presented in this thesis so far have explored the effect of 
cognitive load on hierarchical processing exclusively through the use of hierarchical 
patterns. Hierarchical patterns allow exploration of the ability to select either local or 
global information without interference from the other hierarchical level (e.g., Navon, 
1977; Kimchi, 1992). However, the ecological validity of hierarchical patterns has been 
questioned as they lack grouping principles such as connectedness and closure which 
define many real-world objects (Navon, 2003). Previously, we discussed a host of 
stimulus-driven factors which could affect local-global salience in hierarchical patterns. 
In the present chapter we move beyond hierarchical patterns in our investigation of 
cognitive load and hierarchical processing and present a series of experiments which 
explore the extent to which our observations with hierarchical patterns are applicable to 
objects defined by other grouping principles. We suggest that cognitive load should still 
make it more difficult to ignore salient information, but the properties that define local-
global salience in hierarchical patterns (e.g., pattern density and exposure duration) may 
not be important in defining local-global salience in objects with stronger groupings.  
 
An important grouping factor that is absent in hierarchical patterns is uniform 
connectedness (Palmer & Rock, 1994) which describes how elements that are physically 
connected to each other, and uniform in terms of their visual properties (e.g., colour, 
luminance), form a single entry-level perceptual unit upon which grouping principles 
later act. Connectedness is a strong determinant of how the visual field is initially 
segregated into likely candidates for object groupings and has been shown to be 
dominant over proximity, similarity, and both similarity and proximity in conjunction 
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(Palmer & Rock, 1994; although see Han, Humphreys & Chen, 1999). Indeed, local 
elements in hierarchical patterns are distinct connected objects in their own right which 
are then grouped by proximity, similarity and common onset (e.g., Han et al., 1999; 
Kimchi, 2009; Wertheimer, 1923/1950) before the process of shape formation 
determines how these clusters appear as a global whole (Koffka, 1935; Trick & Enns, 
1997). Palmer and Rock went so far as to suggest that connectedness was the 
“foundation of perceptual organisation”  and “what really ‘goes together’ in the 
strongest physical sense is a single connected piece of matter, not separate ones that 
happen to be near each other in space” (p. 32). Thus, objects defined by connectedness 
should have stronger global salience than hierarchical patterns.     
 
Furthermore, the global salience of objects in which global structure is defined by 
connectedness should not decay over time and we should be able to see the effect of 
cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information in an unlimited exposure-duration 
task, unlike hierarchical patterns in which global salience decays with exposure duration 
(e.g., Paquet & Merikle, 1984). In the present research we used stimuli in which global 
and local salience was manipulated by connecting or disconnecting the local element 
from the global structure. We predicted that global salience would be strong when the 
local element was attached to the global structure. In this circumstance, we would 
predict that cognitive load should have the same impact on selection as was observed by 
Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) in their selection task; we would expect cognitive load to 
make it harder to ignore salient global structure when selecting local detail. When, 
however, the local element is disconnected from the global structure, local salience 
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should be stronger and we should find that cognitive load makes it more difficult to 
ignore salient local information when performing a global-selection task. In the present 
chapter, we used the Framed Line Test (FLT; Kitayama et al., 2003) – a selection task 
that uses stimuli in which local detail is connected to the global structure – to investigate 
the impact of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information in an unlimited-
exposure task. We first describe extant work with the original version of the task – in 
which the local element is connected to the global structure – before we describe a 
disconnected version of the task.   
 
The Framed Line Test (FLT), as originally conceived by Kitayama et al. (2003; 
developed as an extension of the Rod and Frame Test; Witkin, 1950), is a pen-and-paper 
task designed as a measure both of the ability to integrate local information into its 
context and the ability to isolate it from its context (see Figure 28 for a schematic 
depiction of the task). In the FLT, participants are shown a square frame with a line 
descending from the top and, after it is removed from view, are required to redraw the 
line from memory in a test frame either i) in accordance with the line’s absolute length, 
for the absolute task, or ii) its length relative to the first frame, for the relative task. 
Crucially, the first and second frame may be different sizes; thus, success in reproducing 
the line in the absolute task depends on the ability to isolate local detail and ignore 
surrounding context, whereas success on the relative task depends on the ability to 
integrate the line into the global structure. All participants perform both tasks; better 
performance on the absolute task is said to reflect a more local style of processing, 
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whereas better performance on the relative task is said to indicate a more 
contextual/holistic style of processing.  
 
As the FLT explores the ability to select global structure or local detail whilst ignoring 
distracting hierarchical information we discuss it here as a measure of selective attention 
to hierarchically structured information: successful performance on the absolute task 
requires that the participant ignores the distracting global context, whereas successful 
performance on the relative task requires that local detail is ignored. Thus, the absolute 
and relative tasks can be aligned respectively with the local and global tasks in the 
selective-attention hierarchical-patterns paradigm. Therefore, we expect cognitive load 
to affect performance on the FLT in the same way that cognitive load affects 
performance on the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task: the effect of cognitive 
load should depend on stimulus-driven salience. 
 
Research with the FLT has suggested that performance on the relative task should 
always be better than on the absolute task, given that a visible frame of reference (as in 
the relative task in the FLT) will always enable more accurate performance than when 
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there is no visible frame of reference (as in the absolute task; Zhou et al.)
2
. This mirrors 
findings which suggest that phenomenal size is determined relationally (Rock & 
Ebenholtz, 1959) and that selection of line elements is more difficult when part of a 
configuration (known as the configurational superiority effect; Pomerantz & Garner, 
1973). These observations combine to suggest that the global structure in the FLT – that 
is, the relationship between the line and the frame – is more salient than the line in 
isolation. Thus, the relative task should always be easier to perform than the absolute 
task and high cognitive load should disproportionately impair performance on the 
absolute task (the local-selection task) as it should make it more difficult to ignore the 
salient global context.  
 
Evidence to support the idea that cognitive load may selectively impair performance on 
the relative task comes from a study which measured performance on the FLT while 
experimentally manipulating social power (Guinote, 2007). Social power, that is the 
extent to which an individual holds power over a situation, has been shown to alter 
cognition; powerless individuals are hyper-vigilant in the face of uncertainty (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003), are at the mercy of others (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
                                                          
 
 
 
2
 In the original task, Kitayama et al. (2003) found that American participants were better at the absolute 
task than at the relative task, whereas Japanese performance were better at the relative task than the 
absolute task. However, Zhou et al. (2008) conducted several replications of the original study with both 
American and Chinese participants and failed to find any circumstances where performance on the 
absolute task was better than performance on the relative task. 
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Magee, 2003) and exhibit less cognitive flexibility than powerful individuals (Guinote, 
2007). Especially pertinent to the present research is that powerlessness has also been 
associated with impaired executive functioning (Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky & van Dijk, 
2008). This means that powerless individuals could potentially be under higher cognitive 
load than powerful individuals. In a study into the effect of social power on basic 
cognition, participants were experimentally manipulated to feel either powerful or 
powerless, and then performed a number of tasks including the FLT (Guinote, 2007). 
Guinote found that powerful participants could perform the absolute and relative tasks 
equally well. Powerless participants, on the other hand, were significantly worse at the 
absolute task than the relative task (performance on the relative task did not differ from 
that of the powerful participants). Guinote suggested that powerless individuals found it 
harder to ignore irrelevant contextual information and therefore were less able to ignore 
the surrounding frame when performing the absolute task. We suggest that their 
impaired executive functioning – which could be analogous to operating under high 
cognitive load – made them less able to perform the more cognitively-demanding task of 
isolating the (connected) line from its salient global context.  
    
Interestingly, Guinote (2007) also had participants perform a selective-attention 
hierarchical-patterns task, in which exposure durations were unlimited. In this task, 
powerless participants were relatively faster to respond to local elements than global 
structure, whereas no difference between responses to local detail or global structure 
were found with powerful individuals. It is possible that Guinote showed what we failed 
to demonstrate in Experiment 5 (reported in Chapter 3), namely that high cognitive load 
157 
 
 
 
 
(driven by powerlessness) enhances the salience of local elements in an unlimited-
exposure hierarchical-patterns paradigm and thus impairs selection of global structure. 
This may be because powerlessness is a stronger manipulation of cognitive load than our 
digit-span task. 
 
In this chapter we present a series of experiments designed to explore the effect of 
cognitive load on performance of the FLT. We firstly report the results of an experiment 
on the connected FLT without a cognitive load manipulation so that we can confirm that 
global structure is indeed more salient than local detail (Experiment 8) and show that 
performance on the relative task is better than on the absolute task. We then run the 
connected FLT with an added cognitive load manipulation (Experiments 9 and 10); as 
global structure is more salient than local detail, we would expect high cognitive load to 
make it harder to isolate the local line element and to ignore its salient task-irrelevant 
context when performing the absolute task. Thus, performance on the absolute task 
should become worse under high cognitive load in comparison to low cognitive load. In 
the relative task, cognitive load should only increase interference from irrelevant salient 
information; as local information is less salient than global information in the FLT, we 
would not expect cognitive load to impair performance on the relative task.   
 
Throughout the present thesis we have suggested that the effect of cognitive load on 
attentional selection should depend on stimulus-driven factors which determine local-
global salience. Thus, high cognitive load should impair performance on the relative 
158 
 
 
 
 
task if we can make the global structure less salient than the local line element. This is 
what we aimed to do in Experiment 11. Zhou et al. (2008) have previously demonstrated 
that superior performance on the relative task can be eliminated by degrading the context 
surrounding the line element. To achieve this they used paper cut-outs as frames rather 
than black squares printed onto paper. Furthermore, evidence has shown that irrelevant 
contextual elements are easily ignored when local elements are separable (Pomerantz & 
Garner, 1973). Thus, we reasoned that we could degrade global salience even further 
than Zhou et al. managed if we disconnected the line element from its global context. As 
the disconnected line and frame no longer form a single entry-level unit, local 
information should be more salient than global structure and cognitive load should 
increase distraction from the line when performing the relative task. Thus, in Experiment 
11 we expected high cognitive load to impair performance on the relative task.  
 
The four experiments presented in this chapter explore the effect of cognitive load on 
selection of hierarchical information and demonstrate that the effect of cognitive load is 
dependent on stimulus-driven local-global salience. If global context is more salient than 
local detail we expect cognitive load to increase processing of irrelevant global 
information. On the other hand, cognitive load will increase processing of irrelevant 
local information if local salience is strong. Although this is an idea we have explored in 
the last two chapters, the present experiments test the extent to which the effect of 
cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information is applicable beyond hierarchical 
patterns.  
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5.2 Experiment 8 
 
In the present experiment, we ran the FLT in its original form to see whether participants 
would perform better on the relative task than the absolute task in the absence of 
cognitive load. Recent research has suggested that performance on the relative task 
should always be better than the absolute task as there is a visible frame of reference to 
assist with reproduction of the line element (Zhou et al., 2008). If we observe this 
pattern of performance in our sample it would suggest that global salience is stronger 
than local salience.  
 
However, the FLT (Kitayama et al., 2003) was originally developed to demonstrate 
cross-cultural differences between ‘Westerners’ (thought to have a more analytic 
processing style) and ‘East Asians’ (thought to have a more contextual processing style). 
It was found that Westerners were better at the absolute task than the relative task, 
whereas East Asians were better at the relative task than the absolute task. This would 
suggest that our participants – who were a sample of university students studying at 
Goldsmiths, University of London, UK – might find local detail more salient than global 
structure. Faced with this discrepancy in the literature, we ran the FLT with no cognitive 
load first to establish whether our sample were better at the relative task (as in Zhou et 
al., 2008) or the absolute task (as in Kitayama et al., 2003).  
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5.2.1 Method 
 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
Participants (N = 33; 28 females, 5 males; mean age 19.4 years) were first-year 
psychology undergraduates at Goldsmiths, University of London, and participated in 
exchange for course credit. The study received ethical approval from the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. 
 
5.2.1.2 Design 
The study used a mixed design, with task (absolute vs. relative) and trial-type 
(corresponding to five different stimulus trial-types; see Table 6 for dimensions and 
Appendix A for the complete stimulus set) as the within-subjects variable, and order 
(absolute task or relative task first) as the between-subjects variable. Magnitude of error 
from correct response, measured either as absolute error, in mm, or percentage error, in 
%, were the dependent variables. 
 
 5.2.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
Stimuli were similar to those used in Kitayama et al. (2003). Five differently-sized 
square frames with vertical lines descending from the top were used for five different 
trial-types and each was paired with a corresponding empty response-frame. As can be 
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seen in Table 6, the proportional size relationship between pairs of frames, as well as the 
length of the line in the first frame, varied with the trial. In the version of the FLT 
developed by Kitayama et al. (2003), and used here, there are five different frame sizes; 
each frame is paired with another frame, forming five different frame-combinations, or 
trial-types, and the length of the original line is different for each trial (see Table 6 for 
details of the stimulus dimensions).  
 
Table 6. Sizes of frames in each trial and the length of their corresponding lines (mm) 
 
 
The task was performed using a pen and paper. Stimuli were printed on A4-size (297 x 
210 mm) 210 gsm white card in black ink (1.5 point). Empty response frames were 
printed on A4-size 80 gsm white paper in black ink. Participants were provided with a 
medium-point (1.0 mm) black Bic ‘Cristal’ ballpoint pen with which to draw their 
responses.  
Trial 
type 
Height of 
first frame 
 
Length of 
line 
 
Height of 
second frame 
Correct line length 
Absolute 
task 
Relative 
task 
 
1 
 
89 
 
62 
 
179 
 
62 
 
125 
2 102 29 153 29 43 
3 127 53 127 53 53 
4 153 87 102 87 58 
5 179 31 89 31 15 
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Participants’ responses were measured by the experimenter with a transparent ruler. The 
same ruler was used to measure responses from all participants to reduce any variation 
due to measurement error. An effort was made to either round up or round down to the 
nearest millimetre if the line length fell between two millimetre measurements.   
 
5.2.1.5 Procedure 
Participants were seated at a table in a well-lit but quiet room. The task was verbally 
explained to participants with the aid of a schematic diagram (identical to Figure 28) to 
ensure that they were aware of the differences between the two tasks. The diagram was 
for illustrative purposes only and did not correspond to a specific trial type. Participants 
were told that in the absolute task they must copy the absolute length of the line and 
ignore its size in relation to the frame, whereas in the relative task they must take the 
size of the frame into account and redraw the line in the same proportion to the test 
frame as the first line was to the first frame. The experimenter ensured that both the 
absolute and relative tasks were completely understood before the trials began.  
 
The FLT consists of ten trials, five absolute trials and five relative trials. Trials are 
blocked by task and participants are always aware in advance of each trial as to which 
task they are to perform. Participants were presented with each trial-type twice, once 
when performing the absolute task and once when performing the relative task. Half of 
the participants performed the absolute task first and the other half performed the 
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relative task first; participants were alternately assigned to either the ‘absolute first’ or 
‘relative first’ conditions.  
 
 
Figure 28. Schematic illustration of the Framed Line Test (FLT; Kitayama et al., 2003). 
Ideal performance on the absolute (top right) and relative (bottom right) tasks is 
illustrated and frame dimensions are for illustrative purposes only. Participants are first 
shown a frame with a line descending from the top (left image). In the absolute task (top 
right), the new line has been redrawn in the test frame exactly the same length as the line 
in the first frame (original stimulus on left), which in this instance is 30 mm. In the 
relative task (bottom right), the new line has been redrawn in the same proportion to the 
test frame as the first line was to the first frame, namely one third of the height of the 
frame.  
 
At the beginning of each trial, participants were verbally reminded of the task that they 
were to perform. Each trial ran as follows. The experimenter drew a frame-and-line 
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stimulus at random and placed it in front of the participant, and the participant was given 
five seconds to study it. The stimulus was then removed and the participant was asked to 
move to another table where the experimenter had placed the corresponding empty test 
frame. The change in location was to minimize the role that iconic memory could play in 
the reproduction of the line, as in Kitayama et al. (2003). The participant then redrew the 
line in the empty frame as best as possible, in accordance with task demands. In the 
absolute task, they attempted to draw the line the same absolute length as it was in the 
first frame. In the relative task, they redrew the line in the same proportion to the test 
frame as the first line was to the first frame. The participant then moved back to the first 
table to wait for the next trial to begin.  
 
5.2.2 Results 
 
Participant responses were measured with a ruler and calculated in terms of both the 
absolute error (mm) and percentage error (%) from the correct line length. The direction 
of error was not taken into account so that overestimations and underestimations of line 
length were treated equally. Although participants were reminded of the demands of 
both the absolute and relative tasks before each trial, there were some trials for which 
errors were extreme; in these instances, it was judged that the wrong task had been 
performed by the participant. Therefore, participants whose error on any trial of the 
absolute or the relative task exceeded three standard deviations from the group mean 
were excluded from further analysis. The data from only two participants were excluded 
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from the final analysis in accordance with this criterion. In Experiments 4-7 we 
calculated inverse efficiency scores on the data; however, an inverse efficiency 
calculation is inappropriate for performance on the FLT because although there is an 
accuracy measure there is no measure of reaction time. Instead, we performed separate 
analyses on the data for absolute error (mm) and percentage error (%). These analyses 
are detailed below.  
 
5.2.2.1 Absolute error (mm)  
Our first analysis was performed on the mean magnitude of error (mm). This was 
calculated by measuring the deviation from correct line length, in mm, ignoring the sign. 
The data were entered into a 2x5x2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
(absolute vs. relative) and trial type (89-179, mm 102-153 mm, 127-127 mm, 153-102 
mm, and 179-89 mm) as the within-subjects factors and task order (absolute task first or 
relative task first) as the between-subjects factor. There was a highly significant main 
effect of both task [F(1, 29) = 15.04, p < .01, η = .34] and of trial-type [F(4, 116) = 8.4, 
p < .001, η = .23], and furthermore the interaction between these two factors was highly 
significant [F(4, 116) = 10.75, p < .001, η = .27]. Order was non-significant as a main 
effect and did not contribute to any significant interactions [p > .1].  
 
The main effect of task reflected the fact that errors were larger in the absolute task [M = 
8.95 mm, SE = .59] compared to the relative task [M = 6.04 mm, SE = .5]. This 
suggested that our participants found the relative task easier than the absolute task. The 
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interaction with trial-type suggested that this effect was not uniform across all trial types 
(see Table 7 for descriptives). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that errors in the absolute task 
were greater than errors in the relative task in all except the 102-153 mm trial-type 
(although this effect was statistically reliable in only the 153-102 trial-type [t(30) = 5.9, 
p < .01] after Bonferonni correction [all other tests p > .5]).  
 
Table 7. Mean magnitude of error (mm) for each trial type in both the absolute and 
relative tasks (Experiment 8). 
 
 
5.2.2.2 Percentage error (%) 
We repeated the analysis on the mean percentage error (%). This was because a 1 mm 
error on a line of 15 mm is a much greater percentage of error than a 1 mm deviation 
Size of first and 
second frames 
  
89 – 179 
mm 
 
102 – 153 
mm 
 
127 – 127 
mm 
 
153 – 102 
mm 
 
179 – 
89 mm 
        
 
Absolute Task 
M 10.06 5.97 7.84 15.03 5.87 
SE 1.19 0.87 1.05 1.7 0.81 
        
 
Relative Task 
M 9.32 7.23 5.32 4.26 4.06 
SE 1.19 1.03 0.87 .61 0.85 
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from a line of 125 mm. We calculated this by dividing the absolute error (mm) by the 
correct line length, to see the percentage error from correct line length (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8. Mean percentage error (%) for each trial-type in both the absolute and relative 
tasks (Experiment 8). 
 
 
As in the previous analysis, task and trial-type were the within-subjects variables and 
order was the between-subjects variable. The main effect of task was marginally 
significant [F(1, 29) = 3.83, p = .06, η = .12]; percentage error was greater in the 
absolute task [M = 17.56 %, SE = .1.18] than in the relative task [M = 13.75 %, SE = 
.1.61]. There was a main effect of trial-type [F(4, 116) = 7.61, p < .01, η = .21], which 
interacted with task [F(4, 116) = 4.26, p < .05, η = .13]. Error in the absolute task was 
significantly higher than that in the relative task for the 89-179 mm [t(30) = 4.34, p < 
Size of first and 
second frames 
 
 
89 – 
179 mm 
 
102 – 
153 mm 
 
127 – 
127 mm 
 
153 – 
102 mm 
 
179 – 
89 mm 
        
 
Absolute Task 
M 16.23 20.58 14.79 17.28 18.94 
SE 1.93 3.0 1.98 1.95 2.61 
        
 
Relative Task 
M 7.46 16.8 10.04 7.34 27.1 
SE .95 2.4 1.64 1.05 5.66 
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.001] and 153-102 mm [t(30) = 4.41, p < .001] trial-types but all other comparisons were 
non-significant [p > .1]. Order was not significant as a main effect and did not contribute 
to any significant interactions [p > .1]. 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
 
The data from the present experiment show that our participant sample found the relative 
task easier than the absolute task, as evidence by a greater magnitude of error in the 
absolute task than in the relative task. This is in agreement with research that suggests 
that performance should be better in a task with a visible frame of reference (e.g., Zhou 
et al., 2008), such as in the relative task, and suggests that global salience is stronger 
than local salience with these stimuli. This is analogous to most instances of the 
selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task in which a global advantage is usually 
observed (as most studies use hierarchical patterns with strong global salience). This is 
at odds with Kitayama et al (2003), whose data suggest that our ‘Western’ participants 
should show an advantage for the absolute task over the relative, and adds to evidence 
which has failed to replicate their findings (e.g. Zhou et al, 2008). The present 
experiment gave us confidence in the FLT as a task that could be used to measure the 
effect of cognitive load in a task where global salience is strong at unlimited exposure 
durations. In Experiment 9, we explored the effect of cognitive load on performance of 
the FLT. 
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5.3 Experiment 9 
 
In Experiment 8, we demonstrated that global salience was stronger than local salience 
in the connected FLT. Ahmed and de Fockert (2012) have shown that cognitive load 
makes it harder to isolate local information from its global context when global salience 
is very strong. They showed this pattern in performance using hierarchical patterns; in 
the present experiment, we wanted to show that the same effect could be observed for 
stimuli other than hierarchical patterns. Thus, in the present experiment we ran the 
connected FLT with an added cognitive-load manipulation. We predicted that cognitive 
load should make it more difficult to ignore salient global information and thus that 
cognitive load should impair performance of the absolute task. However, cognitive load 
is unlikely to have any effect on performance of the relative task as the irrelevant local 
detail is less salient than the global structure and consequently should not be distracting. 
In the present experiment, participants performed the FLT twice, once under low 
cognitive load and once under high cognitive load. 
 
5.3.1 Method 
 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
We endeavoured to test the same number of participants as Kitayama et al. (2003) in 
their original experiment (twenty) in each of our  four conditions (see the variable order 
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in section 5.3.1.2 Design below for further explanation). Thus, eighty-four participants 
(63 females, 21 males; mean age 24.1 years) were recruited from either Goldsmiths, 
University of London, UK, or the Science Museum, London, UK. Goldsmiths students 
were reimbursed with course credit and Science Museum staff received snacks in 
exchange for participation. The study was approved by the Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.  
 
5.3.1.2 Design 
The design was mixed, with task (absolute vs. relative), trial-type (89-179, 102-153, 
127-127, 153-102, 179-89 mm) and cognitive load (low vs. high) as the within-subjects 
variables, and order as the between-subjects variable. Participants performed the FLT 
twice, once under low cognitive load and once under high cognitive load. The order in 
which cognitive load was performed (low first or high first) was counterbalanced across 
participants. The manipulation of task was nested within the manipulation of cognitive 
load and counterbalanced (absolute task followed by relative task, or relative task 
followed by absolute task). This meant that there were four possible levels of order. The 
four possible orders were: (1) absolute task low cognitive load (AL), relative task low 
cognitive load (RL), absolute task high cognitive load (AH), relative task high cognitive 
load (RH); (2) RL, AL, RH, AH; (3) AH, RH, AL, RL; (4) RH, AH, RL, AL. Mean 
magnitude of error from correct response, measured either as absolute error, in mm, or 
percentage error, in %, were the dependent variables. 
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5.3.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 8 with the 
exception that there was now a cognitive load manipulation. For the low-cognitive-load 
condition the numbers 1-9 were printed on separate pieces of card (one card for each 
number). The numbers were shuffled for each trial and one was drawn at random on 
each trial. To prepare the high cognitive load manipulation six numbers from 1-9 were 
drawn, without replacement, using a program developed for a previous experiment. 40 
of these combinations of six numbers were printed on white card. One six-digit number 
was selected at random for each trial. 
 
5.3.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 8, with the exception that the FLT 
was now performed twice by each participant, once under low cognitive load (remember 
one digit) and once under high cognitive load (remember six digits). In the low-
cognitive-load condition, participants were shown a digit on a piece of card and were 
told to memorise it for the duration of the trial. They were then shown the first frame 
and line, which was replaced with the test frame into which they were to draw the line, 
as in Experiment 8. When they had drawn the line they wrote down the digit that they 
had been remembering, at the bottom of the page. The next trial then began. The 
procedure for the high-cognitive-load condition was the same as for the low load 
condition, with the exception that participants were shown six digits at the beginning of 
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each trial. Participants were required to write down the six digits at the end of the trial in 
the same order that they had been presented at the beginning of the trial.  
 
5.3.2 Results 
 
5.3.2.1 Absolute error (mm)  
As with Experiment 8, there were some trials for which errors were extreme and it was 
judged that the wrong task had been performed by the participant. Therefore, 
participants whose error on any trial of the absolute or the relative task exceeded three 
standard deviations from the group mean were excluded from further analysis. The data 
of seven participants were excluded in accordance with this threshold. Thus, the data of 
77 participants were entered into the analysis. A 2x2x5x4 mixed ANOVA was 
performed on the data with task (absolute vs. relative), cognitive load (low vs. high) and 
trial-type (89-179 mm, 102-153 mm, 127-127 mm, 153-102 mm, and 179-89 mm) as the 
within-subjects variables and order as the between-subjects variable. Order was non-
significant as a main effect and did not contribute to any significant interactions, and it 
was therefore removed from the analysis. Table 9 shows the mean error for all 
conditions.  
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Table 9. Mean magnitude of error (mm) in line reproduction made for each trial-type 
for each task under both low and high cognitive load (Experiment 9). 
 
There was a significant main effect of task [F(1, 76) = 10.62, p < .01, η = .12] indicating 
that participants overall were more accurate on the relative task than the absolute task, 
replicating our finding from Experiment 8. The main effect of cognitive load was 
marginally significant [F(1, 76) = 3.09, p = .08, η  = .04], indicating a trend for 
performance to be worse overall under high than low cognitive load. 
 
 
Size of first 
and second 
frames 
 
 
89 – 179 
mm 
 
102 – 
153 mm 
 
127 – 
127 mm 
 
153 – 
102 mm 
 
179 – 89 
mm 
        
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 T
a
s
k
 
Low 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 7.62 4.0 5.19 12.42 5.49 
SE 0.8 0.4 0.4 1.01 0.49 
       
High 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 11.48 4.21 5.19 12.88 6.04 
SE 1.55 0.66 0.5 1.01 0.45 
        
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 T
a
s
k
 
Low 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 11.23 5.34 4.48 5.91 3.9 
SE 0.87 0.58 0.2 0.68 0.38 
       
High 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 9.97 7.01 4.84 6.29 2.62 
SE 0.82 0.64 0.51 0.69 0.27 
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The interaction of interest here was between task and cognitive load. The prediction was 
that cognitive load would impair performance on the absolute task more than on the 
relative task. Although Figure 29 shows a trend in that direction, the interaction between 
task and cognitive load was only marginally significant [F(1, 76) = 2.89, p = .09, η  = 
.04].  
 
Figure 29.  Mean magnitude of error (mm) for all trial-types combined for the absolute 
and relative tasks under low and high cognitive load (Experiment 9). Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean.  
 
 
The main effect of trial-type was significant [F(4, 304) = 50.11, p < .01, η  = .4] and 
interestingly contributed to a significant interaction between task, cognitive load, and 
trial-type [F(4, 304) = 4.58, p < .01, η  = .06], suggesting that cognitive load affected 
task performance differently for different trial-types. We reasoned that we might only 
see an effect of cognitive load on task performance in the trial-types where the first 
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frame and test frame varied the most in size (89-179 mm and 179-89 mm) and there was 
most room for error. In contrast, we might not expect an effect of cognitive load in the 
trial-types where the first frame and test frame varied less in size (102-153 mm and 153-
102 mm) or indeed where the first frame and test frame were the same size (127-127 
mm).  
 
To explore this prediction we combined the data from the 89-179 mm and 179-89 mm 
trial-types to generate a new most extreme condition; we then combined the data from 
the 102-153 mm and 153-102 mm trial-types to generate a new least extreme condition 
(see Figure 30). The resulting data were entered into a 2x2x2 ANOVA with task 
(absolute vs. relative), cognitive load (low vs. high), and trial-type (most extreme vs. 
least extreme) as the factors.  
 
Our interaction of interest was task x cognitive load x trial-type, which was significant 
[F(1, 76) = 12.32, p < .01, η = .14]. This suggests that cognitive load did indeed affect 
performance differently in the most extreme and least extreme trial-types. We followed 
this interaction up with two further 2x2 ANOVAs, one on the most extreme trial-types 
and one on the least extreme trial-types. For the least extreme trial-types there was a 
main effect of task [F(1, 76) = 14.6, p < .001, η = .16] – where performance on the 
absolute task was worse than on the relative task – but no other main effects or 
interactions were significant. For the most extreme trial-types, however, the main effects 
of task and load were non-significant [p > .1] but the task x load interaction was 
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significant [F(1, 76) = 11.66, p < .01, η = .13]. Follow-up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests 
confirmed that this interaction was driven by the asymmetrical effect of cognitive load; 
high cognitive load significantly impaired performance on the absolute task [t(76) = -
2.58, p < .05]  but significantly improved performance on the relative task [t(76) = 2.57, 
p < .05].  
 
Figure 30. Mean absolute error (mm) for the most extreme (89 – 179 mm and 179 – 89 
mm) and the least extreme (102 – 153 mm and 153 – 102 mm) trial-types for the 
absolute and relative tasks under low and high cognitive load (Experiment 9). Error 
bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
 
5.3.2.2 Percentage error (%)  
As in Experiment 8, we repeated the original analysis – with all five trial-types – using 
percentage error as our dependent variable (see Table 10). There was still a main effect 
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of task [F(1, 76) = 5.11, p < 0.05, η = .06] and trial-type [F(4, 304) = 29.59, p < .01, η = 
.28] but not of load [p > .1]. Crucially, the interaction between task and load was 
significant [F(1, 76) = 3.96, p = .05, η = .12], which suggested that the effect of 
cognitive load was not uniform across tasks (see Figure 31). Performance in the relative 
task was unaffected by high cognitive load [p > .05]. There was a trend for performance 
in the absolute task to be impaired by high cognitive load, although this follow-up t-test 
was only marginally significant [t(76) = -1.8, p = .08, one-tailed]. 
 
We repeated the analysis using only the most extreme and least extreme trial-types, as 
we did when analysing absolute error (mm). The data were entered into a 2x2x2 
ANOVA with task (absolute vs. relative), cognitive load (low vs. high), and trial-type 
(most extreme vs. least extreme) as the factors (see Figure 32). The three-way 
interaction between task, load and trial-type was significant [F(1, 76) = 17.81, p < .001, 
η = .19] and therefore ran two further ANOVAs, one on the most extreme trial-types and 
the other on the least extreme trial-types. For the least extreme trial-types there were no 
significant main effects or interactions [p > .05]; for the most extreme trial-types, 
however, there was a significant interaction between task and cognitive load [F(1, 76) = 
14.9, p < .001, η = .16]. Follow-up t-tests confirmed the pattern observed in the data for 
absolute error (mm): the percentage error was larger under high than low cognitive load 
in the absolute task [t(76) = -2.42, p < .05] but smaller under high than low cognitive 
load in the relative task [t(76) = 3.45, p < .05]. 
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Table 10. Percentage error (mm) in line reproduction made for each trial-type for each 
task under both low and high cognitive load (Experiment 9). 
 
 
 
 
Size of first 
and second 
frames 
  
89 – 179 
mm 
 
102 – 153 
mm 
 
127 – 127 
mm 
 
153 – 102 
mm 
 
179 – 89 
mm 
        
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 T
a
s
k
 
Low 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 11.33 13.89 9.93 14.09 16.7 
SE 1.17 1.46 0.89 1.16 1.47 
       
 
High 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 14.78 14.12 9.95 14.42 18.34 
SE 1.52 2.37 0.97 1.15 1.41 
        
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 T
a
s
k
 
 
Low 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 8.67 11.21 8.35 10.53 25.21 
SE 0.68 1.26 0.98 1.21 2.47 
       
 
High 
Cognitive 
Load 
M 7.79 15.86 8.50 10.79 17.81 
SE 0.65 1.43 0.9 1.24 1.91 
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Figure 31. Percentage error (%) for the absolute task and relative task under both low 
and high cognitive load for all trial-types combined (Experiment 9). Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean.   
 
 
Figure 32. Combined percentage error (%) in line for the most extreme (89 – 179 mm 
and 179 – 89 mm) and the least extreme (102 – 153 mm and 153 – 102 mm) trial-types 
for the absolute and relative tasks under low and high cognitive load (Experiment 9). 
Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Absolute Relative
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 e
rr
o
r 
(%
) 
Task 
Low Cognitive load
High Cognitive load
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Absolute task Relative task Absolute task Relative task
Most extreme Least extreme
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 e
rr
o
r 
(%
) 
Low cognitive load
High cognitive load
180 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
 
As in Experiment 8, our participants were better at the relative task than the absolute 
task – regardless of cognitive load – which suggests that on the whole global salience 
remains stronger than local salience when a cognitive load manipulation is added to the 
task. We predicted that high cognitive load would impair performance on the absolute 
task as it would make it more difficult to ignore the salient global context when 
reproducing the line in isolation. We aligned this with Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) 
finding which suggested that cognitive load makes it more difficult to ignore irrelevant 
but salient global information when performing a local-selection task with hierarchical 
patterns. This is what we found, but only when we looked at the trial-types where the 
difference in size between the first frame and test frame was most extreme (and there 
was arguably most room for error). When we looked at these trial-types only, high 
cognitive load not only significantly impaired performance on the absolute task but 
significantly improved performance on the relative task.  
 
In Experiment 10, we created a pared down version of the FLT where we used only the 
‘most extreme’ trial-types. This was to ensure that that the effect of cognitive load on 
selection remains when the ‘least extreme’ trial-types (and the 127-127 mm trial-type) 
are no longer included.  
 
181 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Experiment 10 
 
In Experiment 9, we demonstrated that cognitive load impaired performance on the 
absolute task and improved performance on the relative task. However, this was only 
when we looked at the trial types where the first frame and test frame differed the most 
in size. With the present experiment we aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 9 
using only the 89-179 mm and 179-89 mm trial-types. This was to ensure that the effect 
of cognitive load observed in Experiment 9 is not limited to situations in which the 
most-extreme trial-types are intermixed with the least-extreme trial types. As we 
deliberately used fewer trial types, and as order did not contribute significantly to any 
interactions, we also felt that we could recruit fewer participants in E10 compared to E9.  
 
5.4.1. Method 
 
5.4.1.1 Participants 
Fifty-five participants (37 females, 18 males; 29.03 years,) were either members of staff 
at the Science Museum, London, UK, or were volunteers from Goldsmiths, University 
of London, UK, and participated in exchange for snacks. The study was approved by the 
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.  
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5.4.1.2 Design  
The design was identical to that in Experiment 9, with the exception that there were now 
only two levels of trial-type (89-179 and 179-89 mm). 
 
5.4.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to in Experiment 9.  
 
5.4.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 9. As fewer trial-types were used, the 
FLT now included only two trials in the absolute task and two trials in the relative task, 
meaning that the Experiment was 8 trials long (four trials performed under low cognitive 
load and four under high cognitive load). 
 
5.4.2 Results 
 
As for previous experiments, participants were excluded from the analysis if they were 
judged to have lapsed into accidentally performing the wrong task. The data from only 
two participants were excluded on this basis. For Experiments 8 and 9, we conducted 
two separate analyses, one for the absolute magnitude of error (mm) and one for the 
percentage error (%). In the present experiment, we used only the percentage error (%) 
183 
 
 
 
 
in our analysis as the correct line lengths are dramatically different in the 89-179 mm 
(correct line length is 125 mm) and 179 – 89 mm (correct line length is 15 mm) trial-
types for the relative task. As a result, a 1 mm absolute error is very different in both of 
these trial-types in terms of percentage error that it represents (0.8% and 6.7% 
respectively). Values for absolute error are however reproduced in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Mean absolute magnitude of error (mm) in line reproduction made for each 
trial-type for both the absolute task and relative task under both low and high cognitive 
load (Experiment 10). 
 
 
Size of first and 
second frames 
 
89 – 179 mm 179 - 89 mm 
     
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 T
a
s
k
 
Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 8.74 6.15 
SE 1.56 0.61 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 11.92 7.11 
SE 2.29 0.59 
     
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 T
a
s
k
 
Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 10.21 3.62 
SE 0.95 0.45 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 9.94 3.43 
SE 1.13 0.41 
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Percentage error data were entered into a 2x2x2 within-subjects ANOVA with task 
(absolute vs. relative), cognitive load (low vs. high cognitive load) and trial-type (89-
179 mm and 179-89 mm) as the within-subjects variables. As order did not interact with 
any factors in Experiment 9, we excluded it from the present analysis.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the percentage magnitude of error can be seen in Table 12. The 
main effect of task was marginally significant [F(1, 52) = 3.03, p  = .09, η2 = .6]; there 
was a trend for performance to be worse overall in the absolute task [M = 19.16, SE = 
1.78] than in the relative task [M = 15.84 %, SE = 1.29]. The main effect of cognitive 
load was non-significant [p > .1]. The main effect of trial-type was significant and was 
qualified by a significant interaction with task [F(1, 52) = 10.09, p > .01, η2 = .16] but 
after Bonferroni-correction no pairwise-comparisons were significant.  
 
Importantly, the interaction between task and cognitive load was significant [F(1, 52) = 
4.74, p  < .05, η2 = .08; see Figure 33]. Bonferroni-corrected follow-up t-tests revealed 
that performance on the absolute task was impaired by high cognitive load [t(52) = -
2.19, p < .05; one-tailed] whereas performance on the relative task was unaffected by 
cognitive load [p > .1]. The interaction between task, cognitive load and trial-type was 
non-significant, indicating that the effect of cognitive load on performance was the same 
for both the 89-179 mm and 179-89 mm trial-types. 
 
185 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Mean percentage error (%) in line reproduction made for each task-type for 
each task under both low and high cognitive load (Experiment 10). 
 
 
 
Size of first and 
second frames 
 
89 – 179 mm 179 - 89 mm 
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Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 14.24 19.72 
SE 2.54 1.96 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 19.6 23.07 
SE 3.68 1.92 
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e
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e
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Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 8.36 24.28 
SE 0.76 3.03 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 7.95 22.77 
SE .91 2.77 
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Figure 33.  Percentage error (%) in relation to the length of the original line for the 89-
179 and 179-89 trial-types combined for the absolute and relative tasks under low and 
high cognitive load (Experiment 10). Error bars represent one standard error of the 
mean. 
 
 
5.4.3 Discussion 
 
The present experiment replicated the finding from Experiment 9 showing that high 
cognitive load significantly impairs performance in the absolute task. However, there is 
no longer evidence to suggest that cognitive load improves performance on the relative 
task. Combining findings from Experiments 9 and 10, we suggest that cognitive load 
makes it more difficult to ignore irrelevant-yet-salient global information.  
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5.5 Experiment 11 
 
With the previous three experiments, we have demonstrated a pattern of findings 
consistent with the suggestion that the connected FLT elicits strong global salience. 
Under these conditions we have presented evidence to suggest that cognitive load 
impairs performance on a task of local selection (the absolute task). We suggest that 
cognitive load makes it more difficult to ignore the salient global context when selecting 
the local line element. This is consistent with Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) finding 
that performance on a task of local selection deteriorates with cognitive load when using 
hierarchical patterns. Having replicated this finding with the FLT, with the present 
experiment we wanted to replicate the effect that we observed in Experiment 7, namely 
that cognitive load impairs performance on a global-selection task when local detail is 
salient.  
 
The strong global salience of the stimuli in the FLT has been attributed to the fact that it 
is easier to perform a task in which there is a visible frame of reference (Zhou et al., 
2008). Furthermore, the fact that the local line element is connected to the frame means 
that the global configuration should be represented as a single entry-level unit (Palmer & 
Rock, 1994) and thus should have strong global salience. In the present experiment, we 
reduced global salience – and enhanced local salience – by detaching the line from the 
frame. Under these circumstances, local salience should be stronger than global salience 
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and cognitive load should make it more difficult to integrate the line into its global 
context and to perform the relative task.  
 
5.5.1 Method 
 
5.5.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-one participants (48 females, 13 males; mean age 25.77 years) were recruited from 
adverts placed around Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. Participants were 
reimbursed £5. The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. 
 
5.5.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 10 with the 
exception that the line was no longer attached to the frame (see Appendix B for the 
complete stimulus set). The line was still vertical, but was centred in the middle of the 
frame.  
  
5.5.1.3 Design  
The design was identical to that in Experiment 10.  
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5.5.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 10. 
 
 
5.5.2 Results 
 
As for Experiment 10, we used only the percentage error (%) in the analysis (absolute 
magnitude of error can still be seen in Table 13). Participants were excluded if they were 
deemed to have mistakenly performed the wrong task; on this occasion two participants 
were excluded on this basis. The data of 59 participants were entered into a 2x2x2 
within-subjects ANOVA with task (absolute vs. relative), cognitive load (low vs. high) 
and trial-type (89-179 and 179-89 mm) as the within-subjects factors. The dependent 
variable was the percentage error (%; see Table 14).  
 
There was a main effect of task [F(1, 58) = 13.07, p < .001, η2 = .18]; in this version of 
the FLT, participants were more accurate on the absolute task [M = 15.97 %, SE = 1.02] 
than on the relative task [M = 23.45 %, SE = 1.99], suggesting that local detail is more 
salient than global structure. The main effect of cognitive load was non-significant [p > 
.1]. There was a main effect of trial-type [F(1, 58) = 35.14, p < .01, η2 = .38] which 
contributed to a significant interaction with task [F(1, 58) = 8.14, p < .01, η2 = .12]. 
After Bonferroni correction, two t-tests were significant; error in the 89-179 mm trial-
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type in the absolute task [M = 12.73, SE = 1.28] was smaller than the error for both the 
89 – 179 mm trial-type in the relative task [M = 27.43, SE = 3.34] and the 179-89 mm 
trial-type in the absolute task [M = 19.22, SE = 1.51]. 
 
Table 13. Absolute magnitude of error (mm) in line reproduction made for each trial-
type for each task under both low and high cognitive load (Experiment 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size of first and 
second frames 
  
89 – 179 mm 
 
179 - 89 mm 
     
A
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Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 8.54 5.84 
SE 1.26 0.59 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 7.24 6.0 
SE 0.84 0.60 
     
R
e
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ti
v
e
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a
s
k
 
Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 17.32 3.76 
SE 1.29 0.54 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 16.46 6.25 
SE 1.00 1.01 
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Table 14. Percentage error (%) in line reproduction made for each trial-type for each 
task under both low and high cognitive load (Experiment 11). 
 
 
Size of first and 
second frames 
  
89 – 179 mm 
 
179 - 89 mm 
     
A
b
s
o
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a
s
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Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 13.78 19.08 
SE 2.04 1.86 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 11.67 19.35 
SE 1.36 1.92 
     
R
e
la
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v
e
 T
a
s
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Low Cognitive 
Load 
M 13.85 25.08 
SE 1.03 3.59 
    
High Cognitive 
Load 
M 13.17 41.69 
SE 0.8 6.71 
 
 
Most importantly, the interaction between task and cognitive load was significant [see 
Figure 34; F(1, 58) = 6.54, p = .01, η2 = .1]. Follow-up t-tests suggest that cognitive load 
exerts asymmetric effects on the absolute and relative tasks; high cognitive load impairs 
performance in the relative task [t(58) = -2.23, p < .05; one-tailed] but does not 
significantly affect performance in the absolute task [p > .1]. The interaction between 
task, cognitive load and trial-type was marginally non-significant [p = .08], indicating 
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that the effect of cognitive load on performance was not significantly different for both 
the 89-179 mm and 179-89 mm trial-types. However, the data indicate that the 
interaction between task and cognitive load was driven by the 179 – 89 mm trial-type.  
 
 
Figure 34.  Percentage error (%) in relation to the length of the original line for the 89-
179 and 179-89 trial-types combined (Experiment 11). Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean. 
 
 
5.5.3 Discussion 
 
The present experiment has provided evidence to suggest that the effect of cognitive 
load on the standard FLT is driven by the fact that the line is connected to the frame; 
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when the line is detached from the frame, as it was in the present experiment, 
performance is better on the absolute task than on the relative task and it is the relative 
task that suffers under high cognitive load. This is consistent with our suggestion that 
cognitive load should impair performance on a global-selection task when local salience 
is strong. Thus, we have provided further evidence to support the assertion that cognitive 
load can impair global processing when local salience is strong. 
 
 
5.6 Discussion of Chapter 5 
 
In Experiments 8-11, we have provided further evidence to suggest that the effect of 
cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information depends on stimulus-driven 
factors which affect local-global salience. The contribution of the present chapter is to 
show this in stimuli other than hierarchical patterns.  The present thesis challenges the 
assumption that high cognitive load always makes processing more global (Ahmed & de 
Fockert, 2012) and instead suggests that the effect of cognitive load depends on the 
relative salience of local and global information. In Chapters 2 to 4, we presented a 
series of experiments using hierarchical patterns (e.g., Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Navon, 
1977) to demonstrate that cognitive load does not always make processing more global 
but can make processing more local if local salience is strong. With the experiments 
presented here we wanted to demonstrate that the effect of cognitive load on selection of 
hierarchical information is not just limited to hierarchical patterns. Furthermore, as 
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hierarchical patterns lack grouping properties such as closure and connectedness that are 
present in real-world objects (Navon, 2003), we wanted to show that cognitive load can 
affect hierarchical selection in stimuli that are more akin to real-world objects. Thus, in 
Experiments 8-11, reported in the present chapter, we used another selection task – the 
Framed Line Test (FLT; Kitayama et al., 2003) – to test the effect of cognitive load on 
processing of objects in which local information is either connected to or disconnected 
from the global context. Our data suggest that global salience in the connected FLT is 
strong and that cognitive load makes it more difficult to select local information from its 
surrounding global context (Experiments 9 and 10). When, however, the local line 
element is disconnected from the surrounding frame, selection of global structure is 
impaired. This provides further evidence to suggest that the effect of cognitive load on 
the processing of hierarchical visual information is complex and does not simply make 
people ‘more local’ or ‘more global’; rather, its effects are influenced by stimulus-driven 
factors which determine local-global salience. 
 
In the present experiments we used the FLT to provide a counterbalance to previous 
work in which the effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing was explored using 
hierarchical patterns (Experiments 1-7; Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012). We chose the FLT 
to do this as it is a selective-attention task in which local or global information has to be 
selected whilst ignoring information at the other level (in the absolute and relative tasks, 
respectively). Specifically, we aligned the absolute task with local-selection tasks and 
the relative task with global-selection tasks in the selective-attention hierarchical-
patterns paradigm. In Experiments 9-11, we provided evidence to suggest that cognitive 
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load affects selection of hierarchical information in the FLT in the same way that it 
affects selection of local and global information in hierarchical patterns. In Experiments 
9 and 10, participants performed the original version of the FLT under low and high 
cognitive load. Global salience of these stimuli was strong – as evidenced by more 
accurate performance on the relative task than the absolute task – and cognitive load 
made it more difficult to ignore irrelevant global structure while performing a local-
selection task (the ‘absolute task’). In Experiment 11, we detached the line from the 
frame and demonstrated that local salience became stronger than global salience. 
Critically, we demonstrated that cognitive load impairs performance on the relative task, 
consistent with cognitive load making it more difficult to ignore the absolute length of 
the salient local element (when integrating it into its global context in the relative task). 
This is in line with our findings from the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task in 
Experiment 7, where we demonstrated that cognitive load makes it more difficult to 
ignore salient local information when performing a global-selection task.     
 
Importantly, in the present chapter we were successful in manipulating global salience in 
a stimulus viewed for an unlimited duration. Real-world vision does not result from a 
series of briefly presented stimuli and in the experiments presented in this chapter we 
have shown that closed and connected stimuli (as in the connected the FLT) can have 
strong global salience at unlimited exposure durations when the line element is 
connected to the frame; as soon as the line is disconnected from the frame, however, the 
local line element becomes more salient than its global context. Thus, it was 
manipulation of the relationship between individual elements and their place in the 
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whole that affected global salience, rather than exposure duration per se. This 
demonstrates that unlimited exposure durations do not always enhance local salience 
under high cognitive load, contrary to the findings reported in previous experiments 
using hierarchical patterns (Experiments 2 and 3). 
 
By manipulating the relationship between the (local) line and (global) frame it is 
possible to create two stimuli with identical local elements which vary only in the extent 
to which the line is related to the global context. In the connected FLT (utilised in 
Experiments 8, 9 and 10) the line is connected to the frame; the fact that performance on 
the relative task is typically better than on the absolute task is consistent with global 
salience being stronger than local salience. As the line is an integral part of the overall 
whole (Pomerantz & Garner, 1973), cognitive load impairs selection of the local line 
element. Disconnecting the line from its strong global context is effortful and thus high 
cognitive load impairs performance on a task of local selection (the absolute task). 
However, when the line is detached from the frame, participants now find the relative 
task more difficult than the absolute task (Experiment 11) and it becomes cognitively 
demanding to integrate the line into its global context (Kimchi, 1998, 2000) and thus 
performance on a task of global selection (the relative task) is impaired under high 
cognitive load. 
 
Kitayama et al. (2003) developed the FLT as a way to test the assumption that an 
individual’s culture shapes the way in which they process the visual world, suggesting 
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that some cultures foster more holistic or global ways of processing while others more 
analytic or local. They invoked the more analytic and holistic cognitive styles of 
‘Westerners’ and ‘East Asians’ respectively to explain superior performance on the 
absolute task compared to the relative task in Westerners, and superior performance on 
the relative task compared to the absolute in East Asians. Our participants were either 
students at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK, or employees of the Science 
Museum, London, UK, and all lived in London, UK. Although they were of mixed 
ethnic and cultural origin, we classed our participants as Western and as such would be 
presumed to perform better on the absolute task than the relative task. However, in 
Experiments 8, 9, and 10, where the line was attached to the surrounding frame, we 
failed to replicate Kitayama et al.’s (2003) findings that the local task was performed 
better than the relative task. Indeed, across of all the connected FLT studies reported in 
this chapter, our participants were better at the relative task than the absolute task. It is 
possible that classifying individuals as ‘Western’ simply because they reside in London, 
UK, is ignoring the influence that cultural background could have on hierarchical 
processing (although both Kitayama et al., 2003, and Caparos et al., 2012, have shown 
that host culture and environment respectively can influence local-global processing 
style). However, our participants’ superior performance in the relative over the absolute 
task also supports the assertion that, regardless of cognitive load, performance will 
always be more accurate when there is a visible frame of reference (Zhou et al., 2008) 
and that selection of local elements is more difficult when they form part of a 
configuration compared to when they are presented in isolation (Pomerantz & Garner, 
1973).  
198 
 
 
 
 
Our data provide more information about the FLT more generally. Kitayama et al. 
(2003) stated that “the FLT is specifically designed to assess both the ability to 
incorporate and the ability to ignore contextual information within a single domain that 
is arguably nonsocial” (p. 202); however, the present research has suggested that the 
original FLT measures “the ability to incorporate and the ability to ignore contextual 
information” when global salience is strong. In Experiments 8-10, we showed that our 
participants were better at incorporating the local line into its global context on the 
relative task than they were at isolating the line element from its surrounding frame in 
the absolute task. However, when we disconnected the line from the frame in 
Experiment 11, we saw that our participants were better at copying the line in isolation 
than they were at integrating it into its context. This is further evidence to suggest that 
measures of hierarchical processing need to be considered in the light of the relative 
salience of local detail and global structure. 
 
If cognitive load affects the ability to isolate local detail from salient global 
environments then it suggests that cognitive load could impair performance on other 
tasks of hierarchical processing, such as the embedded figures test (EFT; Witkin, 
Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). In the EFT, participants are required to find a small part 
which is embedded in a whole figure. Success on this task depends on the ability to dis-
embed the part from its strong global context; the findings from the present study 
suggest that cognitive load may make it more difficult to ignore salient holistic 
properties and may make it more difficult to dis-embed the part from its global context. 
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Thus, cognitive load may make it more difficult to isolate the ‘trees’ from the ‘forest’, if 
the tree is deeply embedded in the forest.   
 
In the present chapter, we have presented a series of experiments which demonstrate that 
the effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing is influenced by the relative 
salience of local and global information. Importantly, we have shown this in stimuli 
which were presented for an unlimited exposure duration. Our next – and final – study 
will demonstrate that cognitive load can potentially make the world more confusing if 
salient yet irrelevant contextual/holistic information is incompatible with local detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 - GRAPHIC CONSTRUCTION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we presented a series of experiments to demonstrate that the 
effect of cognitive load on the selection of hierarchical information is influenced by 
stimulus-driven factors that affect local-global salience. We explored the generalisability 
of Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) finding that cognitive load enhances global 
processing; specifically, we wanted to show that cognitive load does not always make 
processing more global. We did indeed show that high cognitive load increases 
interference from irrelevant local information on a global-selection task when local 
salience is stronger than global salience (Experiments 7 and 11). We also provided 
further evidence to show that cognitive load can increase interference from irrelevant 
global information on a local-selection task when global salience is strong (Ahmed & de 
Fockert, 2012; Experiments 9 and 10). These findings suggest that the effect of cognitive 
load on hierarchical processing is influenced by the physical properties of the 
environment. In Experiments 9 and 10 (presented in Chapter 5), we presented evidence 
to suggest that connectedness is a strong determinant of local-global salience and that 
cognitive load increases interference from global information when local elements are 
connected and increases interference from local information when elements are 
disconnected. The local elements in real-world objects are often connected (Navon, 
2003) and thus global salience should be stronger than local salience when viewing 
conditions are favourable. There are times, however, when viewing conditions are sub-
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optimal – when objects are partially occluded, or in poor lighting – and on these 
occasions strong global salience might also be confusing. In the present chapter we 
present a single experiment to again show that cognitive load can increase interference 
from salient global information on a local selection task, but use stimuli in which the 
global structure is incompatible with the local elements. We explore the effect that 
cognitive load has on processing of 2D representations of 3D objects and use a graphic 
construction (copying) task to show that cognitive load can impair selection of local 
detail in times when global structure is salient and confusing. 
 
We chose to utilise a copying task to investigate this assumption as, when copying an 
object, a decision must be made as to how the global picture should be segmented into 
parts for copying (van Sommers, 1989). Van Sommers calls this chunking and suggests 
that it operates in a hierarchical fashion; specifically, major global components are 
copied before chunks lower down the hierarchy and at the bottom of the hierarchy are 
the most local details. Copying is a complex cognitive operation that has been said to 
depend on the interplay between the perceptual system and a graphic production system; 
thus, when the output process begins, the individual’s internal representation of the 
picture must be graphically reproduced. The fact that graphic construction – or copying 
– is a hierarchical process suggests that copying tasks could allow exploration of the 
effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing. Specifically, cognitive load should 
make it harder to focus on local detail if the global structure is particularly salient, which 
is likely in the case of connected objects. Much of our interaction with the world takes 
place with graphically presented information, either on paper or on a screen. Cognitive 
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load – which can also be induced by cognitive demands associated with the material on 
the paper in front of us (Leutner, Leopold & Sumfleth, 2009) – could hinder our 
understanding of visual materials. 
 
Our findings from Experiments 9 and 10, as well as the findings of Ahmed and de 
Fockert (2012), have shown that cognitive load makes it more difficult to ignore 
irrelevant-yet-salient global information. Thus, in a copying task, if the global structure 
is incompatible with the local detail then chunking the global structure into constituent 
parts for copying should become more difficult and copying should be impaired. To 
investigate this assumption, we compared performance on a copying task in which the 
global structure was compatible with local detail, against performance on a copying task 
in which global structure was incompatible with local detail.  
 
We tested this idea by utilising a copying task in which participants have to reproduce 
both ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ figures. ‘Possible’ figures are (connected) 2D 
representations of 3D objects that can exist in 3D space. ‘Impossible’ figures, however, 
are (connected) 2D representations of 3D objects that cannot exist in 3D space (see 
Figure 35 for an example). One feature of objects defined by connectedness is that they 
allow us to address holistic (or configural) properties which result from the interaction 
between component parts (e.g., Garner, 1978; Kimchi, 1992, 1994) and combine to form 
something qualitatively different than just a sum of parts (e.g., Köhler, 1935). With 
holistic properties come emergent features (Pomerantz, Sager & Stoever, 1977), 
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properties that exist only as a relationship between individual elements and are absent 
when each part is presented in isolation. With impossible figures, the features that 
emerge from the interaction between local elements are confusing. For example, the 
middle prong in an impossible trident which emerges through the interaction between an 
oval connected to two straight lines (Figure 35) causes confusion for the perceiver when 
they try to reconcile it with the object it belongs to. Accordingly, the ability to 
perceptually isolate individual line elements and ignore the confusing global structure 
will make impossible objects less confusing.  
 
 
Figure 35. An example of a ‘possible’ (left) and ‘impossible’ (right) figure. The trident 
on the left can exist in 3D, whereas the figure on the right cannot. 
 
 
Evidence has shown that typically-developing individuals are slower to copy impossible 
figures than possible figures as they find it difficult to ignore the salient – and confusing 
– global whole (Mottron, Belleville & Ménard, 1999). Evidence to support this comes 
from the finding that autistic individuals, who have been shown to exhibit atypical 
hierarchical processing, find impossible figures no more difficult to copy than possible 
figures (Mottron et al., 1999). Individuals with autism are said to have a hierarchisation 
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deficit which describes the idea that they do not organise global structure and local detail 
‘hierarchically’; instead, they assign equal weight to local and global information 
(Mottron & Belleville, 1993). Mottron and Belleville (1993) described a case study of an 
autistic individual, EC, who showed an absence of hierarchical structuring of the visual 
world. Whereas – all else being equal – typical individuals are biased toward global 
structure, EC was impaired on a task of global selection and his performance was 
facilitated in a task in which success depended on the ability to ignore confusing 
contextual information. Mottron and Belleville suggested that levels of hierarchical 
information are processed independently in individuals with autism, that is, local 
information is processed separately from global information, rather than in the context of 
the global structure in which it is embedded. 
 
Whereas the hierarchisation deficit exhibited by autistic individuals means that they 
integrate component parts into a perceptual whole to a lesser extent than typical controls 
do, the opposite effect may be apparent for typical individuals under high cognitive load. 
Specifically, cognitive load should make it more difficult for typical individuals to copy 
impossible figures than possible figures as it should make it harder to ignore the 
confusing salient global structure. In contrast, as the global structure of possible figures 
is compatible with its local detail, we would not expect cognitive load to impair 
performance on a task in which possible figures are copied. In the present experiment we 
ran Mottron et al.’s (1999) possible- and impossible-figures task with a cognitive load 
manipulation. We predict that copying of impossible figures should be worse than 
copying of possible figures, regardless of cognitive load. However, participants under 
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high cognitive load should find it even more difficult to copy impossible figures than 
those under low cognitive load, as they should find it more difficult to ignore the 
confusing global whole when copying each local element.  
 
6.2 Experiment 12 
 
Impossible figures are named as such because they cannot exist in 3D space. 
Perceptually, the interrelations between the local elements produce emergent properties 
which are not concordant with the global whole, and thus confusion arises. As the local 
elements are connected and form a closed figure in both possible and impossible objects, 
global salience of impossible objects is likely to be strong. However, as the salient 
global structure of impossible objects is incompatible with its local detail then copying 
should be impaired, whereas the salient compatible global structure of possible objects 
should not impair copying. Thus, in the present experiment we predicted that cognitive 
load should make it more difficult to ignore the confusing global whole in impossible 
objects and copying performance should be disproportionately impaired for impossible 
compared to possible objects.   
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6.2.1 Method 
 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-six participants (mean age = 22.6 years; 24 females, 2 males) participated in the 
experiment and were all first-year-undergraduate psychology students at Goldsmiths, 
University of London, UK. Participation was rewarded with course credit. The study 
received ethical approval from the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at 
Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.     
 
6.2.1.2 Design 
A 2x4x2 mixed design was used. The repeated-measures independent variable was 
possibility of figure (possible vs. impossible). The independent-measures variable was 
cognitive load (low vs. high; remember one digit vs. remember six digits). Participants 
were alternately assigned to the low or high cognitive load conditions. The dependent 
variable was the time, in seconds, that it took to copy each figure.  
 
6.2.1.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
The stimulus set consisted of four possible figures and their impossible counterparts (see 
Figure 36 for the complete stimulus set). Stimuli were printed in black ink on pieces of 
white A4 paper and were positioned so that they were centred in the top half of the paper 
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in portrait mode. Impossible figures were the same size as their possible counterparts, 
with the exception that the relationship between the line elements was changed. The 
nature of the figures meant that they differed in size but all stimuli fitted within a 7 x 5 
cm imaginary box. Participants were to copy the figures in the space in the lower half of 
the page. For the digit task, digits were printed in black in on white card. For the low 
cognitive load manipulation the numbers 1-9 were printed on separate pieces of card 
(one card for each number). The numbers were shuffled for each trial and one was 
drawn randomly. For the high cognitive load manipulation six numbers from 1-9 were 
drawn, without replacement, using a program developed for a previous experiment. 40 
of these combinations were printed on white card and one six digit number was selected 
for each trial. 
 
6.2.1.4 Procedure 
Participants sat at a table in a well-lit room and were informed that they were to copy a 
series of line drawings whilst remembering digits. Participants were alternately assigned 
to either the low- or high-cognitive-load conditions; those in the low-cognitive-load 
condition were informed that they would perform the task whilst remembering one digit, 
and those in the high-cognitive-load condition were to perform the task whilst 
remembering six digits. Participants were informed that some of the shapes would seem 
confusing but that they should try to copy them as best they could. Faithful replications 
of the figures were not required, but it was stressed that copies should contain all of the 
features contained in the original drawing. There was no practice session.  
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For the test session, each trial ran as follows. Participants were presented with either one 
digit (low cognitive load) or six digits (high cognitive load) depending on which 
condition they had been assigned to. The digit(s) were presented on a piece of card for 
three seconds and were then removed. The experimenter then immediately placed a 
piece of paper in front of the participant in portrait mode; the original figure was printed 
in the middle of the top half of the page, and the participant was required to copy the 
figure beneath it in the (empty) lower half of the page. When participants were satisfied 
with their drawing they were required to write the digits that they had been remembering 
at the bottom of the page. As soon as the paper was in front of the participant, the 
experimenter started the stop watch; the stop watch was stopped when the participant 
had completed the drawing and started to write down the digit(s). The experimenter then 
removed the paper and proceeded to the next trial. There were eight unique figures (four 
possible figures and four impossible figures) and each was drawn at random and 
presented only once, totalling eight trials.  
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Figure 36. The stimulus set used in the present experiment. The figures on the left are 
the possible objects and the figures on the right are their impossible counterparts. 
Possible figures can be constructed in 3D, but impossible figures are impossible to 
construct in 3D. From the top, we refer to these figures as tridents, cuboids, triangles 
and rhomboids. These images are not to scale.  
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6.2.2 Results 
 
Participants were removed from the analysis if their copying time exceeded 120 s. No 
participants exceeded this threshold. Participants were also excluded from the analysis if 
they omitted components when copying the figures. All participants copied the figures 
accurately. Finally, participants were excluded from the analysis if they failed to recall 
the single digit in the low-cognitive-load condition or if the failed to recall at least five 
of the digits in the correct order in the high-cognitive-load condition. No participants fell 
below this threshold and so the data of all 26 participants were used for the final 
analysis.  
 
Data were entered into a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA, with possibility (possible vs. impossible) 
as the within-subjects factor and cognitive load (low vs. high) as the between-subjects 
factor. The time it took to copy each figure, in seconds, was the dependent variable.  
 
There was a significant main effect of possibility [F(1, 24) = 175.08, p < .001, 2 = .88]; 
participants copied possible figures (M = 21.09 s, SE = 1.22) far quicker than they 
copied impossible figures (M = 38.34 s, SE = 2.38). There was also a significant main 
effect of cognitive load [F(1, 24) = 6.14, p < .001, 2 = .2] which showed that 
participants under high cognitive load (M = 33.38 s, SE = 2.15) were slower overall at 
the copying task than were participants under low cognitive load (M = 20.91 s, SE = 
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1.15). Most importantly, the interaction between possibility and cognitive load was 
significant [F(1, 24) = 6.45, p < .05, 2 = .21; see Figure 37]. Follow-up t-tests which 
were Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons indicated that, whilst cognitive load 
had no significant effect on copying times of possible figures [p > .1], those under high 
cognitive load were significantly slower to copy impossible figures than those under low 
cognitive load [t(24) = -2.6, p < .05].  
 
 
 
Figure 37. Copying time (seconds) for possible and impossible figures under both low 
and high cognitive load (Experiment 12). Error bars represented standard errors of the 
mean.  
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Possible Impossible
C
o
p
y
in
g
 T
im
e
 (
s
) 
Possibility of figure 
Low cognitive load
High cognitive load
212 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Discussion of Chapter 6 
 
The present thesis has argued that the effect of cognitive load on the selection of 
hierarchical information will depend on the salience of the stimulus. If global 
information is salient, then cognitive load will make global information more difficult to 
ignore, whereas local information will be harder to ignore when local detail is most 
salient. In the present experiment we continued to explore the effect of cognitive load on 
processing of objects in which local detail and global structure are connected; 
specifically, we wanted to show that cognitive load might make the visual world more 
confusing if salient global information is incompatible with local detail. We 
demonstrated that cognitive load can make it more difficult to ignore confusing salient 
global information. In the present study, participants copied both ‘possible’ and 
‘impossible’ figures and the time taken to do this was recorded. We found that all 
participants were slower to copy the impossible figures than the possible figures. 
Crucially, we also showed that while cognitive load had no significant effect on the 
speed of copying of possible figures, individuals under high cognitive load were 
significantly slower than those under low cognitive load at copying impossible figures. 
This finding provides further evidence to suggest that cognitive load can impair 
performance on a local-selection task when global salience is strong.  
 
In the present experiment, we showed that high cognitive load not only impairs 
performance on a local-selection task when global salience is strong but also makes the 
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visual world more confusing, to the extent that understanding depends on isolating local 
detail from a salient, but confusing, global context. By their very definition, impossible 
objects are not ‘real-world’ stimuli – as they are impossible to construct in three 
dimensions – but they allow illustration of how cognitive load could make the visual 
world more difficult to understand in times of ambiguity. When the visual field is parsed 
into likely object candidates, the brain chooses the simplest interpretation (as 
exemplified in the Gestaltist’s ‘Law of Prägnanz’). Mostly, the arrangement of local 
detail is congruent with the global whole. However, there may be times when global 
structure is ambiguous, for example, when the visual input is degraded (in times of low 
light or shadow) or when the visual scene is particularly cluttered. In times such as these, 
the findings of the present experiment suggest that cognitive load may make it more 
difficult to resolve this ambiguity and isolation of local detail could be impaired.  
 
We have conceptualised the impossible figures task as a selective attention task, as 
participants are required to ignore the confusing global structure in order to efficiently 
copy the local detail. However, it is also possible that the impossible figures task could 
be used as a measure of perceptual bias. Van Sommers (1989) suggested that people 
copy the global aspects of a figure before the local detail; this can be aligned with the 
suggestion that, all else being equal, global information is prioritised over local 
information (e.g., Kimchi, 1992). The strong global salience of connected objects would 
make this possibility more likely. In the present experiment we simply timed how long 
each drawing took to complete. If we had also used a video camera to record each trial, 
we may have seen that cognitive load affected the likelihood that global structure is 
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copied before local detail. As cognitive load enhances the salience of local detail and 
reduces the salience of global structure (see Experiments 2 and 3, presented in Chapter 
2) it is possible that high cognitive load may make it more likely that participants will 
begin drawing local information before they draw global information.  
 
Indeed, alongside the possible/impossible-objects task, Mottron et al. (1999) ran a 
second copying task which could arguably be classed as a measure of perceptual bias. In 
this task, autistic and typical participants copied a series of objects. Whereas typical 
individuals tended to copy the most global aspects of the picture before filling in the 
details (e.g., Rey, 1959), autistic individuals copied relatively fewer global features and 
relatively more local features in the first part of the copying task in comparison to 
typical individuals, reflecting their locally-oriented processing style. It is interesting to 
consider what might happen if we were to run the object-copying task with participants 
under cognitive load. We would expect individuals under low cognitive load to perform 
like Mottron et al.’s (1999) typical individuals and copy the global aspects of the figures 
before the details. However, as cognitive load reduced the salience of global information 
and increased the salience of local information, it could be that high cognitive load 
would reduce the number of global properties that were copied in the first stages of the 
drawing and may encourage participants to copy more local details in the initial part of 
the copying task. This is an intriguing suggestion and raises the possibility that copying 
tasks could serve as a measure of both attentional selection and of perceptual bias.  
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In conclusion, in the present chapter we have provided evidence to suggest that 
cognitive load makes the hierarchical visual world more confusing when the isolation of 
local detail is required to resolve ambiguity. More broadly, the current experiment 
provides further evidence that cognitive load impairs local selection when global 
salience is strong.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN – GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present thesis explored the effect of high cognitive load on the processing of 
hierarchical information. Recently, it has been shown that high cognitive load improves 
global selection and impairs local selection; this has been interpreted as cognitive load 
causing a “shift towards global processing” (p. 1404; Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012). The 
present thesis probed in more depth the assumption that high cognitive load always 
causes a shift towards global processing. We distinguished between the effect of high 
cognitive load on perceptual bias (which describes how hierarchical information is 
prioritised; Chapter 2) and on attentional selection (which describes the facility for 
selecting the level of hierarchical information relevant to the task at hand; Chapters 3, 4, 
5 and 6). We also explored the effect that stimulus-driven determinants of local-global 
salience could have on the effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing. 
 
The main contribution of the present work is to show that cognitive load affects both 
perceptual bias and attentional selection and that its effects are exerted on these 
processes through separate mechanisms. High cognitive load affects perceptual bias by 
decreasing global salience, we suggest because the increased demands of coping with 
high cognitive load affect relative activation of the (local-dominant) left and (global-
dominant) right hemispheres. High cognitive load also affects cognitive-control 
processes involved in selection, making it more difficult to ignore irrelevant, yet salient, 
hierarchical information; if global information is more salient than local detail then high 
cognitive load will increase interference from irrelevant global information (on a local-
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selection task), whereas if local information is more salient than global structure then 
high cognitive load will increase interference from irrelevant local detail (on a global-
selection task). Thus, high cognitive load does not make people ‘more global’ or ‘more 
local’; instead, the effect of cognitive load depends on i) whether the task addresses bias 
or selection; and ii) the salience of local and global information.  
 
Below, we first summarise our findings that we presented across Chapters 2-6. We 
consider the separate effects of cognitive load on both perceptual bias and attentional 
selection and discuss the mechanisms through which cognitive load may exert its effects. 
We also consider how the effect of cognitive load on perceptual bias may feed into the 
effect of cognitive load on selection. We discuss the importance of stimulus-driven 
salience when considering the effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing and we 
consider how this must be taken into account when researching individual differences in 
hierarchical processing more generally. We also discuss the limitations of comparing 
performance on different measures of hierarchical processing. 
 
7.1 Overview of findings 
 
7.1.1 Local-global perceptual bias 
Chapter 2 addressed the effect of high cognitive load on perceptual bias. Specifically, we 
investigated whether high cognitive load would make participants more or less likely to 
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prioritise global structure over local detail. Participants performed a similarity-matching 
version of the hierarchical-patterns task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) whilst under low 
(remember one digit) or high (remember six digits) cognitive load. Our data showed that 
when exposure durations were unlimited participants were less likely to match patterns 
at the global level under high cognitive load in comparison to low cognitive load. Global 
salience was still determined by stimulus-driven factors to an extent, as global matching 
increased with pattern-density (see Figure 38). We appeal to a relative hemispheric 
activation account to explain our data (discussed later in this chapter). We conclude that 
high cognitive load reduces the global bias and enhances the salience of local elements.  
 
Interestingly, increased local salience was seen only when exposure durations were 
unlimited; when exposure durations were limited, cognitive load had no effect on global-
local matching. To explain this we invoke findings with hierarchical pattern stimuli 
showing that global information is most salient in the early stages of visual processing 
but decays over time (e.g., Paquet & Merikle, 1984). We suggest that the strong salience 
of global structure at limited exposure-durations masked the effect of cognitive load to 
reduce global bias, with the result that there was no observable effect of cognitive load 
at limited exposure-durations. However, the effect of cognitive load at unlimited 
exposures is important given that unlimited exposures are arguably more representative 
of real-world viewing conditions. We conclude that high cognitive load can make people 
more likely to see the ‘trees’ for the ‘forest’. 
 
219 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Schematic representation of how physical stimulus properties (goodness of 
form: perfect form = 1, no form = 0) and person-driven disposition (extent of global 
bias: complete global bias = 1, complete local bias = 0) interact to determine what is 
most ‘salient in the final percept’ (Kimchi, 1992, p 26). We have positioned our findings 
from Experiment 2 (unlimited exposures) in Chapter 2 as an example. Cognitive load 
determines where on the x axis the bias is positioned when exposures are unlimited; low 
cognitive load is positioned toward the global end while high cognitive load is towards 
the local end. Stimulus-driven factors determine positioning on the y axis. Global 
salience is determined by a combination of positioning on the x and y axes.  
 
 
7.1.2 Selection of hierarchical information  
In Chapter 3 onwards, we turned our attention to the effect that cognitive load might 
have on attentional selection of hierarchical information with a view to challenging 
Ahmed and de Fockert’s (2012) assertion that cognitive load should always facilitate 
global processing. We hypothesised that cognitive load should make it more difficult to 
ignore the most salient level of hierarchical information: if global salience is strong then 
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cognitive load should make it more difficult to ignore irrelevant global information on a 
local-selection task, whereas if local salience is strong (and global salience is weak) 
cognitive load should make it harder to ignore irrelevant local information on a global-
selection task (see Figure 39 for a schematic representation). We suggest that Ahmed 
and de Fockert only observed a “shift towards global processing” under cognitive load 
because they used hierarchical patterns with strong global salience. In Experiments 4-7 
(described in Chapters 3 and 4) we endeavoured to show that high cognitive load can 
cause a shift towards local processing when local salience in hierarchical patterns is 
strong.  
 
 
Figure 39. Schematic representation of how global salience determines efficiency of 
selection both a local and global selection task. As global salience increases, local 
salience decreases. Likewise, local salience increases as global salience decreases. 
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In Experiments 4 and 5, global salience was manipulated by varying exposure duration. 
Exposure duration was chosen because the findings from Experiments 1 and 2 had 
shown that global salience was stronger than local salience under high cognitive load at 
limited exposure durations (our patterns were matched at the global level ~60% of the 
time in Experiment 1) but that local salience was stronger than global salience under 
high cognitive load at unlimited exposure durations (~40% global matches). We ran a 
selective-attention version of the hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) using 
exposure duration as a manipulation of global salience, reasoning that high cognitive 
load should make it more difficult to ignore global information salient at limited 
exposure durations but should impair the ability to ignore local information salient at 
unlimited exposure durations. Thus, it was expected that cognitive load should increase 
interference from global information (on a local-selection task) at limited durations but 
increase interference from local information (on a global-selection task) at unlimited 
durations.  
 
A trend in the predicted direction was observed in Experiment 5 (described in Chapter 3) 
but this was not significant. It was reasoned that the unlimited exposure durations may 
not have been long enough to significantly increase salience of local detail over global 
structure, as participants responded much quicker to the ‘unlimited-exposure’ patterns in 
Experiment 5 (~650 ms) than they did in Experiment 2 (~1350 ms). This suggests that 
the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task, as a speeded-response task, does not 
lend itself well to manipulations of exposure duration. Instead, in Experiments 6 and 7 
(reported in Chapter 4) a limited-exposure version of the selective-attention hierarchical-
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patterns task was used and local salience was increased by manipulating the density of 
hierarchical patterns. Kimchi (1998, 2000) has suggested that very low density patterns 
are initially represented in terms of their local detail whereas high density patterns are 
initially represented in terms of their global structure. Furthermore, the findings from 
Experiments 1-3 replicated Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) observation that global salience 
decreases as the number and density of elements within a hierarchical pattern decreases. 
Thus, we ran two experiments, one with low-density hierarchical patterns (Experiment 
7) and one with medium-density patterns (Experiment 6; these were the same stimuli as 
those used in Experiments 4 and 5 where we had seen no effect of cognitive load on 
selection of hierarchical information) and expected cognitive load to increase 
interference from irrelevant local detail only in response to low-density patterns with 
strong local salience. 
 
In Experiments 6 and 7, we also changed how we manipulated cognitive load. In 
Experiments 1-5, cognitive load was imposed by having participants remember one (low 
cognitive load condition) or six (high cognitive load condition) digits. In Experiments 6 
and 7, however, we manipulated cognitive load through task-switching (e.g., Monsell, 
2003) as this allowed us to explore the effect of low and high cognitive load on the same 
participants within the same block of trials. This was to increase ecological validity and 
to avoid strategic confounds which can occur when a single task is performed for an 
entire block of trials.  
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In Experiment 7, it was found that low-density patterns had stronger local than global 
salience (even when presented for a limited duration) and that cognitive load (induced 
by task switching) significantly impaired global selection; specifically, cognitive load 
significantly increased interference from local elements on a global-selection task. When 
the same experiment was run with medium-density patterns (Experiment 6), however, 
there was no evidence to suggest that local salience was stronger than global salience 
and cognitive load did not asymmetrically increase interference on the local- and global-
selection tasks. It was concluded that high cognitive load can make it more difficult to 
ignore local detail when local salience is strong.   
 
Hierarchical patterns were used in Experiments 1-7 (in Chapters 2, 3 and 4) to address 
the effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing. However, hierarchical patterns 
lack certain grouping principles, such as connectedness, which are integral to the 
structure of real-world objects. By moving away from hierarchical patterns it was hoped 
that it would be possible to explore the effect of cognitive load on stimuli which are 
more akin to real-world objects. In Experiments 8-11 (reported in Chapter 5) the Framed 
Line Test (FLT; Kitayama et al., 2003) was used to explore whether the effect of 
cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information would remain if stimuli with 
different grouping principles were used. It was reasoned that while we would see a “shift 
towards global processing” (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012) if global salience was strong, 
we would also see a shift towards local processing if local salience was strong.  
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The FLT tests the ability to either isolate a local line element from the global frame that 
it is connected to (the absolute task), or integrate the line into the surrounding frame (the 
relative task). The grouping principle of connectedness suggests that the line and frame 
should be treated as a single entry-level unit and global salience should be very strong. 
Indeed, high cognitive load impaired performance on the absolute task (a task of local 
selection) and made it more difficult to isolate the line element from the frame 
(Experiments 9 and 10), a finding arguably analogous to that of Ahmed and de Fockert 
(2012). By disconnecting the line from the frame in Experiment 11, however, local 
salience was enhanced and cognitive load was shown to impair performance on the 
relative task (a task of global selection). This finding is arguably analogous to the 
finding in Experiment 7 with hierarchical patterns in the present thesis. We conclude 
that the effect of cognitive load on selection of hierarchical information is not restricted 
to hierarchical patterns but could be applicable to a wider range of hierarchical 
information. Whether cognitive load increases interference from local or global 
information – and thus whether cognitive load makes us more local or more global – 
depends on stimulus-driven factors that determine local-global salience. In hierarchical 
patterns, the findings from Experiments 1-7 (presented in Chapters 2-4) showed that 
these stimulus factors include exposure duration and pattern-density, while in the FLT, 
the findings presented in Experiments 8-11 (Chapter 5) showed that connectedness is 
important in modulating salience.  
 
The experiments presented in Chapters 4 and 5 showed that cognitive load can make it 
more difficult to ignore salient local information. However, as the majority of real-world 
225 
 
 
 
 
objects are defined by strong grouping principles such as connectedness (Navon, 2003) 
it is likely that global salience will be stronger than local salience in real-world objects 
under optimal viewing conditions and the most common effect of cognitive load, when 
attending to a discrete object, will be to increase interference from global structure when 
attending to local detail. In Chapter 6, we presented a final experiment (Experiment 12) 
to show that high cognitive load may cause confusion when the global form of an object 
is incompatible with its local detail. We had participants perform a copying task in 
which they copied both ‘possible’ figures (objects that can exist in 3D) and ‘impossible’ 
figures (objects that cannot exist in 3D) as quickly but as accurately as possible whilst 
under low or high cognitive load. Successful performance of the impossible-figures task 
requires that participants ignore the confusing (but salient) global form. We found that 
participants under high cognitive load were significantly slower to copy impossible 
figures than those under low cognitive load, whereas cognitive load had no effect on 
copying time of possible objects. We reasoned that high cognitive load made it more 
difficult to ignore the confusing global structure.  
 
The findings detailed in the present thesis have provided two key observations. We have 
shown that high cognitive load does not always benefit global processing (as was 
suggested by Ahmed and de Fockert, 2012) but that the effect of cognitive load on 
hierarchical processing depends on i) whether perceptual bias or attentional selection is 
involved; and ii) the salience of global and local information. Thus, cognitive load does 
not make people more global or more local, but rather cognitive load will interact with 
both task-demands and the relative salience of local and global information. In the 
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following sections, the mechanisms that could underlie the observed effects of cognitive 
load on perceptual bias and attentional selection, and the extent to which they interact in 
order to determine local and global salience and hierarchical processing, are discussed.  
 
7.2 Hierarchical perceptual bias and selective attention 
 
Hierarchical perceptual bias and attentional selection are often conflated. For example, 
in the cross-cultural literature, perceptual bias – indexed by the extent to which culture 
determines whether individuals are “attuned” (p. 201; Kitayama et al., 2003) to focal 
objects or contextual information – is presumed to also determine performance on 
attentional selection tasks; individuals who engage in holistic, interdependent cultures 
(such as East Asian cultures) have been shown to perform better on tasks of global 
selection than those who are engaged in cultures that are more analytic (such as Western 
cultures; e.g., Kitayama et al., 2003). While it makes intuitive sense that perceptual bias 
should also feed into selection, Caparos et al. (2013) have shown that bias does not 
always determine selection; the Himba, a remote population in Namibia, have a 
markedly local bias in comparison to Westerners but experience less interference on 
global- as well as local-selection tasks than do Westerners. Caparos et al. suggested that 
perceptual bias and attentional selection may be governed by separate mechanisms and 
specifically that performance on tasks of attentional selection may be governed by 
cognitive control.   
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The findings in the present thesis support the suggestion that perceptual bias and 
attentional selection are governed by separate mechanisms; the present findings not only 
lend support to the well-established assertion that cognitive control affects attentional 
selection and the ability to ignore salient distraction (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004) but also 
suggest that cognitive load could affect perceptual bias through affecting relative 
hemispheric activation. The left hemisphere is thought to be dominant for local 
information processing and the right hemisphere dominant for global information 
processing (e.g., Fink et al., 1996, 1997; Martinez et al., 1997; Van Kleeck, 1989). Thus, 
the activation of the left and right hemispheres in the resting state could determine the 
relative weight given to local and global information when approaching the world. 
Evidence has shown that activation of the right hemisphere is higher than of the left 
when participants are preparing to respond to visual information (e.g., Warm, Matthews 
& Parasuraman, 2009; Stroobant & Vingerhoets, 2000) and this could explain why 
participants exhibit a global bias under low cognitive load. As task-difficulty increases, 
right-hemisphere activation drops and hemispheric activation becomes bilaterally 
symmetrical (Helton et al., 2010). This suggests that the left-lateralised local mechanism 
becomes activated to the same extent as the right-lateralised global processing 
mechanism. We suggest that exactly this happens as cognitive load increases. In sum, 
we suggest that cognitive load alters the relative activation of the local-dominant left and 
global-dominant right hemispheres (see Figure 40), thereby reducing the global bias by 
reducing the extent to which the brain is likely to prioritise global structure over local 
detail. 
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Figure 40. Graphical representation of how cognitive load might affect hemispheric 
activation and how this might affect perceptual bias.  
 
A hemispheric-activation account provides a viable explanation for the findings of 
Experiments 1-3 (presented in Chapter 2) and suggests that cognitive load should always 
enhance local salience (and decrease global salience). Whether local detail is ultimately 
most “salient in the final percept” (p 26; Kimchi, 1992), however, is dependent on 
stimulus-driven factors which determine global salience, such as exposure duration or 
density in the case of hierarchical patterns. In the similarity-matching-paradigm, global 
salience reads out as the proportion of matches that are made to the global level of 
representation. The reader is referred to Figure 38, which uses our findings from the 
unlimited-exposure-duration similarity-matching task in Experiment 2 to illustrate how 
salience depends on both perceptual bias (that is, the likelihood that global information 
will be prioritised over local detail as it may be affected by relative hemispheric 
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activation) and the goodness of form of the stimulus (determined by stimulus density in 
this instance).  
 
In Figure 38, the x axis determines the preparedness of the brain to prioritise global 
structure over local detail. The likelihood that information will be represented in terms 
of its global structure increases as the scale moves towards ‘1’ and decreases as it moves 
towards ‘0’; equally, the likelihood that information will be interpreted according to its 
local detail decreases as the scale moves towards ‘1’ and increases as the scale moves 
towards ‘0’. Our findings from Experiments 2 and 3 (presented in Chapter 2) suggest 
that cognitive load makes it less likely that hierarchical information will be interpreted in 
terms of its global structure, so that perceptual bias is positioned towards ‘1’ under low 
cognitive load but moves towards the ‘0’ end of the scale under high cognitive load. The 
y axis denotes the goodness of form. In Experiments 1-3 it was shown that – regardless 
of cognitive load – global salience increased as pattern density increased and thus high-
density patterns will be positioned more towards ‘1’ than low-density patterns which 
will be positioned more towards ‘0’. For the FLT (presented in Chapter 5), positioning 
will be towards the top of the axis when the line is connected to the frame but towards 
the bottom when the line is disconnected from the frame. This reflects a stimulus-driven 
change in goodness of form while local-global bias remains constant. Our data are 
consistent with the suggestion that local-global salience is modulated by the point at 
which the person-driven bias and stimulus-driven form factors intersect.  
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The idea that local-global salience depends on a combination of person-driven factors 
(such as perceptual bias) and stimulus-driven factors that may affect local-global 
salience suggests that it is not possible to have an absolute measure of perceptual bias; 
instead, it is only possible to observe relative differences in the extent to which 
individuals prioritise global structure over local detail. We discussed this possibility in 
Chapter 2, where we suggested that use of the terms ‘global bias’ and ‘local bias’ should 
be avoided in absolute terms. This is especially important when comparing between-
group differences in perceptual bias, as whether the ‘trees’ are ultimately more salient 
than the ‘forest’ depends to an extent on stimulus-driven factors which affect global 
salience. Our findings presented in Chapter 2 illustrate that cognitive load reduces the 
likelihood that hierarchical information will be interpreted in terms of its global structure 
over its local detail, but it would be incorrect to assert that individuals under low 
cognitive load show a ‘global bias’ while individuals under high cognitive load show a 
‘local bias’. Instead, we can conclude that cognitive load makes it less likely that people 
see the ‘forest’ than the ‘trees’ by reducing the global bias; thus cognitive load reduces 
global salience, and enhances local salience, but whether local detail or global structure 
is most “salient in the final percept” (Kimchi, 1992)  is influenced by stimulus-driven 
factors which affects local-global salience. 
 
In Chapter 3, it was proposed that the effect of cognitive load on local-global salience 
through perceptual bias could also determine the effect of cognitive load on attentional 
selection. This is an important consideration as the idea that cognitive load makes it 
more difficult to ignore salient hierarchical information is central to the present thesis. In 
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Experiments 4 and 5, we explored the possibility that cognitive load could affect the 
perceptual bias by enhancing the salience of local detail and thus impair performance in 
a global-selection task. The stimuli that were used in Experiments 4 and 5 were dictated 
by our findings in Experiments 1 and 2; there, it was shown that global salience was 
stronger than local salience in medium-density patterns at limited exposure-durations 
under both low and high cognitive load, but at unlimited exposure-durations cognitive 
load reduced global salience so that local detail was more salient than global structure. 
Thus, under high cognitive load global salience should be stronger than local salience at 
limited exposures but local salience should be stronger than global salience at unlimited 
exposures. This being the case, we reasoned that high cognitive load, in comparison to 
low cognitive load, would increase interference from global information (on a local-
selection task) at limited exposures but would increase interference from local 
information (on a global-selection task) at unlimited exposures. We saw a trend in the 
predicted direction, although this was not statistically significant. 
 
We suggest that the stronger global salience of the FLT and the limited-exposure 
hierarchical patterns tasks (Experiments 4-10) masked the effect of cognitive load on 
perceptual bias. In the limited-exposure hierarchical-patterns task, the sudden onset of 
hierarchical patterns may have masked the effect of cognitive load to make perceptual 
bias less global. Equally, the FLT (Kitayama et al., 2003) has very strong global salience 
by virtue of the fact that the local detail is connected to the global context; in this 
instance, cognitive load may have reduced global perceptual bias and salience but it is 
likely that global structure was still far more salient than local detail, as evidenced by the 
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fact that the relative task was still easier to perform than the absolute under high 
cognitive load. Indeed, it is probably often the case that stimulus-driven factors which 
increase global salience are so strong that only those observers with an extremely low 
tendency to prioritise global information over local information would show stronger 
local than global salience. Brain damaged individuals would be an example of this; for 
instance, Behrmann and Kimchi (2003) reported a case of a visual agnostic patient (R. 
N.) who had great difficulty deriving the global whole of a hierarchical pattern while 
identification of local detail remained intact.  
 
The findings reported in Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 show that the extent of global 
salience in a measure of perceptual bias does not necessarily indicate whether a global or 
local advantage will be observed in a selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task. In 
Experiment 1, medium-density patterns were matched at the global level approximately 
60% of the time under both low and high cognitive load. However, when these same 
stimuli were used in a selective-attention task in Experiments 4 and 5 (using both 
limited- and unlimited-exposure versions of the task) they were responded to with a 
local advantage, meaning that responses were quicker to the local level than the global 
level and more interference was experienced from local detail (on a global-selection 
task) than from global structure (on a local-selection task). The latter findings imply that 
local salience was stronger than global salience which is at first sight hard to reconcile 
with the findings from the matching paradigm using the same stimuli. This could have 
been for several reasons. Sustained attention to global structure has been associated with 
increased right-hemisphere cognitive fatigue (Helton et al., 2009). This may have 
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decreased global salience and enhanced local salience, which was reflected in a local 
advantage. The selective-attention task was also likely more cognitively demanding than 
the similarity-matching paradigm and this may have imposed a further cognitive load 
which may have enhanced local salience. Finally, the selective-attention and similarity-
matching tasks also differed in the way in which patterns were presented. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, medium-density patterns were intermixed with low-density and 
high-density patterns. In Experiment 4 and 5, however, medium-density patterns were 
presented alone in a block. This could have affected global and local salience. Against 
this, however, when we ran a matching paradigm on medium-density patterns in 
isolation (not reported here) we found that the strength of global salience was the same 
as when medium-density patterns were intermixed with other densities in Experiment 2.  
 
The fact that patterns can be prioritised in terms of their global structure on a bias 
measure but selected more efficiently on the basis of their local detail is particularly 
problematic when making cross-experimental comparisons; by looking only at data from 
Experiments 1 and 4, it could have been concluded that participants had a global bias but 
a local advantage and therefore that perceptual bias does not necessarily indicate 
performance on a selection task. Thus, it is necessary to exercise caution when 
generalising local-global salience from a measure of perceptual bias to local-global 
salience in a selective-attention task. It may be that the findings from Experiments 1-5 
are only contradictory because global salience was not particularly strong in the 
medium-density hierarchical patterns used in those studies. When findings using stimuli 
with strong local salience are compared – such as the low-density stimuli in Experiments 
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1 and 7 – findings in bias and selection paradigms are more harmonious. Specifically, 
participants made approximately 45% global matches to low-density stimuli presented 
for a limited duration under high cognitive load in Experiment 1 (indicating that local 
salience was greater than global salience) and showed a local advantage to these same 
patterns when presented as part of a limited-exposure selection task under high cognitive 
load in Experiment 7. This shows that the extent to which measures of perceptual bias 
and attentional-selection converge is dependent in part on stimulus-driven factors that 
determine relative global and local salience.   
 
The findings reported in the present thesis illustrate the importance of accounting for 
stimulus-driven determinants of global salience when making cross-experimental 
comparisons about the relationship between perceptual bias and attentional selection. 
For example, comparing performance on a bias measure to performance on a selection 
task may be completely uninformative if the physical properties of the stimuli differ in 
any number of ways. If a person were to show a local bias on a measure of perceptual 
bias and a global advantage on a selection task this does not necessarily mean that a 
contradictory pattern in performance has been observed. Rather, it could just be that 
there was particularly strong stimulus-driven local salience in the bias measure and 
strong stimulus-driven global salience in the selection task. Thus, it is critical that 
differences between paradigms and the stimuli that they use are taken into account when 
making cross-experimental comparisons about hierarchical processing.  
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We have suggested that cognitive load affects local-global perceptual bias and 
attentional selection of hierarchical information through separate mechanisms; 
specifically, it may be that cognitive load affects perceptual bias by affecting relative 
hemispheric activation, while it affects selection by impairing cognitive control and 
making it more difficult to ignore salient hierarchical information. We now turn our 
attention to individual differences in cognitive load and cognitive control that could 
affect the processing of hierarchical information. In particular, it is important to 
distinguish between cognitive load – that is, demand being placed on cognitive resources 
– and working memory capacity, which indicates the amount of resource that an 
individual has available in the absence of cognitive load. 
 
7.3 Individual differences 
 
Throughout this thesis we have manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by 
imposing a cognitive load on perceivers while they perform a task of hierarchical 
processing. However, the availability of cognitive resources does not just depend on the 
presence or absence of cognitive load as there is also variation in the baseline amount of 
cognitive resources that an individual has at their disposal. This is also known as 
working memory capacity (WMC) and has been shown to underpin functions like 
working memory and to be closely related to the capacity for executive control (Engle & 
Kane, 2004; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota & Hambrick, 2010). Tasks such as 
the operation span, or OSPAN (Turner & Engle, 1989), provide an index of WMC. 
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Research with WMC tasks has shown that WMC varies from person-to-person and 
suggests that the availability of cognitive resources (and subsequently the ability to 
ignore behaviourally irrelevant information) is subject to individual differences; 
individuals with low WMC are less able to maintain task goals in working memory and 
are less able to handle response conflict than those with high WMC (Engle & Kane, 
2004; Kane & Engle, 2003), a finding which mirrors the effects of high and low 
cognitive load on task performance respectively (e.g., see de Fockert, 2013, for a 
review).  
 
Thus, this suggests that the amount of baseline cognitive resource that an individual has 
at their disposal (operationalised as WMC) could also affect how efficiently hierarchical 
information can be selected without interference from irrelevant hierarchical 
information. Throughout the present thesis we have suggested that cognitive load should 
make it more difficult to ignore the most salient level of hierarchical information as it 
depletes cognitive resources and impairs the ability to prioritise behaviourally relevant 
stimuli (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004); in line with this, individuals with low WMC – who 
have less cognitive resource available to them than those with high WMC – should find 
it harder than those with high WMC to select global information when the local level is 
salient, and harder to select local information when the global level is salient. Thus, we 
should see the effect of high and low cognitive load on processing of hierarchical 
information mirrored in those with low and high WMC respectively. However, we 
suggest that the change in perceptual bias with cognitive load reported in Experiments 2 
and 3 was due to increasing task difficulty and its effect on hemispheric activation, 
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rather than availability of cognitive resources per se and so it is unlikely that WMC 
should affect relative hemispheric activation. Thus, WMC should have no effect on 
perceptual bias. Indeed, we have data which suggest that participants with low and high 
WMC do not differ in their extent of global bias as measured by responses to 
hierarchical patterns on an unlimited-exposure similarity-matching task (see Figure 41). 
The fact that cognitive load has an effect on both perceptual bias and selection whereas 
availability of cognitive resource (operationalized through WMC) may only have an 
effect on selection is an important distinction to make, because cognitive load and WMC 
can otherwise read-out in identical ways. For example, individuals under high cognitive 
load and individuals with low WMC will perform a task of cognitive control more 
poorly than individuals under low cognitive load or those with high WMC (e.g., Lavie et 
al., 2004; Engle & Kane, 2004).    
 
Sometimes, however, individual differences in hierarchical processing may be due to 
individual differences in cognitive load rather than capacity. An example of this may be 
depression. There is evidence to suggest that clinical depression incurs a high cognitive 
load, as depressed individuals find it more difficult to direct cognitive resources to 
behaviourally-relevant stimuli and prevent task-irrelevant processing (Jones, Siegle, 
Muelly, Haggerty & Ghinassi, 2010). This may be due to increased rumination in 
depressed individuals (Beevers, 2005). Indeed, it has been suggested that depression in 
itself is akin to multi-tasking (Bredemeier, Berenbaum, Brockmole, Boot, Simons & 
Most, 2012) which, as was discussed in Chapter 4, is associated with a high cognitive 
load (Yeung & Monsell, 2003). Interestingly, individuals with high levels of depression 
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have been found to process hierarchical information differently to those with low levels 
of depression. It has been shown that increases in depression decrease the likelihood of 
making a global match in a similarity-matching task (Basso, Schefft, Ris & Dember, 
1996) which suggests that depressed individuals are less globally biased than their non-
depressed counterparts. Furthermore, in a selective-attention version of the hierarchical-
patterns task, de Fockert & Cooper (2013) showed that individuals with high levels of 
depression responded to both local and global information equally quickly, while 
individuals with low levels of depression were faster to respond to global structure than 
local detail. This again suggests that depression makes it less likely that global structure 
is prioritised over local detail.  
 
 
Figure 41. Proportion of global matches made to low, medium and high density 
hierarchical patterns as a function of WMC-Ospan (unreported data). 
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It is possible that the cognitive load associated with depression, whether through 
increased rumination (Beevers, 2005) or multitasking (Bredemeier et al., 2012), affects 
relative hemispheric activation and therefore reduce the likelihood that global structure 
will be prioritised over local detail. De Fockert and Cooper (2013) suggest that their 
findings show that the detail-oriented cognitive processing style of depressed individuals 
is also reflected in performance on a hierarchical patterns task. However, this account 
does not sit easily with the higher cognitive load of depressed individuals (compared to 
non-depressed individuals) which, according to Ahmed and de Fockert (2012), should 
cause a “shift towards global processing” and should increase interference from 
irrelevant global structure on a local-selection task and decrease interference from local 
detail on a global-selection task. This pattern of findings was not observed in de Fockert 
and Cooper and lends further support to our suggestion that cognitive load does not 
always make processing more global.  
 
Another example of a cognitive state that can impose a cognitive load is social power. 
This refers to the ability of an individual to “control their own outcomes” (p. 621; Fiske, 
1993). It has been suggested that the mental world of powerless individuals differs 
greatly from the powerful, so that they are hyper-vigilant in the face of uncertainty 
(Keltner et al., 2003) and are at the mercy of others (Galinsky et al., 2003). They have 
also been shown to have impaired executive functioning in comparison to powerful 
individuals (Smith et al., 2008) and to find it more difficult to ignore distracting 
information on an attentional orienting task (Slabu, Guinote & Wilkinson, 2013). Thus, 
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powerless individuals may approach the world in a hyper-vigilant state compared to the 
powerful and are also likely to be operating under higher cognitive load.  
 
Interestingly, a study exploring the effects of social power on hierarchical processing 
(Guinote, 2007) has provided evidence to suggest that powerless individuals are 
sometimes more local than powerful individuals but at other times are more global. In a 
series of experiments, Guinote (2007) ran both an unlimited-exposure selective-attention 
version of the hierarchical-patterns task (Navon, 1977) and the original version of the 
FLT (Kitayama et al., 2003) on participants who had been experimentally manipulated 
to feel either powerful or powerless. On the selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task 
it was found that powerless individuals were quicker to respond to local detail than 
global structure, while powerful individuals responded to both local and global 
information the same. This suggests that powerless individuals exhibited a local 
advantage on the selection task and implies that local information was more salient than 
global information for powerless individuals. However, when participants performed the 
FLT – a task with strong global salience – it was found that powerless individuals were 
better at the relative task than the absolute task, whereas the powerful performed both 
tasks equally well. This suggests that powerless participants found it more difficult to 
select local information than powerful participants and experienced more interference 
from the salient global structure, a pattern seemingly at odds with findings on the 
selective-attention hierarchical-patterns task.  
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Guinote (2007) explained this pattern in performance by suggesting that powerless 
individuals do not select between relevant and irrelevant information; instead, they 
process all information in the environment. This is in contrast to powerful individuals 
who more readily select relevant information at the expense of irrelevant information. In 
the FLT, Guinote suggested that powerless individuals were more likely to attend to the 
global context even when it was irrelevant (and thus performance deteriorated in the 
absolute task in comparison to powerful participants) and in the selective-attention 
hierarchical patterns task were more likely to attend to the local detail that comprised the 
global whole (thus responding quicker to local detail than global structure). However, in 
light of the findings in the present thesis we suggest that Guinote’s findings can be 
reinterpreted in terms of the effects of cognitive load on hemispheric activation and on 
cognitive control.  
 
Powerless individuals have been shown to be hyper vigilant (Keltner et al., 2003), a state 
which is associated with high right hemisphere activation (Duschek & Schandry, 2003; 
Helton et al., 2007; Hitchcock et al., 2003; Stronbant & Vingerhoets, 2000). Evidence to 
support this assertion comes from studies that have shown that participants primed with 
powerlessness have relatively higher right hemispheric activation than participants who 
are primed to feel powerful (Boksem, Smolders & Cremer, 2012) and that powerless 
individuals bias attention more to the left side of space in comparison to powerful 
individuals, a finding which is also indicative of higher right than left hemisphere 
activation (Wilkinson, Guinote, Weick, Molinari & Graham, 2010). Higher right 
hemispheric activation, however, should mean that powerless individuals show a global 
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advantage in a selective-attention hierarchical patterns task, as the right hemisphere is 
dominant for global information processing, but in Guinote’s (2007) study this was not 
the case; here, powerless participants were faster to respond to local detail than global 
structure. To explain this, we suggest that powerless individuals may be operating with 
elevated right hemisphere activation in the absence of task demands. When they are then 
required to perform a cognitively-demanding task, such as the selective-attention 
hierarchical-patterns task, hemispheric activation becomes bilateral (Helton et al., 2010) 
and local salience is enhanced. This would explain why Guinote’s (2007) powerless 
individuals were quicker than powerful individuals to respond to local detail than global 
structure in an unlimited-exposure selective-attention hierarchical patterns task. 
 
The impaired executive functioning associated with powerlessness (Smith et al., 2008) 
should then make it more difficult for powerless individuals to ignore salient local or 
global information. Guinote (2007) did not report interference scores on the selective-
attention hierarchical patterns task so we cannot examine whether powerlessness is 
associated with increased interference from salient information on this task; if this 
information were presented, however, in line with the arguments presented in this thesis 
we would predict that powerless individuals should experience more interference from 
irrelevant local detail on a global-selection task than do powerful participants. On the 
FLT, we do have this information. Whereas powerful participants performed the 
absolute and relative tasks equally well, powerless participants were significantly worse 
at the absolute task than they were at the relative task. These findings suggest that 
powerless participants are less able to ignore irrelevant salient global information than 
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the powerful. If powerless and powerful individuals were to perform a disconnected 
version of the FLT, as we did in Experiment 11 (reported in Chapter 5), we suggest that 
powerless individuals should now be worse at the relative task than the powerful. 
 
It is interesting to consider how powerful and powerless individuals may differ on a 
measure of perceptual bias, such as the similarity-matching hierarchical-patterns 
paradigm presented in a series of experiments in Chapter 2. The fact that powerless 
individuals show higher right hemisphere activation than powerful individuals (Boksem 
et al., 2012; Wilkinson et al., 2010) suggests that the powerless may have a stronger 
global bias than the powerful, as global information processing is lateralised to the right 
hemisphere. However, as the hyper-vigilance of powerless individuals means that right 
hemisphere activation is likely to be at ceiling, they will possibly be more affected by 
additional cognitive load than will powerful individuals. This means that a lower amount 
of cognitive load may be needed in order for hemispheric activation to become bilateral 
in powerless individuals in comparison to the powerful; indeed the very act of matching 
stimuli based on perceived local-global similarity (such as the similarity-matching 
paradigm; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) may be sufficient.  
 
The fact that vigilance more generally may interact with task difficulty to determine 
perceptual bias, and therefore local-global salience, is important as the need to remain 
vigilant is necessary in many diverse scenarios; notable examples are military settings 
(McBride, Merullo, Johnson, Banderet & Robinson, 2007), monitoring automated 
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machines (Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996), and baggage screening in airports (Hancock 
& Hart, 2002). If the task to be performed is cognitively demanding, this could affect 
relative hemispheric activation and enhance the salience of local information and reduce 
the salience of global information. Thus, any number of situations that require vigilance 
may also incur a cognitive load which may affect how hierarchical information is 
prioritised. This could mean that difficult vigilance tasks may make it more likely that 
individuals will be distracted by irrelevant local detail and may miss the ‘big picture’.  
 
The present section has considered the effect that individual differences in vigilance, 
cognitive load, and working memory capacity might have on both perceptual bias and on 
attentional selection. In experimental scenarios, the possibility that a multitude of 
individual differences could affect both perceptual bias and attentional selection of 
hierarchical information suggests that performance on hierarchical processing tasks 
could be driven in part by the characteristics of the participant sample. For example, if 
the experimental setting caused participants to become more vigilant then the associated 
cognitive load could produce a pattern in performance that would be different to 
performance in a more relaxed experimental setting. Furthermore, individual differences 
in baseline vigilance, for example, could affect performance between participants. 
Considering that any number of individual differences could have an effect on 
hierarchical processing, it is important to consider the extent to which individual 
differences in our own participant samples could have influenced performance on 
hierarchical processing tasks.  
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In Chapter 5 we discussed the extent to which culture has been shown to affect local-
global processing style (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2003). The majority of participants tested 
across all 12 experiments reported in the present thesis were either first-year psychology 
undergraduate students at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK or employed as Visitor 
Experience assistants at the Science Museum, London, UK. They were mainly young, 
were predominantly female, and for the purposes of the present research we classified 
these individual as ‘Westerners’ as they all lived in London, UK. That our participant 
samples were fairly homogenous is positive because it reduces the extent to which 
individual differences could influence task performance. However, by defining 
participants as ‘Western’ solely because they live in London, UK we could be ignoring 
potentially important individual cultural differences that could affect hierarchical 
processing. For example, participants may have recently moved to London from 
overseas and thus may only recently begun to engage in ‘Western’ culture. Research has 
suggested that being born into a certain culture does not solely determine hierarchical 
processing; second generation Asian-Australians have been shown to exhibit a strong 
global advantage which is more similar to East Asians living in Asia than their 
Caucasian-Australian counterparts (McKone et al., 2010). Indeed, differences in 
hierarchical processing have been shown even within cultures; for example, members of 
farming and fishing communities in Turkey’s Black Sea region exhibit a stronger global 
processing style compared to herders living in the same region (Uskul et al., 2008). 
Counter to this, however, is evidence that suggests that individuals that move to another 
country adopt the local-global processing style of the host culture (Kitayama et al., 
2003) and that even a single visit to an urban environment can be enough to change the 
extent to which global structure is prioritised over local detail (Caparos et al., 2012). 
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Thus, a multitude of cultural and environmental factors could influence person-driven 
salience of hierarchical information, and thus could influence the effect that cognitive 
load has on hierarchical processing. 
 
Aside from culture, it is likely that the ‘default setting’ with which observers approach 
visual information (Dale & Arnell, 2013) is determined by a host of individual 
differences. ‘Western’ individuals may be less global than ‘Eastern’ individuals; 
however, other factors within a culture such as vigilance, depression or social power 
could interact to determine exactly where the ‘default setting’ is placed. It is possible 
that the effect of certain individual differences on hierarchical processing could 
outweigh others. For example, although ‘Westerners’ are said to be more locally-biased 
than ‘Easterners’, it is possible to imagine a scenario where the hierarchical processing 
style of a hypervigilant ‘Easterner’ resembles that of a less-vigilant ‘Westerner’. This 
suggests that while it is important to account for individual differences when exploring 
the effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing, it might not be possible to control 
for all factors that could be affecting local-global processing. Furthermore, considering 
that cognitive load could interact with individual differences to determine hierarchical 
processing (see the example of powerlessness above), it is likely that the effect of 
cognitive load on local-global processing results from an interaction between many 
different individual differences.  
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The present section has considered the effect that individual differences such as 
vigilance, cognitive load, and working memory capacity might have on both perceptual 
bias and on attentional selection. It is important to state that individual differences in 
hierarchical processing should not automatically be equated with individual differences 
in cognitive load; however, our findings can be extrapolated to suggest that when 
individual differences in cognitive processing do incur a high cognitive load, differences 
in hierarchical processing should be observed. Indeed, it is possible that individual 
differences may be a stronger manipulation of cognitive load than the secondary digit-
span task often utilised in experimental situations. In the following section, we consider 
the effect that cognitive load could have on hierarchical processing in real-world 
scenarios.  
 
7.4 How might cognitive load affect real-world vision?  
 
Thinking beyond the laboratory, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that 
cognitive load may fundamentally impact how individuals process the hierarchical 
visual world. Humans are subjected to varying amounts of cognitive load. Whilst 
differences in cognitive load could be transitory, they could also be prolonged and could 
fundamentally alter how individuals perceive their environment, both in terms of how 
they approach the world (perceptual bias) and how well they can work with the 
hierarchical information in the environment (attentional selection). Cognitive load may 
not only decrease the tendency to see the ‘forest’ instead of the ‘trees’ but may also 
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make it more difficult to attend to global structure if local detail is particularly salient or 
more difficult to attend to local detail if global structure is particularly salient. 
 
One consequence of this may be to affect the understanding of graphical or written 
information, which is ubiquitous in the environment. Words are perceptual wholes and 
thus cognitive load could potentially affect how well words are understood. A 
phenomenon referred to as ‘orthographic satiation’ in Chinese characters (Cheng & Lan, 
2011; Cheng & Wu, 1994) and ‘Gestaltzerfall’ of Japanese kanji characters (Ninose & 
Gyoba, 1996, 2002) shows that prolonged viewing of these characters makes them more 
difficult to understand. For example, Ninose and Gyoba (1996) demonstrated that kanji 
characters could be recognised very quickly by experienced readers but after prolonged 
viewing (in the region of 25 s) an uncertainty about the orthographical correctness of the 
perceptual whole emerged. They suggested that kanji are initially represented within the 
visual system as perceptual wholes but that their structural cohesiveness is disrupted by 
prolonged viewing. The findings presented in this thesis have also shown that cognitive 
load affects the representation of hierarchical information, by reducing global salience 
and enhancing local salience (see Chapter 2). Thus, it is possible that cognitive load will 
enhance local salience in kanji – and perhaps words in other writing systems – by 
affecting hemispheric activation, which could ultimately make words more difficult to 
read.  
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The idea that cognitive load may make reading more difficult is problematic when we 
consider the fact that differences in situational factors related to reading, such as text 
difficulty or reading ability, can impose differences in cognitive load. For example, the 
task of learning to read is cognitively demanding and as such may disrupt the structural 
cohesiveness of words which is fundamental to reading. Additionally, individuals with 
dyslexia or those who are less skilled readers may experience a greater cognitive load 
when reading, which may negatively affect the representation of words as perceptual 
wholes and hinder the task of reading still further.  
 
Reading is just one example of a real-world scenario in which cognitive load could 
affect the processing of hierarchical information. Another real-world consequence of the 
effect of cognitive load on hierarchical processing could be its effect on face processing. 
Faces are represented holistically (e.g., Tanaka & Farah, 1993) and it has been shown 
that recognition of a previously-seen face is worse when recognition follows 
performance of a local-selection task and better when it follows performance of a global-
selection task (McCrae & Lewis, 2002). In a single experiment, McCrae and Lewis had 
participants view a 30 s video of a simulated robbery. Participants then performed either 
a local-selection hierarchical-patterns task, a global-selection hierarchical-patterns task, 
or an unrelated task as a control condition. In a subsequent facial-recognition test, it was 
found that participants who had performed the local-selection task performed worse than 
the control participants (30% vs. 60% accuracy respectively) whereas those who had 
performed the global-selection task performed better on the recognition test than the 
control participants (83% vs. 60% accuracy respectively). This finding suggests that face 
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recognition is improved as processing becomes more global. It is interesting to consider 
how cognitive load might affect face processing. Work in the present thesis has shown 
that cognitive load enhances local salience and reduces global salience; because faces 
are represented holistically (e.g., Tanaka & Farah, 1993), cognitive load could 
potentially impair face recognition by making it more difficult to represent faces as a 
whole. However, the holistic nature of faces means that they may have strong global 
salience; this being the case, the strong global salience of the face as a whole might 
mask the effect of cognitive load to reduce global salience. 
 
Ultimately, when interacting with the world humans are interacting with objects which 
exist in complex scenes rich in visual information. Sometimes the scene as a whole may 
be appreciated, while other times attention may need to be focused on individual objects 
(e.g., Treisman, 2006). Importantly, the contents of a scene cannot simply be divided 
into ‘global structure’ and ‘local detail’; rather, objects exist within nested hierarchies in 
which visual information may be classed as global structure in one scenario (i.e., a tree 
is a global structure which consists of local branches, leaves and a trunk) but as local 
detail in another (i.e., a tree is a local detail in the context of a forest). The work 
presented in this thesis suggests that the effect of cognitive load on scene processing 
should depend on the analysis that is required. If the scene as a whole is to be 
appreciated, then cognitive load might reduce global salience and enhance local salience 
(by affecting hierarchical perceptual bias) and weaken the relationship between objects 
in a scene. This might make it more likely that people will ‘miss the big picture’. 
However, if individual objects are of interest then the effect of cognitive load will 
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depend on the salience of the stimulus. As discrete objects tend to have strong global 
salience (Navon, 2003) then cognitive load may enhance the processing of global 
structure and impair the processing of local detail. The findings presented in this thesis 
should ultimately be extended to whole scenes. As cognitive load varies from both 
person-to-person, and can vary within an individual across time, exploring the effect that 
cognitive load has on scene perception could be of fundamental importance to 
establishing the effect that cognitive load could have on real-world vision.   
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
The present thesis explored the effect of cognitive load on processing of hierarchical 
information. Across a series of 12 experiments we showed that cognitive load does not 
always make people more global, as was suggested by Ahmed and de Fockert (2012), 
but rather the effect of cognitive load depends on i) whether the task is addressing 
perceptual bias or attentional selection, and ii) stimulus-driven factors which affect 
local-global salience. We have presented findings to show that cognitive load affects 
perceptual bias and makes it more likely that hierarchical information will be interpreted 
in terms of its local detail and less likely that information will be interpreted in terms of 
its global structure (Experiments 1-3, presented in Chapter 2). In Chapters 3-6, a series 
of experiments showed that the effect of cognitive load on attentional selection is 
influenced by stimulus-driven factors which affect local-global salience; cognitive load 
increases interference from local information on a global-selection task when local 
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salience is strong (Experiments 7 and 11) and increases interference from global 
information on a local-selection task when global salience is strong (Experiments 9, 10 
and 12). Our findings have provided further evidence to support the suggestion that 
perceptual bias and attentional selection operate through separate mechanisms (Caparos 
et al., 2013); we suggest that perceptual bias could be influenced by relative hemispheric 
activation, whereas selection of hierarchical information is governed by cognitive 
control. In conclusion, we suggest that cognitive load does not simply make people 
‘more local’ or ‘more global’ but that its effects depend on whether the task is 
addressing perceptual bias or attentional selection, as well as on stimulus-driven factors 
which affect local-global salience. 
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Appendix A: Stimuli used in the connected FLT 
 
 
1. Trial-type 1: 89 mm frame and line 
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2. Trial-type 1: 179 mm test frame 
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3. Trial-type 2: 102 mm frame and line 
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4. Trial-type 2: 153 mm test frame 
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5. Trial-type 3: 127 mm frame and line 
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6. Trial-type 3: 127 mm test frame 
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7. Trial-type 4: 153 mm frame and line  
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8. Trial-type 4: 102 mm test frame 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
282 
 
 
 
 
9. Trial-type 5: 179 mm frame and line 
 
 
283 
 
 
 
 
10. Trial-type 5: 89 mm test frame 
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Appendix B: Stimuli used in the disconnected FLT 
 
1. 89 mm frame and line 
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2. 179 mm test frame 
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3. 179 mm frame and line  
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4. 89 mm test frame 
 
 
